

## MIND

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PSYCHOLOGY AND PHILOSOPHY

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**I.—ALEXANDER CAMPBELL FRASER.**

1819-1914.

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THE death of Professor Campbell Fraser in his ninety-sixth year severs the last link which connected our British philosophy of to-day with its own origins in the thirties and forties of the preceding century—with Hamilton's attack on the Philosophy of the Unconditioned, Mill's early essays and the first edition of the *Logic*, and the trenchant idealism of Ferrier. Within the spacious limits of his life Fraser saw the rise and decline of Hamilton's influence, and watched the older English empiricism of Mill take on the larger outlines of Spencerian evolutionism; he had already been teaching philosophy for twenty years when the first writings of Stirling, Green, and Caird heralded the wave of Kantio-Hegelian idealism that swept over our universities in the second half of the nineteenth century; and after the floodtide of that movement in the nineties, the most recent phases of contemporary thought—pragmatism, realism, Bergsonism—still found him an interested reader and critic. Through all these changes of speculative atmosphere and philosophical idiom he held on his own way, taking little part as an active partisan in the more technical controversies of the schools, but pondering unceasingly the central mysteries of our being and communicating to many students the spirit of his own reverent quest. The *Philosophy of Theism*, in which he endeavoured to sum up the results of his lifelong meditation, has much of the breadth and simplicity of statement

which distinguish a personal deliverance from an academic argument.<sup>1</sup>

Alexander Campbell Fraser was the eldest son of the parish minister of Ardoch in Argyllshire, who had married the daughter of a neighbouring laird. He was thus a Celt both on the father's and the mother's side. Born at the manse on September 3, 1819, in the last year of the reign of George III., he was able towards the end of his life to say that he had lived under six British sovereigns. After a single session in Glasgow he entered the University of Edinburgh in 1834, where he heard Sir William Hamilton's inaugural lecture and was introduced to moral philosophy by John Wilson, better known as Christopher North. A little later he was a member of Hamilton's advanced class in metaphysics, and attended Dr. Chalmers's lectures on divinity in preparation for the ministry of the Church of Scotland. At the Disruption in 1843, Chalmers became the leader of the Free Church; and Fraser, following the example of his teacher as well as of his own father, joined the seceders, and was ordained in 1844 as minister of the Free Church at Cramond, a small country charge near Edinburgh. Two years later, the establishment of a Chair of Logic and Metaphysics in the Free Church theological college opened up to him the academic career to which his strong native bent and all his tastes adapted him. He held this position for ten years, till the death of Hamilton, in 1856, threw open the University professorship. He made a reputation from the first as a stimulating teacher, and during these years he also became known to wider circles as the editor of the *North British Review*.

Hamilton died in May, 1856, and the struggle for the Chair which he had made famous formed something of an episode in the domestic history of Scottish philosophy. Ferrier, then Professor at St. Andrews, was almost certainly at that time the most distinguished representative of metaphysics in Scotland. Eleven years older than Fraser, and the author of an important metaphysical work, he seemed marked out for the succession alike by the boldness of his speculations and the brilliance of his literary gifts. But Ferrier had sought out other masters than Reid and Stewart. He was understood to have drunk deep at German sources and, in his forcible style, he had

<sup>1</sup> This paragraph and some other parts of the introductory account of Fraser's life are taken from a biographical notice contributed to vol. vi. of the *Proceedings of the British Academy*, to which readers are referred for further information.

spoken very contemptuously of the Scottish philosophers whom Hamilton had edited and expounded. Orthodox suspicions were aroused, and Dr. John Cairns (who had the offer of the Chair himself, as he had had that of Moral Philosophy on Wilson's death four years previously) came forward with an *Examination of Ferrier's Theory of Knowing and Being*, which was largely instrumental in deciding the issue. Cairns was himself a metaphysician of considerable power, and his pamphlet undoubtedly touched real weaknesses in Ferrier's system; but it also exaggerated its supposed theological tendencies, and thus fanned the prejudices of the electors. Denominational influences were also brought to bear upon the Town Councillors, with whom the patronage of the Chair then rested. A lively war of pamphlets ensued, waged both in prose and verse. Prof. Aytoun mingled (or was believed to have mingled) in the fray with a skit in verse, *A Diverting History of John Cairns*. More serious combatants entered the lists on Ferrier's behalf; but Cairns returned to the charge with a second pamphlet, *The Scottish Philosophy, a Vindication and a Reply*, and on July 15 Fraser was elected by a majority of three to the Chair which he was to dignify for thirty-five years. After the election Ferrier delivered his soul in a 'statement' called *Scottish Philosophy, the Old and the New*, in which he vehemently repudiated the supposed Hegelian origin of his philosophy—claiming that it was 'Scottish to the very core, national in every fibre and articulation of its frame'—and denounced the procedure of the Town Council, inasmuch as, 'after the recent abolition of theological tests, they have arbitrarily imposed a philosophical test of the most exclusive character. It is well to know that a candidate for a philosophical chair in the University of Edinburgh need not now be a believer in Christ or a member of the Established Church, but he must be a believer in Dr. Reid and a pledged disciple of the Hamiltonian system of philosophy.' It is pleasant to be assured that this somewhat envenomed controversy did not affect the friendly relations which continued to subsist between the two candidates. Ferrier died as long ago as 1864, and at the distance of nearly sixty years from the controversy there is ground for the view that, if Fraser did not possess his rival's literary brilliance and incisive statement, there was more of human breadth and more staying power in his thinking than in the somewhat meagre results of Ferrier's demonstrative method. But the more immediate sequel of the appointment was not without its surface aspects of humour. His 'idealism' had been one of the

main counts against Ferrier, and Fraser soon afterwards laid the foundations of his wider reputation by his sympathetic exposition of the English idealism of Berkeley, which became central in his academic teaching for at least a quarter of a century.

Fraser taught in the University of Edinburgh for thirty-five years, and, by common consent of those most capable of judging, left the reputation of a great teacher. He was a great teacher not exactly in the sense of a dominating personality—for I do not think that he made much impression on the average undergraduate, apt to be indifferent to philosophy—still less as a man with a dogmatic message which he impressed upon his pupils, but because he possessed a singular power of awakening and stimulating the philosophic instinct in his best students. Doubts and questions were presented to them rather than solutions, but ways were pointed out along which solutions might be found. The mystery of the world was emphasised, but faith in an intellectual and moral harmony was kept alive; and so there was created in the old classroom an intellectual eagerness combined with elevated feeling which seemed to make it an ideal home of the philosophical spirit. Like Socrates, Fraser was fond of declaring himself 'a seeker,' and it was because his students divined in him a fellow-seeker that he was so good a guide to their opening minds. I cannot do better than quote from the warm address presented to him by his old honours students on the occasion of his academic jubilee in 1906. 'You never sought,' the signatories say, 'to impose upon our minds a dogmatic system of belief, but with a deeper trust in the eventual harmony of the results of all serious and independent thinking, sought to stimulate us to a constant individual effort in the pursuit of truth. And while yourself a scholar whose work upon the classics of English philosophy has achieved a world-wide reputation, you never failed to set before us a higher ideal of philosophical study than that of mere scholarship and research—the ideal which we saw exemplified in your own work as a thinker and teacher, of ever-renewed and unwearying meditation on the questions that are most ultimate and fundamental in the spiritual life of humanity.' It was the natural consequence of such an influence that the Edinburgh class of Logic and Metaphysics became a training-ground of philosophical thinkers who went out to fill Chairs in most of the universities of the English-speaking world.

The earlier years of Fraser's tenure of the Chair were chiefly occupied by the studies which issued in the great

edition of Berkeley's *Works*, and of his *Life and Letters* in 1871, supplemented by the charming presentment of his life and thought contributed to Blackwood's 'Philosophical Classics' in 1881. By his work on Berkeley Fraser made his name a household word wherever English philosophy is studied, and in spite of the larger range and more independent grasp of some of his later work, it was to the end as the editor of Berkeley that he was most widely known. From Berkeley he was naturally led back to a closer study of Locke, the fruits of which appeared successively in the article 'Locke,' contributed to the ninth edition of the *Encyclopædia Britannica*, in a volume on Locke, a companion to his Berkeley in Blackwood's series, and an elaborate edition of the *Essay*, with prologomena and notes, published in 1894, three years after his retirement. Two years later his appointment as Gifford Lecturer in his old university enabled him to gather up the results of his life-long meditation in two volumes on *The Philosophy of Theism*; and in 1904 he published, under the title *Biographia Philosophica*, an interesting retrospect of his long life, in which personal reminiscence is charmingly combined with a meditative re-statement of his philosophical results. Still later, in an article in the *Hibbert Journal* of January, 1907, characteristically entitled 'Our Final Venture,' and in a little volume on *Berkeley and Spiritual Realism*, contributed to Constable's series of 'Philosophers Ancient and Modern,' he returned to present in short compass his fundamental positions. He was in his ninety-second year when he laid down his pen. During the last three or four years of his life there was of necessity an increasing physical feebleness, but his mental faculties remained unimpaired to the end, and his bodily senses were still as keen as those of a young man. He passed away painlessly and almost imperceptibly on the morning of 2nd December, 1914.<sup>1</sup>

<sup>1</sup>For convenience of reference a complete list of his philosophical publications is appended:—

*Inaugural Lecture at the opening of the Class of Logic and Metaphysics in the New College, Edinburgh*, 10th December, 1846. (Reprinted from *Lowe's Edinburgh Magazine*, 1847.)

*Introductory Lecture on Logic and Metaphysics*, 8th November, 1850 (printed in a volume commemorating the *Inauguration of the New College of the Free Church, Edinburgh*, 1851).

*Essays in Philosophy*, published in 1856, consisting of six articles contributed to the *North British Review* between 1846 and 1855.

*Rational Philosophy in History and in System*, the expansion of an introductory lecture to his course, published in 1858.

Article on 'Recent British Logicians' (*North British Review*, 1860).

As we have seen, Fraser's adhesion, or presumed adhesion, to the national way of thinking was in some degree his passport to the Edinburgh Chair. But the polemical emphasis of Scottish philosophy was different in the time of Hamilton from what it had been in the days of Reid. Hamilton, it is true, had incorporated in his teaching the Natural Realism of the founder of the school—combined with a Kantian phenomenalism and other modifications whose consistency with the original doctrine is more than questionable—but his own reputation was mainly based on his challenge to Cousin, and through him to German Absolutism. This was, therefore, the aspect of Scottish Philosophy which was most in people's minds, and it was a suspicion of the German, more particularly the Hegelian, *virus* which proved fatal to Ferrier's candidature. Vehemently as he repudiated a foreign origin for his thought, he at least confessed to having "read most of Hegel's works again and

'The Real World of Berkeley' (*Macmillan's Magazine*, 1862).

'M. Saisset and Spinoza' (*North British Review*, 1863).

'Berkeley's Theory of Vision' (*North British Review*, 1864).

'Archbishop Whately and the Restoration of the Study of Logic' (an Introductory Lecture, 1864).

'Mill's Examination of Sir W. Hamilton's Philosophy' (*North British Review*, 1865).

'Isaac Taylor' (*Macmillan's Magazine*, 1865).

'The Philosophical Life of Professor Ferrier' (*Macmillan's Magazine*, 1868).

Clarendon Press edition of Berkeley's *Works* (3 vols.), and *Life and Letters* (1 vol.), 1871. (Second edition of the *Works*, in four volumes, with new biographical and critical Introduction, 1901.)

'Biographical Notice of J. S. Mill' in the *Proceedings of the Royal Society of Edinburgh*, 1873.

*Selections from Berkeley*, with Introduction and Notes, 1874 (6th edition, 1910).

*Berkeley* in Blackwood's 'Philosophical Classics,' 1881 (new edition, 1899).

Article on 'Locke' in *Encyclopædia Britannica*, 1882.

'Philosophical Development' (*MIND*, 1890).

*Locke* in Blackwood's *Philosophical Classics*, 1890.

Clarendon Press edition of *Locke's Essay* with Prologomena and Notes (2 vols.), 1894.

*Philosophy of Theism* (Gifford Lectures) (2 vols.), 1895 and 1896. (Second edition in a single volume, 1899.)

'Philosophical Faith,' in *Philosophical Review*, November, 1896. (This is a reprint of Lecture V. in the second Gifford volume.)

*Thomas Reid*, in 'Famous Scots' series, 1898.

*Biographia Philosophica*, 1904.

'John Locke as a Factor in Modern Thought' (for the bicentenary of Locke's death in 1904), in *Proceedings of the British Academy*, vol. i.

'Our Final Venture' (*Hibbert Journal*, January, 1907).

*Berkeley and Spiritual Realism*, in 'Philosophers, Ancient and Modern,' 1910.

again"; and so much trafficking with the enemy may have seemed to many incompatible with innocence. Fraser, on the other hand, received the benediction of Cousin as a faithful pupil of his illustrious master "who would maintain the integrity of the Scottish Philosophy before the European public" and prevent its yielding ground "à quelque importation de la mauvaise métaphysique de l'Allemagne dégénérée". Cousin in his maturer years had largely abandoned the absolutist speculations of his youth, and felt himself much in sympathy with *le bon sens* of the Scottish philosophers and the assiduous study of human nature in which their thinking is rooted.<sup>1</sup> It becomes of interest, then, to inquire in what relation Fraser stands to the doctrines historically associated with "Scottish Philosophy". Is he to be regarded as the inheritor and transmitter of the doctrines of Reid and Hamilton? Or, if the specific doctrines of his predecessors receive little prominence either in his earlier or his later writings, is there still that in his philosophical attitude and conclusions which marks him out as the genuine heir of the national tradition?

Certainly, if we look at his early essays, or at the account which he gives in the *Biographia Philosophica* of his mental development, there is little trace of special interest in the question of Natural Realism which is usually treated as the cardinal doctrine of this school. There is, I should almost say, an inadequate appreciation of the originality and significance of Reid's attack on 'the ideal theory'. He does, indeed, on occasion (*e.g.* in his critical essay on Ferrier) intimate his adhesion to Hamilton's doctrine of a direct knowledge of the primary qualities of matter;<sup>2</sup> but in the essay on "Hamilton and Reid," where the subject is more fully discussed, he gives it as his opinion that "the theory of perception maintained by Sir William Hamilton is not likely to exhaust discussion. . . . We are inclined to expect an increase rather than an abatement of the intellectual gladiatorship which has been associated with the theory of our knowledge of matter, as the result of a more diffused acquaintance with the assumptions and arguments of these Dissertations."<sup>3</sup> And in the earlier essay on 'The Life and Philosophy

<sup>1</sup> Preface to the third edition of Cousin's *Philosophie Ecossaise*, published in 1857.

<sup>2</sup> *Essays in Philosophy*, 338-339. And again in a note on p. 204, in drawing a distinction between Reason and Reasoning, he says, "In 'perception' and 'self-consciousness' Reason recognises Matter and our own Personality as real".

<sup>3</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 97.

of Leibniz,' after comparing Leibniz and Berkeley, as "two philosophers whose speculations conducted them to immaterialism," he expressly leaves the dispute between 'the national philosophy of Scotland' and the idealistic hypotheses it has had to encounter, as "at least an open question in metaphysical science".<sup>1</sup> Moreover, in the very act of defending the direct apprehension of objects as extended, he again brings "the philosophy of Scotland into relation with the philosophy of Berkeley," and quotes Sir William Hamilton's own authority for "the general approximation of thorough-going Realism and thorough-going Idealism."<sup>2</sup> He says, indeed, in the *Biographia*, "At one time I was disposed to regard the difference here between Berkeley and Hamilton as more in words than in the implications of their thought".<sup>3</sup> And in the important essay which he contributed, in 1865, to the controversy called forth by the appearance of Mill's *Examination of Hamilton*, he deliberately sought to reconcile Hamilton's very peculiar variety of Natural Realism with Mill's doctrine of 'permanent possibilities,' and both with the divine sense-symbolism of Berkeley. "Men cannot act, cannot live, without assuming an external world, in some conception of the term 'external'. It is the business of the philosopher to explain what this conception ought to be. For ourselves [he concludes], we can conceive only—(1) an externality to our present and transient experience in our own possible experience past and future; and (2) an externality to our own conscious experience in the contemporaneous, as well as in the past or future experience of other minds."<sup>4</sup> No wonder that Mill, in replying to his multitudinous critics, welcomed Fraser as an ally. "The view I take of externality, in the sense in which I acknowledge it as real," he comments on this passage, "could not be more accurately expressed than in Professor Fraser's words."<sup>5</sup> Looking back upon this incident long afterwards, in the *Biographia*, Fraser was inclined to think that, in this attempted eirenicon, sympathy had made him stretch conciliation too far.<sup>6</sup> But it is at least obvious, from the quotations given, that it is not as a stalwart upholder of Natural Realism that Fraser is to be ranked among the Scottish philosophers. The attitude of mind revealed in these papers, extending over a period of twenty years, makes it plain that the question possessed no central importance for his thought. He was, indeed, pre-

<sup>1</sup> *Essays*, pp. 48-50.<sup>2</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 338.<sup>3</sup> *Biographia*, p. 61.<sup>4</sup> *North British Review*, vol. xliii., p. 26.<sup>5</sup> *Examination*, third edition, p. 233, note. Cf. Preface, vii.<sup>6</sup> *Biographia*, p. 175.

occupied from first to last with the ultimate questions of metaphysics and theology—the first two problems of the Kantian triad, the problem of God and the problem of man's responsible agency.

This is borne out by what we glean from the *Biographia* about the course of his early mental development. His earliest metaphysical ponderings turned on the question of causation, forced upon his childish mind by the popular doctrine of God as the origivative Cause of the universe; and Timothy Dwight's lectures on natural theology proved more suggestive of doubts than helpful towards a solution of difficulties. When his philosophical bent asserted itself more definitely a few years later, during his college course, it was Thomas Brown's lucid *Inquiry into the Relation of Cause and Effect*, read in the summer of 1836, which attracted his youthful allegiance, and his own first attempt at philosophical writing was an essay on the same subject, read before one of the students' societies in the spring of 1838. Now Brown, although usually enumerated in the Scottish succession between Reid and Hamilton, is more properly to be regarded as a link between Hume and the Mills. His view of causation is simply invariable antecedence as learned from experience or impressed on us by association. Brown's Essay presents Hume's doctrine in a less compromising setting without drawing Hume's sceptical conclusions; and Hume's doctrine, again, it must be remembered, is just Berkeley's theory of sign and thing signified *minus* Berkeley's theistic background. To Berkeley the causal relation between phenomena is a beneficent arrangement of the Deity for the guidance of our lives; it is part of a divine sense-symbolism whereby one phenomenon suggests another. But when we look at the matter from the subjective side and consider the process by which this language is learned, Berkeley, like Hume, refers us *simpliciter* to association. The arbitrary or non-necessary character of the relation is a topic on which he is never tired of insisting. Hume's triumphant polemic against the idea of 'secret power' and his demonstration of the unpredictability of the particular sequences prior to experience contain, in principle, nothing new, although his incisive statement and his concentration upon the question made his treatment of decisive historical importance. There is nothing surprising, therefore, in the attraction of the theory for the future editor and expounder of Berkeley. For the purposes of science and of practical life, moreover, invariable (or, as Mill eventually calls it, unconditional) sequence is a sufficient account of the facts of physical causation; and to physical caus-

ation Berkeley had limited its application. Its inadequacy as an account of personal agency (here Hume's argument is superficial almost to flippancy) soon led Fraser, as it had done Berkeley before him, to a distinction between the phenomenal sequence of events which we miscall causation and the active or real causation of intending will. John Wilson's moral philosophy lectures called his attention to free agency as involved in moral responsibility; and in the summer of 1838, which he cites as an era in his life, further reading of Berkeley, supplemented by Coleridge's *Aids to Reflection* and by 'echoes of Kant,' confirmed a distinction which remained henceforth fundamental in his thought. From the beginning it was thus Berkeley's doctrine of the active causation and the central reality of mind, rather than his immaterialism or so-called idealism which attracted Fraser. 'Spiritual Realism' was the title he gave, in 1910, to his latest exposition of his favourite philosopher.

During the same summer of 1838 he made his first acquaintance with Hamilton's two essays in the *Edinburgh Review* on the 'Philosophy of the Unconditioned' and the 'Philosophy of Perception,' and during the following winter—the first of his theological course—he attended Hamilton's advanced class in metaphysics and also the evening gatherings of his best students which took place, on the professor's invitation, at his own house. Looking back after more than fifty years, Fraser says deliberately, "I owe more to Hamilton than to any other intellectual influence".<sup>1</sup>

The nature and extent of that debt is somewhat difficult to determine on account of the extreme dissimilarity in manner between the two philosophers. Hamilton is dogmatic and polemical, the master of an incisive and rhetorically balanced style; he delights in the minutiae of controversy, and multiplies distinctions by the invention of a highly technical terminology. Fraser's style is often that of one meditating aloud, and is apt to become involved and amorphous in consequence. At other times his method is Socratic, working by question and suggestion; the interrogation mark probably occurs more frequently in his writings than in those of any other philosopher. He avoids explicit controversy, and when he has to deal with other thinkers, his usual attitude is sympathetic and conciliatory. His instinctive effort is to find an eirenicon or, if that is impossible, to reduce the difference to some fundamental issue. "What is the concrete question," he characteristically asks, "which lies beneath this contro-

<sup>1</sup> *Biographia*, p. 58.

versy about an Unconditioned?"<sup>1</sup> Or, again, in his first published paper, speaking of the controversy between realism and idealism, its adjustment, he says, "is of practical importance chiefly as it is connected with the refutation of scepticism".<sup>2</sup> He shows almost a pronounced distaste for the technical discussions of the schools, and unceasingly endeavours to recall philosophy to the fundamental human interests which these controversies mask. And in a similar spirit in his second essay, even in the act of praising the precision of Hamilton's elaborate nomenclature and terminology, he hints that "the ratiocination in which the terms are included sometimes appears to imply a mere involution and evolution of the signification of a series of names," and intimates a doubt on his own part whether "the resources of our good old native English with its agreeable suggestions of common or less abstract objects, have been rendered so available as they might have been."<sup>3</sup> We are prepared then to find that the debt he owed to Hamilton consisted largely in the stimulating influence of mind on mind. Just as Natural Realism in its strict sense plays no part in Fraser's teaching, so the doctrine of the Relativity of Knowledge which Hamilton combines with it reappears in Fraser in a form so generalised as to escape the criticism which has been justly levelled against the Hamiltonian theory. Whereas Hamilton's doctrine of Relativity would reduce all our knowledge to illusion—a systematic distortion of reality ("rerumque ignarus, imagine gaudet")—to Fraser the doctrine means no more than the essentially limited and fragmentary character of our knowledge compared with what Locke calls "the vast ocean of being". Such a position casts no aspersion on the truthfulness of the knowledge so far as it goes, though it effectually forbids the hope of that completed system of knowledge which we imagine an omniscient mind to possess. This is, indeed, the sense which Fraser put upon Hamilton's doctrine of universal 'nescience' in the apologia which he wrote in reply to Mill in 1865: "Let us recollect," he says, "that when we are said to be ultimately nescient, this implies that there can be no proper science of anything until everything is completely known—that Omniscience is the only Science."<sup>4</sup> As compared with this

<sup>1</sup> *North British Review*, vol. xliii., p. 50.

<sup>2</sup> *Essays in Philosophy*, p. 49.

<sup>3</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 73-74.

<sup>4</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 49. In the *Biographia*, nearly forty years later, he gives the same interpretation of the Hamiltonian doctrine. "While the language in which it was expressed was paradoxical, I believed that it was in intention only an expansion of what is involved in the question in the Bible—

impossible ideal, Fraser was content to confess with Bacon, in the passage he was so fond of quoting, that in our human philosophy "many things must be left abrupt". Or, as he often puts it, our knowledge though practically adequate is speculatively insufficient; and in particular it is impossible to eliminate the element of faith on which the whole fabric rests. Fraser's position, in short, is not the Kantio-Hamiltonian agnosticism which we meet again in Mansel and Spencer, but a fresh expression of that modesty in philosophising so characteristic of our older English writers as compared with the more confident and ambitious speculators of the Continent.

Nevertheless Hamilton's polemic against the Philosophy of the Unconditioned, or, as it is now called, Absolutism, exercised a decisive and permanent influence on Fraser's thinking, and that not only as regards the general doctrine of the limitation of human faculty but also as regards the specific form of Hamilton's contention—the argument from the antinomies of space and time and causality, in which reason finds itself involved when it tries to think out the cosmic whole. The definite declinature of the Absolutist or 'gnostic' solution is perhaps from first to last the most outstanding characteristic of Fraser's thought; and in his latest as well as his earliest writings there is the recurrent reference to Space and Time—"these perennial mysteries of thought"—"these sublime avenues to the inconceivable".<sup>1</sup> No doubt the limitations of human knowledge had been a traditional thesis of British philosophy, and the doctrine of the antinomies he might have got direct from Kant. "The spirit of Bacon," he says himself in one passage, "together

'Who by searching can find out God, who can find out the Almighty unto perfection?' An exhaustive explanation of the mysteries in the Divine Reality seemed possible only in Omniscience; but man is not and cannot become omniscient. Yet this intellectual helplessness was not inconsistent with a progressive human knowledge of the Active Reason that is (so far) revealed in all the facts and laws of the physical and spiritual universe. Nor would Hamilton, I daresay, have denied this, although his point of view led him to lay an emphasis upon the ultimate incomprehensibility, not upon this practical revelation of the Universal Mind or Will" (p. 148). As a matter of fact, Hamilton sometimes uses language which would imply that this is all he means, and certainly this is all that is meant by many of the 'cloud of witnesses' whom he quotes in support of his agnostic conclusion. But his own doctrine is fatally entangled in the false metaphysic which treats the substance or thing-in-itself as a separate entity behind the qualities, concealed by the qualities or appearances instead of being revealed in them.

<sup>1</sup> *Essays in Philosophy*, p. 171; cf. Berkeley ('*Philosophical Classics*'), p. 211 (second ed., 206); *Gifford Lectures*, first series, pp. 174-177; *Biographia*, p. 314.

with the speculations of Locke and Kant and Sir William Hamilton have wonderfully advanced our knowledge of the true theory of our *necessary* ignorance"; and in a note he adds, "this surely is the lesson of all true philosophy from Plato downwards".<sup>1</sup> But in spite of this consensus of authorities, it is reasonable to assume that Hamilton was the channel through which these doctrines reached Fraser and shaped his mental attitude. In this respect, therefore, Fraser may be said to inherit and carry on the specific contention of what he called in the '40's of last century "the new Scottish Philosophy"; but it is characteristic of him that from the first he disuses almost entirely the technicalities of Hamilton's statement in the so-called "Philosophy of the Conditioned".

Indeed, an attentive reader of the early *Essays*, not to speak of his later writings, cannot fail to make the general observation that Fraser's affinities were, in many respects, more with the older English thinkers than with his more immediate predecessors in Scotland, or any philosophy that could be designated specifically Scottish. As he says in the *Biographia*, reviewing his mental attitude in the '40's: "My inclination was to an English manner of treatment, so far as it keeps firm hold of what is found in concrete experience, under conditions of place and time, and refuses to pursue a unity that is possible for men only in a world of abstractions".<sup>2</sup> It is the larger contrast between British and Continental philosophy which he has in view, the Continental type being most prominent in the speculative metaphysics of Germany, though exemplified earlier in the deductive and professedly demonstrative systems of Descartes and Spinoza. As he puts it in an essay of 1853 on Hamilton's *Discussions*, "the philosophical methods and language which have originated in Germany during the last seventy years, so fill the vision of some of the minds devoted to this study in Britain and America, that they seem to have forgotten the fact, concealed in the past behind the cloud of German metaphysics, that we have a characteristic British philosophical literature of our own. . . . The old Scottish [philosophy] was a modification of the British, with some important peculiarities".<sup>3</sup> Such language strikes us as almost strange at a time when so little was really known in this country of the great German movement; but the reference is to what he calls "the new Scottish doctrine"<sup>4</sup>—"the Scoto-German philosophy"<sup>5</sup> of

<sup>1</sup> *Essays*, p. 265.<sup>2</sup> P. 138.<sup>3</sup> *Essays*, pp. 134-135.<sup>4</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 163.<sup>5</sup> P. 72.

Hamilton, with perhaps a glance at a thinker like Ferrier, whose mind was so markedly of the deductive, Continental type, and who had written very contemptuously of the home-grown product. Thirty years later—in the eighties—when the labours of Stirling, Green, and the Cairds had promoted a much more genuine and intimate knowledge of German Idealism, Fraser had to face among his own students, and among the younger generation of University teachers generally, an almost universal adoption of German terminology and German methods.<sup>1</sup> Idealism of a Hegelian type seemed to have made a permanent conquest of academic thought. But Fraser found himself as little disposed as ever to acquiesce in “the philosophical prejudice of Germany against what Bacon calls ‘abruptness’—that is to say, acknowledgment of an unexplained residuum of mystery, which forbids the perfection of philosophical science”. So he characterised the Hegelian movement in 1881, in the suggestive closing chapter of his little volume on *Berkeley* in Blackwood's Philosophical Series, where he presents “a philosophy grounded on Faith,” as the only legitimate and possible human position, in contrast to the “gnosticism” or omniscience apparently involved in the claim of Absolute Idealism. And in his very last printed page, the short preface to a sixth edition of his *Selections from Berkeley*, dated October, 1910, he described his own position as “a Realism that is fundamentally spiritual, although after a native rather than a German type”.

It will be sufficiently obvious from what has been already said—or, if not, it will become plain in the sequel—that this attitude was not dictated by insular patriotism but was based on a real contrast in philosophic doctrine or, perhaps one should say, in philosophical temper. Nor was it due to ignorance, for though Fraser certainly never studied the post-Kantian Idealists with the pains lavished upon them by a younger generation, he had made himself sufficiently acquainted with their general position, the assumptions on which it was based and the consequences which it legitimately involved. More than this seemed unnecessary to one to whom philosophical scholarship was no end in itself, and who carried the actual problems always about with him. “Glimpses of Germany engaged in speculation,” he had said in one of his earliest essays, “are no substitute for original thought about matters such as those on which the Germans in these times, and Reid, Locke, and Bacon in Britain, in

<sup>1</sup> “A generation saturated with Kantian and Hegelian conceptions” is an expression used by himself in the *Biographia*, p. 289.

other times, have displayed the highest qualities of intellect. If these specimens, by Sir William Hamilton, of what a profound knowledge of the history of opinions really is, incite some men to an exact study of the books of foreign countries and of former generations, they are also fitted to rouse the still more dormant spirit that seeks direct and independent intellectual contact with the *real problems themselves*. It is not the repetition of a faint echo from Germany or France that constitutes the substance of what is contained in the immortal works of the British philosophers whom we have named, who erected for us a National Philosophy, with certain invaluable characteristics peculiarly its own."<sup>1</sup> He was nourished on the classics of English philosophy; these were the books on which he first browsed as a youth, and to which he continually returned. There is no author whom he is fonder of quoting than Bacon, and Berkeley fascinated him from his fourteenth year when he first heard of him in talks with his tutor. Berkeley and Locke were his constant companions during thirty years of his maturer age, and Hume he read with a keen pleasure. He was accustomed to say that, if he ever felt intellectually stale, a few pages of Hume acted as an infallible stimulant. To these central names must be added the liberal theology of Hooker, Chillingworth, Cudworth and other Cambridge Platonists, and in more recent times Coleridge and Newman. Besides these, Pascal was a favourite author, while French philosophy in Descartes and Malebranche was familiar ground, as well as Spinoza and Leibniz, and of course Plato and Aristotle. He had also given considerable attention to Aquinas and other mediæval writers. But besides Leibniz, the only German thinker with whom he had vital relations was Kant, and chiefly, I think, the Kant of the Antinomies and of the Categorical Imperative—the critic of rationalistic metaphysics, who found his ultimate standing-ground in an ethical faith. So regarded, Kant is nearer to traditional English modes of thought than to either the arid ontology of the Wolffians—his German predecessors—or the soaring Idealism of his successors. Fraser offers thus the interesting spectacle of a thinker whose culture is practically independent of what we usually understand by German philosophy, and whose discussions avoid almost entirely the technical dialect which, as he often complained, was robbing philosophy of its proper influence on the general thought of the age, and making it a learned speciality, to an extent which was not the case in

<sup>1</sup> *Essays*, p. 71.

the great thinkers of our race in the past. He resented the idea, apparently implied, that profound thought could not be expressed in a style as lucid and direct as the English of Berkeley or Hume. And he lived long enough to see in many quarters a return to greater simplicity and clarity of diction as well as a reaction against too exclusive subservience to German masters.

At this distance of time the essays collected in 1856 are not in themselves particularly impressive. They suffer from diffuseness and a tendency to digression—faults partly due, no doubt, to their appearance in a periodical designed to interest the general reader. Their topics, with the exception of the first paper on Leibnitz which was written to the editor's order, are drawn from the contemporary movement of philosophy in Scotland. The second essay, on the occasion of Hamilton's edition of Reid in 1848, circles round the doctrines of these two philosophers, especially in regard to perception; the third utilises the appearance of Hamilton's collected *Discussions in Philosophy*, in 1852, to discourse on Scottish Metaphysics, old and new, with some independent criticism of Hamilton's theory of Causation; the fourth, on 'The Insoluble Problem,' takes as its starting-point Calderwood's youthful criticism (in his *Philosophy of the Infinite*) of Hamilton's doctrine of nescience; the fifth, taking as its text Mozley's *Treatise on the Augustinian Doctrine of Predestination* (1855), is a fresh discussion of the antinomy between necessity and freedom in the light of Mozley's Hamiltonian formulæ; while the last, and at the same time the ablest both in thought and expression, is a criticism of Ferrier's *Institutes of Metaphysics*. As already partly indicated, the feature common to all the essays is the insistence on the essentially partial or limited character of our knowledge,<sup>1</sup> the mysteries on which our thought ultimately abuts, and the necessity, therefore, of 'philosophical faith' or 'belief' as an element in any human theory of the universe. We find here already the *via media*, the phrase deliberately adopted in his later writings to describe his own position—"that *via media* between Pyrrhonism and Transcendentalism—extremes that virtually meet—which alone is open to [man] during his sojourn on this 'isthmus of a middle state'."<sup>2</sup> Is not philosophy, he says again, "eminently the middle ground from which we wander, alike when we indulge in

<sup>1</sup> "The inspired words which express the best of all metaphysical lessons—we know in part" (*Essays*, p. 262).

<sup>2</sup> P. 83.

a universal suspense of judgment, and when we demand *premises for every judgment* which we accept as an article of faith"?<sup>1</sup> Consequently, in the essay on Ferrier, we have the division into "*ontological metaphysicians, philosophical metaphysicians and sceptical metaphysicians*. But the ontological and sceptical extremes meet and we may divide metaphysicians into *ontologists and philosophers*. . . . We find mankind virtually formed into two great sections, as they, consciously or unconsciously, incline to merge faith in knowledge or knowledge in faith."<sup>2</sup> Faith he calls, in a note to his earliest essay, "the organ of the higher metaphysics."<sup>3</sup>

As to the scope and nature of this Faith or Belief—the specific beliefs which it includes and the precise way in which it functions in our experience—he has not yet arrived at clearness. Sometimes he seems willing to identify it, in its scope and function, with the principles of common sense of the older Scottish philosophy. He speaks, for example, of "the elements of philosophical faith or, in the language of Reid, the principles of Common Sense"; and he defines common sense as "those notions and beliefs which are essential to man, regarded as an intellectual and moral being."<sup>4</sup> In one place he uses the striking phrase, almost Kantian in its suggestion, "those beliefs and notions which create and cement our knowledge."<sup>5</sup> More often he employs Hamiltonian terminology, as when he defines philosophical Faith as "the belief of principles which in themselves are incognisable or irreconcilable by the understanding, and yet unquestionable."<sup>6</sup> Faith is here brought into special connexion with the Law of the Conditioned.<sup>7</sup> The central examples to which Fraser constantly returns are the existence of God, as the Infinite Power on which the universe depends, and the existence of man as a free responsible agent. "The finite mind cannot grasp the full conception of the co-existence of a responsible creature with the infinite Creator. . . . The existence of a *moral creation* is a fact which man cannot explain."<sup>8</sup> They are not however necessarily contradictory, for, as he urges, the incompletable causal regress contains in its bosom the mystery of eternity and is therefore ultimately as incomprehensible as the fact of freedom. A reconciliation of the apparent contra-

<sup>1</sup> *Essays*, p. 195.

<sup>2</sup> Pp. 294-295.

<sup>3</sup> P. 33.

<sup>4</sup> P. 100.

<sup>5</sup> P. 90.

<sup>6</sup> P. 32.

<sup>7</sup> The law, namely, that "all that is conceivable is a mean between two contradictory extremes, both of which are inconceivable, but of which, as mutually repugnant, the one or the other must be true". (Hamilton's *Lectures on Metaphysics*, i., 34).

<sup>8</sup> P. 51.

dictions is therefore possible, though not at the human level, and meanwhile it is incumbent upon man to retain a belief in both.

But while thus emphasising the margin of mystery into which all our definite knowledge fades, Fraser avoids that deliberate flouting of human knowledge implied in Hamilton's favourite epithets "impotence" and "imbecility". He expressly criticises Hamilton's reduction of the causal judgment to a form of our mental weakness, and prefers to regard it as a necessary belief concerning objective existence—a belief which leads us in the end beyond second causes to the ultimate sustaining Cause of the whole.<sup>1</sup> And as regards the general Hamiltonian doctrine of ignorance he asks pertinently: "How can faith be maintained amid an absolute negation of knowledge which implies a total suspense of judgment? Belief *may* consist with an imperfection of knowledge, but how shall it be applied at all to that of which we can know nothing?"<sup>2</sup> "We hold with Cousin," he says elsewhere,<sup>3</sup> "that Transcendent Being is not *wholly* unknown. How else can we account for the controversy at all? Yet we hold with Sir W. Hamilton that, as transcendent or unconditioned, Being cannot be *scientifically* known." "But the Scottish philosopher," he adds, "seems to cut away every bridge by which man can have access to God." He quotes Berkeley's satirical reference to "an unknown subject of absolutely unknown attributes" as on the whole nearly as good as no God at all, and notes the tendency of Hamilton's doctrine "to recognise a Belief that is wholly void of intelligence".<sup>4</sup> He thus enters his protest in advance against Mansel's agnostic application of Hamilton's argument in the interest of theological dogma.

The essay on Ferrier, written in 1855, should be read in connexion with the finely-touched tribute to Ferrier's genius written thirteen years later, on the appearance of his *Philo-*

<sup>1</sup> As he indicates in the *Biographia*, there is a vague anticipation here of his final position. Hamilton's "negative view of Causation seemed unduly to attenuate the conception, and to take no account of what is implied in active originating Power. So I ventured to dissent in favour of a conception of which I was not then fully master. I was beginning to think that the mental demand for the physical cause of an event is a consequence of the inability of the human mind to suppose that nature is finally unintelligible and therefore uninterpretable. . . . The inexorable demand for a cause when we see change was thus ultimately our recognition of the immanence of Omnipotent Mind" (*Biographia*, p. 146).

<sup>2</sup> *Essays*, p. 195.

<sup>3</sup> P. 222.

<sup>4</sup> P. 193.

*sophical Remains*.<sup>1</sup> There is in both the same spirit of personal courtesy along with an ungrudging appreciation of the speculative sweep and literary charm of Ferrier's work; and both urge the same fundamental criticisms of Ferrier's demonstrative method and the results he claimed for it—no less than, in his own phrase, "to lay open the universe from stem to stern". But the later essay shows a distinct growth of Fraser's mind away from distinctively Hamiltonian positions, and a fuller appreciation, therefore, of Ferrier's central polemic against the spurious mystery of unrelated Being or the thing-in-itself. This was due, doubtless, to his prolonged study of Berkeley in the interval. He rightly notes in the earlier essay the affinity between Ferrier's thought and Berkeley's. "Berkeley alone, of all British metaphysicians," he points out, "receives Mr. Ferrier's enthusiastic praise. Mr. Ferrier, carried with a later generation on the strong tide of German speculation, has developed the Psychology of Berkeley into a kind of Scottish Hegelianism."<sup>2</sup> But he shows in that essay an inadequate appreciation of the doctrine common to both, the complete relativity of knowing and being; for he identifies it vaguely with "the familiar maxim that human knowledge is relative,"<sup>3</sup> and refers, moreover, to the theories of Locke and Kant as containing "the new theory expressly or by implication,"<sup>4</sup> although Locke and Kant are precisely the modern philosophers who make most play with unknowable substance and the thing-in-itself, and it is the incisive polemic of Berkeley against Locke and of Hegel against Kant that reappears in Ferrier. The truth is that at this stage of his career Fraser had not yet emancipated himself from the Kantio-Hamiltonian superstition that because nothing can be known without entering into relation to a knower, therefore nothing can be known at all as it really is. Hence we find him at the close of the essay slipping into the characteristically Hamiltonian statement that death itself will not annul the disability; whatever moral advance a future state may bring with it, we shall remain "*eternally ignorant of Being*".<sup>5</sup> In the later article, on the contrary, under the guidance of Berkeley, he is ready to identify himself with Ferrier's central contention. "Abstract substances, whether Mind or Matter, are alike unintelligible and unpractical." The attempt to unite in Knowledge these "unknowable but

<sup>1</sup> "The Philosophical Life of Professor Ferrier," in *Macmillan's Magazine*, January, 1868.

<sup>2</sup> *Essays*, pp. 310-312.

<sup>3</sup> P. 328.

<sup>4</sup> Pp. 330-332.

<sup>5</sup> P. 342.

mutually independent entities or substances" leads, he says, to hypotheses of mediate or representative perception. "The Hamiltonian summary abolition of these hypotheses," he adds, "and substitution of an *immediate* perception—call it *consciousness*—of matter is an advance towards the common standpoint of Ferrier and Berkeley; except so far as it is clogged by the assumption of a *substantial*, and by us unknowable, duality of *Mind in itself* and *Things in themselves*."<sup>1</sup>

But even if we admit all this, how far does it carry us? Does it justify the terms in which Ferrier speaks of his system as a demonstrative science of the universe? Fraser's answer may best be taken from the more mature and authoritative statement of 1868. Ferrier's philosophy, he says in effect, is an abstract theory of the possible, and offers no passage from the possible to the actual. What we are given is "a regulative conception of what Being must include in its meaning, if it is to have any meaning. . . . Under it we can say only that *if* anything exists, it must be combined with consciousness. . . . It determines what God and Matter, *if they exist*, must be; but it does not prove that they *actually are*. . . . Ferrier's is properly a system of *hypothetical* Physics, Pneumatology and Theology. . . . Its purely abstract deductions in regard to Possible Being, from the primary conception of what *intelligible* Being must be, leave a gulf between it and the contingent or changing universe of persons, and of sensible things of which persons are conscious—as these are actually given in historical succession, and as they illustrate the operation of Power or Cause. . . . Whether these actually be only One, or whether there be a plurality of Egos, conscious of phenomena, is a question below the level of extreme generality which this speculation affects."<sup>2</sup> He returns to emphasise the entire absence, in Ferrier's system, of the conception of Power or agency and of any reference to the temporal and changing character of existence. But it is through the fact of will that "the unity of Being or conscious intelligence is found, experimentally and morally, to be broken up into a plurality of conscious Powers". Hence he concludes that Ferrier's conception is "*the step into philosophy* rather than a philo-

<sup>1</sup> *Macmillan's Magazine*, vol. xvii., pp. 200, 201.

<sup>2</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 202. With this criticism we might compare a remark made in a general reference in one of his earliest essays: "Contemplating the framework which contains knowledge more than the knowledge which the framework contains, the mind is apt to lose a direct acquaintance with the actual and the individual, in the splendid theory of the possible" (*Essays*, p. 67).

sophy of the Universe. The philosophical and moral interest is in the next step.' Is an explanation of the Universe, in its evolutions, logical and contingent, and of our true law and ideal of life in it, possible by help of this definition of its essence? Does the definition eliminate mystery?<sup>1</sup> . . . A fruitful speculation of Being in its *essence* should be the introduction to some philosophical interpretation of Being in its *actual physical and moral order*. . . . To recognise that the essence of the Universe is 'the being conscious of objects' is not to unfold the Divine Thought of which the contemporaneous and successive manifestations of objects are the expression; nor does it even put us on the way to this, unless logical links can be found which connect the bare conception of conscious intelligence with the entire objectivated thought. The glimpses possible in this mortal state are not likely to discover these."

In this criticism Fraser seems to touch with a sure hand the real weakness of Ferrier's system of 'necessary truth'. As he had said in another connexion in an early essay, "He who is elaborating a science of *what must be* in thought is in danger of excluding from his regard not a little of *what is* in man".<sup>2</sup> Ferrier's system with its elaborate apparatus of propositions and counter-propositions is, in effect, the incessant repetition of a single abstract theorem—true and, as I understand it, immensely important, but, as Fraser says, only a preliminary to the real task of philosophy which is to interpret the actual facts of nature and history. Hence, in spite of all Ferrier's gifts of exposition, the continual sense we have throughout his volume of waiting for him really to begin, and the feeling of disappointment with which we arrive at the end without emerging from the charmed circle of the possible and the necessary. Fraser's position here is an anticipation of his attitude to the Idealism, somewhat similarly based, of T. H. Green, a decade later. Of the general movement of Anglo-Hegelian thought his criticism was, as it had been of Ferrier, that moving by preference in the region of abstract necessity, it left too many concrete problems unresolved, or even unconsidered, to make it a reasonable human creed.

<sup>1</sup> This point is elaborated in the earlier essay. The universal correlation of existence and consciousness does not of itself make the knowledge possessed by the finite ego "self-contained or absolute". When we try to make it so, we still find that it is embarrassed by contradictions which it cannot reconcile, and loses itself therefore in the end in mystery. Cf. *Essays*, p. 314 *et seq.*, and pp. 339-340.

<sup>2</sup> *Essays*, p. 166.

During the fifteen years that followed the appearance of the *Essays* in 1856—the first fifteen years of his university professorship—Fraser's philosophical output was limited to the expanded Introductory Lecture, published as *Rational Philosophy in History and in System* (1858), four articles in the *North British Review*, between 1860 and 1865, and three shorter papers in *Macmillan's Magazine* between 1862 and 1868. Of these the paper on Ferrier, from which I have just quoted, and the long article on Mill's *Examination of Hamilton*, previously referred to, are the most important. In closeness of thinking and vigour of style they are among the best things that Fraser wrote. The article on Spinoza, though looser in texture, is a characteristic handling of "the prince of systematic divines".<sup>1</sup> Fraser had said in one of the early essays that "the real significance of the theology of Spinoza is the great metaphysical question of this age," and he returned to the subject in his Gifford Lectures. We note again in this article the already familiar classification of "three great types of philosophical teaching," here named "the sensuous or secular" ("which finds its bond of cohesion of all beliefs in the laws of mental association, and the limit of all legitimate belief in the physical experience of this earthly life"), "the speculatively or scientifically rational," and "the practically rational".<sup>2</sup> Spinoza is taken, with Hegel, as representative of the second type. Two of the remaining articles<sup>3</sup> indicate his increasing preoccupation with Berkeley and were the immediate occasion of his being invited by the Clarendon Press to edit the *Collected Works*.

Of Fraser's labours on Berkeley it is not necessary at this time of day to speak at length. His edition is a monument of loving care and sympathetic exposition and his *Life* was the first adequate presentment of Berkeley's fascinating personality and romantic career. He was fortunate enough to unearth the Commonplace Book, that wonderfully living record which enables us to trace the very germination of Berkeley's new conception, its first rough formulation sometimes indistinguishable from Hume, and its speedy development by means of the doctrine of "notions," into the constructive theory which we know. And Fraser's own interpretation of Berkeley's philosophy, reading it in the light of this development and of Berkeley's final utterances in *Siris* (which was as good as given to the world anew in this

<sup>1</sup> *North British Review*, vol. xxxviii., p. 465.

<sup>2</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 485.

<sup>3</sup> "The Real World of Berkeley" (*Macmillan's Magazine*, 1862), and "Berkeley's Theory of Vision" (*North British Review*, 1864).

edition), made it a living factor in the constructive thought of the later nineteenth century, to a greater extent than had ever been the case in Berkeley's own lifetime or the age that followed. Fraser sought, as he says in the *Biographia*,<sup>1</sup> "to present his 'idealism' as a philosophy of the Active Causation with which the universe is charged rather than as Immaterialism, which had been misinterpreted and then ridiculed. . . . For more than a century the world had in consequence hardly taken this theistic philosophy seriously. He had been treated as a sceptic who refused to trust his senses; an unpractical dreamer, who discarded as unreal all that we see and handle, calling that illusion which every man at every moment of his life is obliged to treat practically as something real."<sup>2</sup> . . . I found in his works, taken collectively, germs of theistic philosophy more fruitful than elsewhere in our insular literature." Or as he put it more precisely in 1871 in the finely wrought chapter on Berkeley's Philosophy which concludes the *Life and Letters*: "The Berkeleian philosophy is, in its conception if not in its execution, a reasoned exposition of the dependent and relative character of the reality and causality of the material world".<sup>3</sup> Looking thus broadly at Berkeley's general drift and intention, Fraser is no doubt inclined to minimise the empiricism and nominalism in which the theory had its starting-point and which had their inexorable historical consequences in Hume. And when he suggests the practical agreement of Berkeley and Reid as 'immediate' Realists in common opposition to the hypothetical or mediate Realism—the representative perception—of the majority of philosophers, he can easily be shown to ignore the ultimately more important speculative difference between the two positions; for 'the ideal theory' of the representationists—the doctrine that we immediately know only our own states—is the very foundation of Berkeley's immaterialism. Naturally Fraser was not ignorant of points like these, and he never pretended that Berkeley's theory is throughout consistent with itself. He points out weaknesses and defects of statement as he proceeds with his exposition; but he is mainly concerned to extricate from the detail of their particular historical setting those permanent contributions to a true reading of the universe which he believed that he found in Berkeley. And in his

<sup>1</sup> *Biographia*, p. 189.

<sup>2</sup> Reid and some of his earlier followers were notorious sinners in this respect. Fraser quotes an amusing tirade by Beattie (*Life and Letters*, p. 367).

<sup>3</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 369.

hands Berkeley's thought certainly became immensely stimulating, not only as a pedagogic instrument in the academic class-room, but also, as I have already said, in the general advance of British philosophy in the latter half of the nineteenth century. He offered the 'spiritual realism' of Berkeley as a wholesome corrective to a generation which the very advance of scientific knowledge and the inrush of far-reaching theories of evolution predisposed to materialistic explanations. And unable himself to accept the more pretentious idealism of Germany, his treatment of Berkeley, and especially of Berkeley's progressive realisation of the conceptual and rational elements in experience, suggested the ground which the two theories occupy in common.

Fraser's work as editor and biographer of Berkeley led him back by a natural sequence to similar work on Locke, the great fountain-head of English philosophy. In this case the interest is more purely historical, for obviously there could be no question of using the *Essay* as a modern evangel. But here too the work was inspired by genuine sympathy and bore fruit accordingly. Locke is loose in his terminology, incurably diffuse and generally wanting in speculative depth; but he makes amends by his fine enthusiasm for truth, by the incorruptible honesty of his report, the broad humanity of his spirit, and not infrequently the robust and racy English in which he sets forth some favourite theme. Fraser was attracted to him also by the transparent simplicity of his character, by his polemic against abstractions, his ever-present sense of the limitations of human insight, and the practical certainties on which he is content to rest. "The candle that is set up in us shines bright enough for all our purposes. . . . Our business here is not to know all things, but those which concern our conduct." Locke had come to be treated by historians of philosophy and others exclusively as the progenitor of a thoroughgoing sensationalism and scepticism. The historical issues of certain sides of his thinking had tended to obliterate his own distinctive positions, and there had been little fresh and independent study of his work. This point of view had been strikingly exemplified in Green's elaborate criticism of Locke in his *Introduction to Hume* in 1874. To Green, Locke is simply a factor in the philosophical development which culminated in Hume, and although he had undoubtedly studied the *Essay* with care, Green would certainly have been accused by Locke of "sticking in the incidents," and deliberately ignoring the main design. Green's work has its own value as a chapter in the history of ideas, but he shows no interest in realising

Locke's theory as a whole as it existed historically in its author's mind. His criticisms in consequence are often unfair and even perverse. Fraser, on the contrary, sets himself expressly to develop Locke's comparatively homely 'way of ideas' in its author's own spirit, instead of multiplying criticisms which involve a completely different point of view and belong to another epoch of thought. He is remarkably successful in keeping before us Locke's dominant mood and the dominant motives of his inquiry; and in the *Prolegomena* to the *Essay* it is not too much to say that he effected a critical restoration of the original lineaments of the Lockian philosophy which was both valuable and timely.

During the years of his absorption in Berkeley—which may be said to have lasted through the '70's—Fraser's philosophical individuality was to a large extent sunk in that of the thinker whom he so attractively expounded. He used Berkeley as the vehicle of his class-teaching; and speaking for his students of that decade, I think we all assumed that he was a Berkeleian, without suspecting how much of Fraser himself there was in the Berkeleianism which we imbibed from him. The general public held the same opinion—not unnaturally, seeing that, with the exception of a few magazine articles in the '60's, mostly anonymous, he had published nothing of the nature of a personal statement for more than twenty years. But in the concluding chapter of the *Blackwood Berkeley*, in 1881, the philosophical issues—latent or prefigured, as he says, in Berkeley's various works—are at last detached from that specific setting and treated broadly as they present themselves in modern thought. We meet again the familiar triad, 'Nescience, Omniscience, and Final Faith,' but formulated now with fuller knowledge and with the conviction that comes from a riper experience. In his class-lectures during the '80's, which were influenced by his contemporaneous work on Locke, he came to develop his own position more independently than in the preceding decade. But the short chapter referred to remained, so far as the larger public of readers was concerned, the fullest indication of his settled conclusions till his appointment to the Gifford Lectureship in 1894 forced him to put into shape for a wider audience the results of his life-long reflections. For a proper appreciation of the manner as well as the matter of his thought, the *Philosophy of Theism* should be supplemented by the meditative re-statement of its main position so effectively interwoven with the life-chronicle of the *Biographia Philosophica*.

The lectures open with an impressive review of the types

of speculative thought that have historically divided philosophers. The basis of division here chosen connects itself with the three supposed facts—self, the material world, and God—which give us the traditional threefold division of metaphysical science. According as over-emphasis is laid upon one or other of the three, there results, (1) a system of universal materialism, (2) an immaterialism or pure subjective idealism, which he here calls ‘Pan-egoism,’ or, (3) the various schemes of Pantheism, Impersonalism or Acosmism, which merge the world and the Ego in God. The second conception, reminiscent of Berkeley, is presented, however, rather as an easy solvent of confident materialistic dogmatism<sup>1</sup> than as constituting an actual danger of speculative thought or even as having ever formed an accepted philosophical system. Hence there remain Materialism and Pantheism as the two effective monistic alternatives, to which Fraser adds the attitude of “universal nescience,” as represented by Hume. Hume and Spinoza, he says in his Preface, were seldom absent from his mind. His power of sympathetic reproduction enables him to do full justice to the genuine thought-motives which give these positions their seemingly perennial vitality. The chapter on Materialism, for example, recalls at times the sombre grandeur of the Lucretian mood or the sweep of Tennyson’s “Vastness”. But materialism does not delay him long; it lacks philosophic status, however great may be its practical influence on minds just awakening to reflection. Modern monism inevitably assumes a pantheistic form. And so we are led back to the familiar triad, the two extremes and the *via media*. “Pantheistic Reason, Universal Nescience and Theistic Faith are three ideals now before Europe and the world, with some educated and more half-educated thought oscillating between the first and the second. Which of these three is the most reasonable final conception—the fittest for man in the full breadth of his physical and spiritual being?”<sup>2</sup>

In his previous writings Faith, as necessarily involved in our human attitude towards the ultimate problems of existence, has been chiefly insisted on by Fraser in contrast to the apparent claims of Absolutism to banish mystery and present a completely coherent system of reality. But in his

<sup>1</sup> It will be remembered how it is similarly introduced in the *Bestimmung des Menschen*, where Fichte passes from materialism through subjective idealism to a final position which also, like Fraser’s, invokes a “moral faith”.

<sup>2</sup> *Philosophy of Theism*, p. 85 (second edition). Cf. i., 156, in first edition.

final philosophical deliverance this contrast, though still present, is a minor issue; up to a certain point, there is even a disposition to minimise such differences in face of a common foe. The main controversy is with the forces of utter scepticism and agnostic negation; and Faith—now expressly qualified as 'theistic faith'—is presented by Fraser, not as a principle by which we eke out the defects of knowledge or even as a principle on which we fall back when confronted by ultimate contradictions, but as the fundamental presupposition of all knowledge and reasonable action—the ultimate hypothesis which stands between us and a scepticism in which the very idea of knowledge or of truth would disappear. This is the central argument developed with much sustained power in the *Philosophy of Theism*, and repeated at every opportunity in his later writings as the sum and substance of his philosophic message. Universal scepticism is admittedly incapable of refutation, for every argument must have a basis to start from; but, as Hume himself says, "whoever has taken the pains to refute this total scepticism has really disputed without an antagonist". "The great subverter of Pyrrhonism or the excessive principles of scepticism, is action and employment and the occupations of common life. A Pyrrhonian must acknowledge, if he will acknowledge anything, that all human life must perish, were his principles universally and steadily to prevail. All discourse, all action, would immediately cease; and men remain in a total lethargy, till the necessities of nature unsatisfied put an end to their miserable existence." All argument is entitled to take as its datum or starting-point our conduct in 'the occupations of common life,' and, above all, the procedure by which the sciences are built up. Philosophical proof, as Kant saw, is always by reference to 'the possibility of experience'. The question is, What are the assumptions involved in our habitual activities, cognitive or practical? On what hypothesis can they be explained or justified? And Fraser's reply is—only on the supposition that we are living in a cosmos, not a chaos. Our reliance on the laws of nature—what is called the uniformity of nature—implies an ultimate trust, the belief that the Power at work in the universe will not put us to permanent intellectual confusion. Faith in the continuance of natural order is faith "in the reasonableness or interpretability of nature," and "is not this interpretability of nature another expression for its innate divinity—its final supernaturalness?" It is in fact (he answers his own question) a "moral trust"; "faith in the laws of nature is unconscious faith in God omnipresent

in nature".<sup>1</sup> It was in a similar sense that Descartes made the veracity of God the principal condition of all certainty, so that, as he said, "without the knowledge of God it would be impossible ever to know anything else". So Fraser says, in the *Biographia*, "I gradually came to think of this theistic faith, not as an infinite conclusion empirically found in finite facts, but as the necessary presupposition of all human conclusions about anything".<sup>2</sup> And it is to be noted that, like Descartes, Fraser interprets the 'truthfulness' of God, evidenced in the stable order of nature, as more than mere intellectual consistency—as rooted, indeed, in moral perfection. Nothing less, at all events, is a sufficient guarantee of the confidence with which we adventure upon the future. This is perhaps most plainly put in the *Biographia*: "The Supreme Intelligence, merely as such, might be non-moral, or even immoral, in action. So I must postulate Moral Reason or perfect Goodness—with all that is implied in perfect Goodness—operative at the centre of the universe. Otherwise the Universal Mind revealed in and through my experience, and through collective human experience, *may* deceive me. . . . Supreme Intelligence *may* be diabolic instead of perfectly Good; or may at best operate without purpose, either good or evil, and so in the end chaotically. . . . So on the whole I concluded that the theistic presupposition of omnipotent and omniscient Goodness in the heart of the universe was implied in the practical reliability of human experience."<sup>3</sup>

The question of the ground of induction, it is apparent from the autobiographical record as well as from other indications, occupied a large place in Fraser's reflections. It is prominent in Hume, and Hume was ever a favourite companion; it is from Hume's treatment that his own may be said to start. Both emphasise the impossibility of demonstration, and the consequent element of 'venture' in the procedure; but Fraser translates Hume's psychological 'custom' into a metaphysical 'faith'. And if science itself thus rests on an ultimate trust, and involves a faith-venture, how can we justify the ordinary Agnostic attitude? "The agnosticism that retains physical science is not really a protest against faith; it is only an arrest of faith at the point at which faith advances from a purely physical to the moral and religious interpretation of the universe. Is an arrest at this point justified by reason or by the experience of

<sup>1</sup> *Philosophy of Theism*, pp. 114-116 (second edition).

<sup>2</sup> *Biographia*, p. 188.

<sup>3</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 304.

mankind? Is the religious 'leap in the dark' more irrational than the inductive?"<sup>1</sup> These sentences from the conclusion of the lecture on Hume sufficiently indicate the line of further advance. The parallel between scientific procedure and the moral and religious life of man is pressed home by Fraser with great force and felicity. The initial trust of the man of science is progressively verified or justified by every step he takes in the intellectual conquest of the world; but, however legitimate his confidence, at no conceivable point in that progress, or in any future progress, can the thesis be said to be logically or scientifically *proved*. So with the deeper ethical faith. As in the case of the scientific postulate, it is progressively verified in ethical and religious experience, but never lifted into the region of scientific demonstration. In either case, to demand proof as the preliminary to action would mean to be cut off from the possibility of verification, and, indeed, to be condemned to absolute inaction and sceptical despair. And if the belief in actual law is not strictly a conclusion from the facts, but a governing idea in the light of which we find the facts interpretable, it cannot be an objection to a teleological interpretation of the world that the idea of purpose is brought with us to the facts, if the teleological point of view enables us to reach a better understanding of the whole. Why should we stop short with a merely physical interpretation of the world, when there are moral or spiritual facts which are only interpretable if we regard the universe as "at last the supernatural manifestation of supreme moral purpose"? The larger moral faith includes (and is the real foundation of) the more meagre physical faith; and though neither is in a strict sense proved, both are justified by their works. Such is the ethical teleology or 'theistic faith' in which Fraser finally casts anchor.

The facts of our moral experience thus form the real fulcrum of Fraser's thought and become his key to the whole enigma of the universe. 'Man supernatural,' which stands as the title of one of the lectures,<sup>2</sup> might serve as the motto of the whole philosophy expounded in the two series. "I find," he says, "the signal example of the divine in the spiritual being of man. . . . Conscious life is the light of the world. . . . But it is in man's life as a moral being, in the responsible exercise of deliberate will, not in man as

<sup>1</sup> This quotation is slightly changed in expression in the second edition. Fraser was much given to changes in proof-reading, which were not always improvements, and I have here retained the earlier version (*Phil. of Theism*, i., 219).

<sup>2</sup> The title is modified, but again, I think, not improved, in the second edition.

purely intellectual . . . that man rises as a person above all that is physical and impersonal, that the divine principle at the heart of existence seems to be illustrated in him."<sup>1</sup> For Fraser, as for Kant, freedom is the implicate of duty. Both speak of freedom sometimes as a postulate and sometimes as a fact,<sup>2</sup> but both are agreed in refusing to treat it as a subject of argument. Fraser, following out a line of thought already familiar to him from Berkeley, insists that only in voluntary agency do we touch the real meaning of causation. As he strikingly puts it, "the final meaning of cause is reached through conscience."<sup>3</sup> Natural causes are only metaphorically called causes, if by cause is meant agency, real power to originate the effect. The laws of nature are only rules of the connexion of phenomena—a divine sense-symbolism, as he is fond of saying—and thus the changing world of things can be no more than the instrument of active will or conscious purpose. This conception of the secondary or caused causes of natural science plainly does not depend for its truth upon the too purely subjective idealism of the Berkeleyan theory. It depends only upon the distinction between persons and things. The former alone really *act*, that is to say, originate or create, and they alone, therefore, are responsible for their actions.

This self-determination of which we are conscious in responsible action justifies the supposition that the universe in which we find ourselves is the expression of a Person, not of blind physical forces or of any merely impersonal principle. And the contents of the moral ideal, which man recognises as the supreme law of his life, represent the last word of human insight into the nature of the Power with whom we have to do. In this sense, Fraser adopts and enforces the formula, *Homo mensura*. "The Macrocosm in analogy with the microcosm—the supreme power in nature in analogy with what is highest in man, the *homo mensura*, when the *homo* means the moral and spiritual as well as the sensuous man—in this analogy, for which the contents of consciousness supply the materials, we seem to have the best light within man's reach for the true philosophy of the universe."<sup>4</sup> It is just on the basis of this personal experience, moreover, that Fraser feels himself obliged to part company with all

<sup>1</sup> *Phil. of Theism*, i., pp. 249, 252, 255 (first edition).

<sup>2</sup> "The Idea of Freedom is the only one of the Ideas of Pure Reason whose object is a thing of fact and to be reckoned among *scibilia*" (Kant, *Critique of Judgment*, section 89 (Bernard's translation)).

<sup>3</sup> *Phil. of Theism*, i., p. 270 (first edition).

<sup>4</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 271.

purely monistic theories. The metaphysical thirst for unity tempts us to resolve all finite beings into modes or channels of a single Substance or Absolute, but the moral experiences of responsibility and remorse prove the impossibility of treating persons in that light. The creation of such independently originaive centres may be incomprehensible, but their existence is incontestable; and to seek to override our most ultimate certainties because they do not accommodate themselves to a speculative theory of reality is emphatically to begin philosophising at the wrong end. Unrealised ideals and the existence of that which *ought not to exist* are incompatible with a universe in which everything is necessitated; but they are of the very essence of moral and religious experience and must find room, therefore, in the world of theistic faith.

By most thinkers the existence of evil is probably considered to be the main difficulty which theism has to face; it is treated by Fraser himself in his concluding lectures as 'the great enigma of theistic faith'. But his method of handling the difficulty converts it into a source of strength for his own conception; it is seen to be an essential feature of the universe as he conceives it. For what is the alternative? Is it not "a universe of non-moral *things*, to the exclusion of individual *persons*, who, as moral beings, must be able to make themselves immoral"? . . . "God cannot make actual what involves express contradictions, namely, an individual person who, because under an absolute necessity of willing only what is good, is not a person—if individual personality involves morally responsible freedom. Does not a *necessitated* absence of sin and sorrow mean the necessary non-existence of persons? And is this the highest ideal of the universe that man even can form? Is not . . . a world that includes persons better than a wholly non-moral world from which persons are excluded, on account of the risk of the entrance into existence of what ought not to exist, through the personal power to act ill that is implied in their morally responsible agency?"<sup>1</sup> As a matter of fact, the universe in which we find ourselves seems<sup>2</sup> to have as its chief end the moral probation and education of man. Such

<sup>1</sup> *Phil. of Theism*, ii., pp. 175-177.

<sup>2</sup> "When regarded," he is careful to add, "at the highest *human* point of view; for I am far from supposing that it would seem only this, or not much more than this, at a higher point of view, or that if man could become divinely omniscient the whole difficulty might not disappear in the light of perfect reason" (ii., 175). "The humanly regarded purpose," he says again, p. 279.

a conception of the universe, it may be argued, is compatible with a "theistic optimism" deeper than that of Leibniz, because it neither minimises the absolute distinction between right and wrong, nor weakens in any way the central fact of human responsibility.

The freedom inseparable from personality certainly introduces into the universe an element of real contingency—of adventure, as one might say—capable of frustrating the apparent purpose. "What," he asks, in the lecture on 'Progress,' "if all individual persons were to maintain themselves in permanent resistance to their divine ideal? May not individual persons, with their implied power of initiating evil, gradually make the world of persons a world in which *all* individual persons are wholly and finally bad? What then becomes of the theistic or optimist conception? So far as it consists of persons, the universe would then have become a universe of devils."<sup>1</sup> No answer is given in the context. The theoretical possibility of such an issue is admitted, but it is apparently one function of theistic faith to inspire confidence in a very different consummation. The *Biographia* strikes a more personal note, and enables us to see at least the tenor of his own thoughts. "Instead of the appalling gospel attributed to Calvin, of a capricious selection of a few persons to be made good, leaving others (or even one person in the universe) to go on increasing in wickedness for ever—may it not be that, after due suffering in another life, proportioned to the history of the life here, all are in the end made spiritually good; or, if not thus, that the free agency of probation in which they lived here may be continued, under increasingly favourable conditions, after physical death—education by future as well as by present suffering—remedial not revengeful—through all which, under the divine economy, *all* persons are, as their endless lives advance, sooner or later gradually raised out of the life of sense into the divine life of the spirit and moral likeness to God? I do not know that ecclesiastical authority can produce sufficient reason for extinguishing this hope; or that it can show that the perfect Goodness of God is consistent with *any* persons who are kept in existence being endlessly and increasingly wicked; or that final elevation of each into goodness is too arduous an achievement for Omnipotent Power."<sup>2</sup>

The question of Immortality, introduced here by implication, is also dealt with more directly in the same closing chapter. "Must moral beings, who have once entered into

<sup>1</sup> *Phil. of Theism*, ii., pp. 197-198.

<sup>2</sup> *Biographia*, pp. 320-321.

self-conscious existence, retain their self-conscious individuality for ever?" "I could not find," he replies, "that this needed to be presupposed, in the way the theistic presupposition needed to be presupposed—*i.e.* as the indispensable foundation of the universal order on which the sanity of life depends". The considerations that point, if not to a never-ending at least to a continued existence after death, are rather to be drawn from "the seeming moral chaos on this planet on which so many persons live wicked lives, and on which so many sentient beings seem to suffer unjustly or to be inequitably rewarded". But "as to the posthumous life"—so he concludes—"may we not leave our terrestrial embodiment in theistic faith and hope, departing like the patriarch, when he went out, 'not knowing whither he went'; assured at least that we live and die in a universe that *must* be fundamentally divine, and in which therefore all events, death included, must co-operate for the realisation of divine ideal Good to those who seek the Good."<sup>1</sup>

Such are the large and gracious lineaments of the Faith in which Fraser lived and died, and which he offers as the substance of his philosophical teaching.

By the majority of philosophers an appeal to Faith is regarded with incurable suspicion. But that is due to the historical fact that it has so often meant turning one's back upon reason in order to "swallow whole" (in Hobbes's irreverent phrase) the dogmas of an infallible Church or an infallible Book. But although Pascal is one of Fraser's favourite authors, there is no echo in his teaching of the notorious *il faut s'abêtir*, and although he is fond of describing our ultimate human attitude as a "faith-venture," the suggestions of the terms have nothing to do with Pascal's famous wager. And again we have seen how Fraser dissociated himself from the Hamiltonian polemic against reason and Mansel's agnostic defence of theology. The fundamental faith on which Fraser builds might, indeed, fitly be described as *faith in reason*—"the confidence of reason in itself," as Lotze calls it—with which alone we can beat back total scepticism. Lotze also, it may be noted, in speaking of Descartes's appeal to the veracity of God, adopts for himself the underlying thought, which Fraser elaborates, "that in the immediate assurance which we feel of the significance of the moral Idea lies the security also for the truth of our knowledge".<sup>2</sup> The recourse to faith is apt to be branded as a sign of intellectual indolence, but in Fraser's

<sup>1</sup> *Biographia*, pp. 317-321.

<sup>2</sup> *Logic*, p. 417 (English translation).

case it is due, as has been well said, to "an intense appreciation of the sceptical difficulties which beset the entire metaphysical question"; it is precisely because he realises ultimate doubts which more dogmatic thinkers neglect, that he insists on the ultimate faith which is inwoven in all their systematic constructions, namely, the trustworthiness of reason. It is, as he says, "the faith that is at the root of all other faiths". . . . "The trustworthiness of my faculties, and so the physical interpretability of the universe, presupposes the action of morally perfect spiritual Power at the heart of the Whole. . . . The existence of God is presupposed in the reliableness of experience. If I do not, at least tacitly, indulge in this moral faith, I cannot even make a beginning."<sup>1</sup> The lower degree of this faith—physical or cosmic faith—is necessary if we are to live at all; in its higher form of moral and religious faith—often more specifically designated theistic faith—it is necessary if we are to live the good life. And here Fraser quotes Coleridge's well-known saying that while "it is not in our power to disclaim our nature as sentient beings, it is more or less in our power to disclaim our nature as moral beings".<sup>2</sup> The man who thus deliberately disclaims his higher nature is inaccessible to argument, just as that imaginary being, the total sceptic, is secure against refutation. The condition of this moral faith is the will towards the good; but given such a will, every step towards the ideal is a verification of the faith which inspires it. The law of the moral, as of the physical, world is—Act on this faith and you will find it true. "If any man do the will of God, he shall know of the doctrine." In this sense Fraser's solution is ultimately a practical one, and shows some affinity with the Activism of James, Eucken and other contemporary writers. "Not through intellect alone . . . but in and through the constant exercise of all that is best and highest in him—through the active response of the entire man, while still in an incompletely understood 'knowledge'—it is only thus that it is open to man finally to dispose of his supreme problem with its mysterious intellectual burden. The final philosophy is practically found in a life of trustful inquiry, right feeling, and righteous will or purpose—not in complete vision."<sup>3</sup> It is a faith which "may be reasonably sustained by what one might call *spiritual motive* as distinguished from *full intellectual insight*".<sup>4</sup>

<sup>1</sup> *Phil. of Theism*, ii., pp. 19-20.

<sup>3</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 133.

<sup>2</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 33.

<sup>4</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 130.

But the complete moral sceptic is probably as imaginary a being as the total sceptic in an intellectual reference, and Fraser rightly builds on normal human nature or rather "man in the fulness of his spirit,"<sup>1</sup> "man at his best and highest".<sup>2</sup> Moral or theistic faith, accordingly, is not something which has to be demonstrated into existence: it is a datum in the case. "We do not need to bring into existence by reasoned proofs the already operative faiths which sustain religious, moral, æsthetical, scientific life, or common working life—we cannot bring these into existence in the form of conclusions logically evolved from premises. They arise spontaneously in men's minds as the common root of their growing mental experience." The faith "already operates before it is reasoned out philosophically".<sup>3</sup> This is, indeed, the sense of his whole argument, as he sums it up in the concluding lecture of his second course: "Theistic or ethical faith and expectation is the indispensable basis and rationale of human life—at once its silently accepted preliminary, and the culmination of the deepest and truest human philosophy".<sup>4</sup>

In basing his metaphysical faith on the certainties of the moral life Fraser's procedure has most in common with that of Kant. He was himself aware of the affinity.<sup>5</sup> Kant also casts anchor in a moral faith to which he denies the status of knowledge. His emphatic phrase that he must 'abolish knowledge to make room for belief' has led many to accuse him of bringing in by a back door the very metaphysical doctrines which had been dismissed in the first *Critique* as unable to stand the scrutiny of reason; and, thanks to the sharp distinction drawn between the objective certainty of the one and the merely subjective certitude of the other, his doctrine became in the sequel one of the fountain-heads of modern Agnosticism. But although he did not himself weld his doctrine into a coherent whole, Kant's procedure in both *Critiques* is exactly the same. He is trying to state the conditions of the possibility of experience—in the first *Critique*, the presuppositions of scientific knowledge (mathematical and physical science), and, in the second, the presuppositions of moral action; and, to place the one on a different footing from the other is a purely arbitrary procedure. Fraser's argument is essentially a transcendental

<sup>1</sup> *Phil. of Theism*, ii., p. 16.

<sup>2</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 34.

<sup>3</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 38.

<sup>4</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 274.

<sup>5</sup> *Cf.* ii., p. 15: "That the final interpretation of the universe is reasonably taken under a moral or theistic conception, not a wholly physical one, virtually coincides with Kantian philosophy".

proof of the same type—an argument from the possibility of experience—but he does not, like Kant, confer a fictitious independence on the merely physical experience, and treat (or appear to treat) the intellectual and the moral as two non-communicating spheres. On the contrary, as we have seen, his consistent attempt to base the physical faith on a deeper moral trust is a direct assertion of the unity and continuity of our experience. “The universe,” he says, “is seen to be too mysterious for us to interpret it, even in part and physically, unless we submit understanding to the authority of human nature as a whole, which includes man emotional, and man acting supernaturally in volition, as well as man thinking scientifically, and at last baffled in so thinking.”<sup>1</sup> Faith, in the sense in which he uses the term, is equivalent to “the larger reason, if one chooses so to call it—reason as authoritative, as distinguished from the purely logical understanding.”<sup>2</sup>

This appeal to ‘the larger reason’ or to experience in its integrity brings Fraser into touch with the ‘gnostic’ Idealism against whose apparent claims he had consistently protested since his early Hamiltonian days. He recognises now the extent of positive ground they held in common, and he even suggests in one place that it may be a question of names whether man’s final attitude should be called knowledge or faith. “To call it ‘knowledge’ seems to claim too much, as long as there must be an inevitable remainder of mystery. To call it faith may seem to mean that it is empty of objective rationality.”<sup>3</sup> Between “Hegelian speculation humanised” and the philosophy of faith there may thus possibly be no radical divergence. But this *rapprochement* depends on the abandonment of inadmissible pretensions. If Hegelianism claims that it conserves the actuality of the world in time and of responsible human action, that is well; but how is the time-process related to timeless Reality, and how is the real causality of finite persons reconcilable with their creaturely status and with the eternally complete divine Purpose? “It is difficult to see,” he says, “that modern thought of the Hegelian sort has done much towards translating these two mysteries—the universe in time and morally responsible personality—out of the darkness in which preceding philosophies have had to leave them, and in which it seems that they must remain—unless man is to become God.”<sup>4</sup> Attempts at demonstration tend to leave us with

<sup>1</sup> *Phil. of Theism*, ii., p. 6.

<sup>2</sup> *Ibid.*, pp. 138-139.

<sup>3</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 129.

<sup>4</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 135.

"an abstract universal consciousness or abstract system of rational relations"; on the other hand, if we refuse to surrender the finite facts and maintain that they are still 'somehow' comprehended and harmonised in the 'organic unity' of God and man, do we get more than "an amended verbal articulation of the old difficulties"?<sup>1</sup> Is this more than an assertion of faith at last? Faith, indeed, is inevitable, in Fraser's view, at the end no less than at the beginning of our philosophic venture. '*Omnia exeunt in mysteria*,' as he so often quotes. Space and time and the unending regress of physical causation—ideas which we handle safely for all the practical purposes of life—have always led the candid thinker to this confession. "The understanding, measuring by sense and imagination, tries to transcend itself, and in doing so is always lost at last in the Infinite Reality. How to reconcile finite places with the Immensity in which place seems lost, or finite times with the Eternity in which duration seems to disappear, is the mystery of an experience which, like ours, is conditioned by place and time, in a way that must always leave thought at the last under a sense of intellectual incompleteness and dissatisfaction."<sup>2</sup> Thus, in spite of the momentary approximation, we perceive a fundamental difference of temper between Fraser and all forms of Absolutism. From the latter the acknowledgment of an unexplained remainder of mystery appears to be wrung, as it were, unwillingly, under the pressure of controversy; to Fraser, on the contrary, the ultimate mysteriousness of the universe is the thought most intimately present from the beginning to the end of his reflective life. It determines his speculative mood. He sees in it the inevitable condition of our middle state—a condition, moreover, which has to be regarded not merely as intellectual defect but as the instrument of moral discipline, and as fostering the reverence and humility which are the conditions of spiritual health.

<sup>1</sup> *Phil. of Theism*, p. 137.<sup>2</sup> *Ibid.*, i., p. 177 (second edition, p. 97).

## II.—THE MEANING OF CAUSALITY.<sup>1</sup>

BY J. ELLIS McTAGGART.

IN this lecture I propose to discuss what is meant, and what should be meant, by the word Causality. The question whether Causality, defined as we shall find reason to define it, does occur in the universe, will not be discussed. Personally I do believe that various existent realities in the universe are connected with one another by the relation of Causality, but the arguments which lead me to this conclusion would require more than a single lecture in which to explain them.

We must begin by considering what characteristics have, at different times and by different people, been considered as essential to causality. There are, I think, seven such characteristics, of which the first two are universally admitted to be essential to causality, while the other five are not.

In the first place, it would, I think, be universally admitted that causality is a relation of Determination. If A is the cause of B, then the existence of A determines the existence of B.<sup>2</sup> And it determines it in some way which does not hold between all things in the universe, so that it is possible for A to be the cause of B, and not the cause of C. We must, that is, give causality such a meaning that it is possible to say that the beheading of Charles I. was the cause of his death, but that it was not the cause of the death of Julius Cæsar.

What sort of Determination is this? It is a determination of Implication. The cause implies the effect. What then do we mean by implication? I am using implication in what I believe to be the usual sense. I should say that implication is a relation between propositions, and that P implies Q when, if I know P to be true, I am justified by

<sup>1</sup> Henry Sidgwick Memorial Lecturer for 1914, delivered at Newnham College, Cambridge.

<sup>2</sup> It is not so universally admitted that the existence of the effect determines the existence of the cause. This will be discussed later.

that alone in asserting that Q is true, and, if I know Q to be false, I am justified by that alone in asserting P to be false. That is, the beheading of Charles I. implies his death, because, if I knew that he had been beheaded, I should be justified by that alone in asserting that he was dead, and, if I had known that he was not dead, I should have been justified by that alone in asserting that he had not been beheaded.

Strictly speaking, as we have seen, implication is a relation between propositions, or truths, and not between events. But it is convenient to extend our use of it, so as to say that, if one proposition implies another, then the event asserted in the first implies the event asserted in the second. It is in this sense that we say that the cause implies the effect.

It must not be supposed that implication is a subjective or psychological relation only. For we have not said that one event implies another because our knowledge of one causes us to assert the other, but because our knowledge of one *justifies* us in asserting the other. And this justification must be due to relation between the events themselves, and not merely to a relation between our thoughts of them.

In the second place, the relation of causality is always held to be a relation between realities which exist. We should not say that the definitions and axioms of Euclid were the cause that two of the sides of a triangle were longer than the third side, although this is implied in the definitions and axioms. For neither the definitions and axioms nor the proposition about the sides *exist*. But if an existent figure—some particular drawing or some particular piece of paper—was a triangle, we should, I think, naturally say that *its* triangularity caused two of its sides to be longer than the third. Again, we should not say that the law of the tides was partly caused by the law of gravitation, but we should say that the height of the sea at a particular time and place had the attraction of the moon as part of its cause.

Again, the beheading of an English king in the eighteenth century implies the death of that king. But we should not say that it caused it, because, in point of fact, no English king was beheaded in the eighteenth century, and so the relation of implication is not between terms which exist. All that we should say would be that, if a king of England had been beheaded in the eighteenth century, it would have caused his death—that is, to assert that, if the terms had been existent, the relation of causality would have held between them.

These two characteristics of causality are, I think, admitted by every one to be essential to that relation. But we now come to others, which are asserted by some thinkers to be essential to causality, while others deny this.

The first of these—the third in our general list—is that a certain activity is exerted by one term of the relation or the other, the name of cause being appropriated to the term which exerts the activity, and that of effect to the term on which it is exerted. Causation, it is said, is more than uniform conjunction. Even if the presence of A is invariably followed by the presence of B, this is not, it is maintained, sufficient to give causation, unless there is also present this activity. If it is asked exactly what is meant by such an activity, the usual answer is that each of us can observe it by introspection whenever an act of his own volition is the cause of the event which is willed in the volition.

The fourth point—which, as we shall see later, is very closely connected with the third—is that the cause determines the effect in some way in which the effect does not determine the cause. It is often held, for example, that our choice between resisting a temptation and yielding to it would be undetermined, if it were not caused, even if it were itself the inevitable cause of certain effects.

Fifthly, it is sometimes held that when the relation of causality holds between A and B, it involves that one of those terms is explained by its holding that relation to the other. When such an explanatory quality is attributed to causation, it is often held that the cause explains the effect, while the effect does not explain the cause. But sometimes the explanation is held to be reciprocal.

Those existent realities which are considered to be causes and effects are generally, though not always, events in time. This brings us to the sixth point. It is asserted that the cause cannot be subsequent to the effect. So much is very generally agreed, but there does not seem any general agreement that the cause must be prior to the effect. It is sometimes held that it can be simultaneous with it in time. Also it is held that a timeless existent reality can be the cause of events in time. For example, it is often held by theists that the creator who caused all temporal things is himself timeless. Nor would it be unusual, I think, to say that the Nicene Creed regarded the First and Second Persons of the Trinity as the causes of the Third, in spite of the fact that all three, and the Procession which relates them, are regarded as timeless.

In these cases, when the cause is not prior to the effect,

it would only be distinguishable from it by a discovery that one of the terms, and not the other, was the one which exerted an activity, or determined the other term, or explained the other term.

We pass to the seventh and last point. Here a word of preliminary explanation is wanted. When we look at what exists, we find that there are Qualities and Relations, and that there are things which have qualities, and which stand in relations. We may call qualities and relations by the general name of Characteristics. Characteristics have themselves other characteristics, but, besides this, we find that there are other things, which have characteristics, but which are not themselves characteristics. It will be convenient to call all of these Substances. It should be noted that if we define substance in this way—which I think, besides being the most convenient definition, is also the most usual—it will include more than is usually realised. For an event is something which has characteristics, and is not itself a characteristic. And thus not only can we so call by the name of substance such things as England, myself, and a pebble, but also such things as the battle of Waterloo or a flash of lightning.

Now a causal relation is always between substances. It is generally, though not always, between events, but it is always between substances. But—and here we come to the seventh characteristic—although it is itself between substances, it always rests on a relation between characteristics. The typical form of a causal proposition is that, whenever a substance occurs with the characteristic X, it causes a substance with the characteristic Y. We may say that the beheading of Charles I. caused his death, where we are speaking of particular substances. Or we might say that the most interesting event which has taken place in Whitehall caused the event from which the reign of Charles II. is measured. But we can only do this because "the beheading of Charles I." and "the most interesting event which has taken place in Whitehall" are descriptions of an event which is the beheading of a human being, and "the death of Charles I." and "the event from which the reign of Charles II. is measured" are descriptions of another event which is the death of the same human being, and because there is a causal law that the beheading of a human being always causes the death of that human being.

Of these seven characteristics, which have been asserted to be essential to causality, which shall we include in one definition? I think we should include the first two only,

and should say that causation is a relation of implication between existent realities—or, to put it more precisely, between existent substances.

My reason for leaving out the seventh characteristic from the definition is that, as I shall endeavour to show in a few minutes, it is implied in the two first. It is therefore true of all cases of causality, defined as I have defined it, but, since it follows from what is already in the definition, it is superfluous to add it.

With regard to the other four the case is different. I propose to leave them out for a different reason. I believe that by rejecting them we shall have a definition which is both more convenient, and, on the whole, more in accordance with ordinary usage. For, by the definition, I propose all that we assert, if we assert the validity of causality, is that the facts of the existent world are so connected with one another that it is possible, at any rate in certain cases, to infer one of them from another, and so form a basis for practical life and the validity of the empirical sciences. Now I believe that this is what people in general mean by causality, and that where these conditions are fulfilled, it would be in accordance with usage and convenience to say that there was causality. If that is the case, we ought not to put the other four characteristics under the definition of causality, even if they were true of all cases of causality.

There is also another reason why it is convenient to leave these other four characteristics out of the definition of causality. It is, I think, convenient, if possible, to reserve the term causality for some relation that actually does occur between all or most existent substances. Now, as I shall try to show, there is reason to judge that these four characteristics do *not* belong to any relation which holds among all or most existent substances.

If, on the other hand, we define causality, as I have proposed, as a relation of implication between existent substances, there is no reason whatever to believe that such a relation does not occur throughout the universe. That, of course, does not involve that there is any reason to believe that it *does* occur. I believe, as I said at the beginning of the lecture, that it can be proved to occur, but that is a point which we cannot consider to-day. But it remains the fact that it cannot be proved not to occur, and that almost every one does believe that it occurs—every one in fact who is not so thorough-going a sceptic as Hume. And, even if the relation does not occur, it is certain that the illusion that it does occur is one of which we cannot get rid.

No one realised more completely than Hume himself that, whether one event did imply another or not, we should always believe it, except when engaged in philosophic thought, and should act on our belief—that we should take food when we wished to appease our hunger, and not cut off our neighbours' heads unless we were prepared to cause their death. It seems therefore more convenient all round to define causality as a relation of implication between existent substances.

I must now proceed to justify the statements which I have made—that the seventh characteristic is implied in our proposed definition, and that the remaining four characteristics do not belong to any relation which holds between existent substance.

Let us first consider the seventh characteristic—that a causal relation, while itself a relation between substances, is based on a relation between characteristics of those substances. This, I submit, is involved in the fact that the relation of causality is a relation of implication. For all implication of one substance by another must rest on an implication of characteristics of the first by characteristics of the second.

This will be seen when we consider that implication must fall under one of two heads. Either it is evident *a priori* that the one term cannot occur without the other term in a certain relation to it—as when the triangularity of a particular figure determines the equality of its angles to two right angles. Or it is simply an ultimate fact that they are always found in a certain relation—as when a certain action in my brain causes the sensation of redness in my mind. Now it is clear that *a priori* implication of one substance by another can only happen as a consequence of *a priori* implication of characteristics, since it is only characteristics—qualities and relations—whose nature can be known *a priori*.

As for the second sort of implication, it depends on the terms always being found together, and has therefore no meaning unless they occur more than once. Now characteristics can occur more than once, for they are universal, and can occur in more than one particular case. But substances are themselves particular, and can only occur once. Therefore all implication must be based on the implication of characteristics. We can, indeed, say that one event implies another—for example, that the beheading of Charles I. implies the death of Charles I., where the two terms of the implication are both particular events. But this is only

because the first event has the characteristic of being the beheading of a human being, and the second event has the characteristic of being the death of the same being, and because the occurrence of an event having the characteristic of being such a beheading involves the occurrence of an event having the characteristic of being such a death.

It has not always been realised in the past that a causal relation must, in the last resort, rest on a relation of characteristics. And many of the difficulties in which writers on causation have involved themselves are, I think, due to their failure to see this, and, consequently, their failure to realise that any causal relation between particulars rests on a relation between universals—since all characteristics are universals. The reason of this failure has often, I think, been the belief that causality had the third characteristic which we enumerated—that there was an activity exerted by a cause or an effect. For, if this had been the case, it might have been maintained that the particular substance which was the cause did intrinsically determine the particular substance which was the effect, by means of this activity, and so implied it directly, and not by the intervention of characteristics. But, as we shall see, this conception of the activity exercised by the cause or the effect must be rejected.

We come now to the four characteristics which, as I have said, there seem to be good reasons for rejecting, as not being characteristics of any relation which does hold between existing realities.

The first of these is the third in our general list, which was spoken of just now—namely, that the cause exerts an activity or an effect. No reason, so far as I know, can be given why we should believe that such an activity exists. If we ask for a proof of its existence we are usually referred to the evidence of introspection. When I will to move my arm, and my arm is thereupon moved, I am directly aware, it is said, of an activity which I, the willing subject, am exerting.

Even if there were such an activity in such cases, it would give us no reason to believe that there was any such activity when the cause was not a volition, nor any indication of what the cause would, in that case, be like. And therefore some of the more consistent supporters of this view are driven to maintain that nothing but a volition is ever a cause—all events which are not the effects of human volitions being the direct effects of divine volitions, and having no other causes. As to this we may remark that it would be a very strained and inconvenient use of the word "cause," to say

that the *only* cause of the death of Charles I. was a divine volition, and that the beheading had no effect at all.

But I do not believe that there is any such activity to be perceived even when our volitions are causes. In my own case I can perceive no such activity. And I *can* perceive something else which could be mistaken for such an activity. I am conscious of willing. And then, after an interval of more or less duration, I am conscious that the result which I willed—the movement of my arm, for example, has taken place. In some cases, also, I am conscious of a feeling of tension or strain within myself. But this is all. Now this feeling of tension or strain is not an activity exercised by me on my arm. It is itself an effect of some cause or causes, and it is a psychical state, and falls wholly within the mind. But I venture to think that this feeling of tension is mistaken for an activity exercised by me on the arm. On these grounds I reject the view that we are directly aware of such an activity when our volitions are causes. And no other reasons have ever been given why we should believe such an activity to exist.

The fourth characteristic was that the cause determines the effect in some way in which the effect does not determine the cause. And it is for this reason that it is supposed that there must be a first cause in any chain of causation, while there need not be a last effect—that an unending series of causes of causes is impossible, while an unending series of effects of effects is quite possible. But, in truth, we do not find this characteristic in any relation of implication which holds between existing substances.

One reason why it has been thought that there is this non-reciprocal determination is, once more, the belief that the cause exerts an activity on the effect. If this were so, it is supposed, the term which determines the activity would determine the other term in a way which was not reciprocated. But this is of course invalid, if, as has been maintained above, there is no such exertion of activity.

Of course—and this may have contributed to the mistake—there really is a non-reciprocal determination between characteristics. Beheading determines death, but death does not determine beheading, since there are many other ways in which death can arise. But this will not justify us in saying that the cause has a non-reciprocal determination of the effect. Very often the determining characteristic belongs to the term which would be called effect, and not to the one which would be called cause. In the case given above, beheading and death, it belongs to the term which would be

called cause—the event of beheading. But, to take another case, we should certainly say that drinking alcohol was the cause of getting drunk, and not that getting drunk is the cause of drinking alcohol. And here the characteristic of what would be called the effect determines the characteristic of what would be called the cause, and not *vice versa*. For I cannot get drunk without drinking alcohol, but I can drink alcohol without getting drunk. It is therefore the characteristic of getting drunk which determines the characteristic of drinking alcohol, and not *vice versa*.

The fact is that it is impossible to say that either event determines the other non-reciprocally, because each event can be described by close and precise characteristics, or by vague and wide ones. And in proportion as it is described by vague and wide ones, they are likely to be such that they are determined without determining. We have seen that drinking alcohol is determined by getting drunk, and does not determine it. But any event which is a drinking of alcohol is also the drinking of a definite amount M under conditions N. And if we take *this* more definite characteristic we find that the drinking now determines the drunkenness and not *vice versa*. For it would be impossible to drink that amount under these circumstances without getting drunk, while it would be possible to get drunk without drinking that amount under these circumstances—a much less amount, for example, might be sufficient for a man with a different constitution.

Thus, of two events causally connected, we cannot say that the one which would generally be called the cause determines the other more than it is determined by the other. Nor can we say that whichever of the two does determine the other ought to be called the cause. Firstly, this would, as we have seen, involve that the one which was later in time should in many cases be called the cause, and the earlier the effect—which would be so contrary to usage as to be very inconvenient. Secondly, because the same event would often have to be called cause if you described it in one way, and effect if you described it in the other. An event, for example, which was described simply as drinking alcohol, would be called the effect of the subsequent drunkenness, but if it were more precisely described as the drinking of an amount M under conditions N, it would be called the cause of that drunkenness. This also would be extremely inconvenient. For all those reasons we must give up the fourth characteristic.

The fifth characteristic was that the discovery of a causal

relation between two events explained those events, or, at any rate, explained the event taken as the effect. Now if explanation here merely means that the events are taken as an instance of a general rule, then of course causality does give an explanation. If I ask why event B occurs, and am told that it was the death of a human body, that the beheading of the same body had immediately preceded it, and that there is a general law that the beheading of a human body is immediately followed by its death, then, in this sense, the event will be explained. But it will not be explained in any other sense, except that of being brought under the law. And, of course, in this sense, the law itself has not been explained. It, in its turn, may be explained by being shown to be a case of some more general law, but we must at last reach a causal law which is ultimate, and cannot be explained further.

But it is more than this which is meant when the characteristic we are considering is asserted. It is supposed that a causal law does not only say that every occurrence of X implies the occurrence of Z, but that in some way it shows us *why* every occurrence of X implies the occurrence of Z, and, that, as a consequence of this, a particular case of Z is explained by its causal relations in some deeper and more thorough manner than by being shown to be an example of a general rule.

Now it is very important to realise that every ultimate causal law—every causal law which is not a case of a more general law—asserts an ultimate connexion of two things—that is, a connexion of which we know that it does exist, but do not know why it exists.

This view is one which many people have been very unwilling to accept. They have been very anxious that causal laws should offer some explanation of that relation of characteristics which they assert, and their anxiety has led them in many cases to an entirely distorted view of the nature of causal laws.

In the first place, it has led to the belief that cause and effect are identical. If the cause is the same thing as the effect, it is thought that the relation between them—or rather the relation it has to itself—will be so obvious that it will be self-explanatory. But then any relation of a thing to itself cannot be a relation of causality. If, whenever we say that A is the cause of B, A is identical with B, what we mean is that B is its own cause, and the only cause it can have. And it is clear that this is not what is really meant by causation, and that it explains nothing, since it merely

connects a thing with itself and gets us no farther than we were before.

This seems so obvious that it seems strange that any one should deny it. And yet many great philosophers *have* denied it. The explanation is, I think, that what they are thinking of is that a cause and effect often have a common element. The egg is part of the cause of the chicken, and some of the content of the egg is some of the content of the chicken. Sugar and fruit are part of the cause of jam (not the whole cause, for there is also the person who makes it) and the same matter which was the sugar and fruit is the matter which is the jam. And we may perhaps say that the energy which was in the cause is also in the effect. But there are cases where there is no such common element. An east wind may be the cause of a bad temper. And the ambition of Napoleon may be the cause of bullet holes in the walls of Hougoumont. And in neither of these cases is there any common element that I can see, except those which are also common to things not causally connected.

But even when there is a common element this does not make the cause and the effect identical. Sugar and fruit may have a common element with jam, but they are not the same thing as jam, or we could not distinguish jam from them, which we can do. And when we say that sugar and fruit (*and* the jam maker) cause jam, what they cause are just the elements in the jam which are not identical with any elements in the sugar and fruit. The elements which are the same are not caused, but persist. We do not say that in making jam we cause its weight or its impenetrability.

Cause and effect, then, are not identical. And we must go farther. That any cause A has an effect B is never a self-evident proposition, in the way that it is self-evident that two straight lines cannot enclose a space. And, still further, it is never a proposition that can be proved by *a priori* considerations, in the way in which we can prove that the angles of a triangle are equal to two right angles. All ultimate causal laws are empirical truths. We know that they are so because, in point of fact, we find them to be so.

We have good reason to believe that, if a man's head is cut off, he dies. But our reason is purely empirical. We believe it either because it has been observed that, in none of the many cases in which a man has been beheaded, he fails to die, or else because it can be deduced from some wider law which itself rests on experience. Apart from experience we should have no reason to suppose that cut-

ting off a man's head would kill him than to believe that cutting his hair would kill him. Apart from experience, we have no more reason to suppose that cutting off my head would kill me than we have to suppose it would kill the executioner, or blow up the Taj Mahal, or destroy a mountain in the moon. We have good reason to believe that it will do the first, and not any of the other three. But our reasons are all empirical. All ultimate causal laws, in other words, are what is sometimes called "brute facts". But the name is misleading, since it rather suggests that there is some defect or imperfection about these facts, or about our knowledge of them, whereas the truth is that such facts not only have no reasons, but do not require any reasons.

There is one case in which it might seem particularly hard to admit that causal relations are here brute facts, and that is the case when a volition to do something—say to move one's arm—causes the movement. Surely, it might be said, even if it is not possible to be certain, apart from experience, that such volitions have such results, it could be seen, apart from experience, that it is likely to have such a result, and the probability, though not the certainty, is more than a brute fact? But this is mistaken. Except for empirical experience, it is just as probable that my volition to move my arm should move my leg, or Mount Everest, as that it should move my arm. This may be made more obvious if we reflect that the *immediate* effect of my volition to move my arm is to produce various changes in my brain, nerves and muscles, which I am not willing, and of which, perhaps, I know nothing whatever, and that, if for any reason this effect, which is not willed, fails, the effect which is willed fails with it.

The fifth characteristic, then, must be rejected. No relation of causality gives any explanation, except in the sense that it gives a general rule of which the particular case is an example. How about the sixth characteristic? This was that the cause could not be subsequent to the effect.

To answer this question, we must consider, in the first place, that we have not as yet found any criterion by which to distinguish the cause from the effect in a causal relation. The definition of causality which we have adopted was that it was a relation of implication between existent substances. The only difference between the two substances concerned which this relation involves is that one of them implies the other, while the second does not (except in cases of reciprocal causation) imply the first. But, as we saw when we were discussing the fourth characteristic, it would be im-

practicable to call the determinant substance the cause, and the other the effect. And thus our definition of causality gives us no criterion for distinguishing one term as cause and the other as effect. The third, fourth and fifth characteristics would have given us such a criterion, but we have found it necessary to reject them.

Accordingly, if we are to distinguish one term as cause and the other as effect it will have to be exclusively by means of a criterion based on the sixth characteristic. The earlier of the two terms connected by a causal relation will be called the cause, and the later the effect. But there will be considerable difficulties about such a use of words. If the distinction between cause and effect depends solely on temporal order, then there could be no causal relation between strictly simultaneous events. And, again, there could be no causal relation between two substances, one or both of which is out of time. A timeless God, for example, could not be the cause of the world, and between such a God and the world there could be no causal relation at all. Whether there is a God, and, if so, whether he is timeless, is another question, but there is, I think, no doubt that a use of the word "cause" would be very inconvenient if it prevented us from saying that such a God, if he existed, could be a cause.

Moreover, although it has been very generally held in the past that the earlier of the two terms should be called the cause, it has by no means been very general to hold that priority by itself is sufficient to make the earlier term the cause. It is generally, I think, believed that the earlier term is the cause because it is the earlier term which exerts an activity, or which determines the other, or which explains the other. And now that we have had to reject this view, it does not seem that we should be in very much harmony with ordinary usage, if we called the earlier term the cause, merely because it was earlier.

The course that I think most convenient therefore is to speak of causal relations as existing between two terms, but not to speak of one of those terms as cause, and of the other as effect. Of course, I am speaking here of philosophical usage. In ordinary life one should doubtless continue to say that a particular drinking of alcohol is the cause of a particular state of drunkenness. But philosophically we should say only that the drinking and the drunkenness stood in a causal relation to one another, since they were existent substances which stood in a relation of implication. What the implication, or rather the implications, may be, depends on the various characteristics of each. We saw above that,

if the drinking is described only as a drinking of alcohol, it is determined by the other, described as a state of drunkenness, and does not determine it, but that this is reversed if it is described as a drinking of an amount M under conditions N.

Of course it might be objected that, after all we have given up, we ought not to speak of causal relations at all. If we have given up all idea of activity, and of explanation, and of the non-reciprocal determination of the later term by the earlier, and if we have given up the designation of one of the terms as cause, and of the other as effect, ought we not to give up causality altogether? This view is taken by Mr. Russell, who, in his paper before the Aristotelian Society on the Notion of Cause, says that the idea of causality "is a relic of a bygone age, surviving . . . only because it is erroneously supposed to do no harm".

There is, no doubt, something to be said for this view, but, as I said previously, I think the balance is the other way. It is admitted that, for example, the occurrence of an event which is the beheading of a human being implies the occurrence of an event which is the death of the same human being. And I think that in this we have the essence of causality, and that we ought therefore to say that there is a causal relation between the beheading of Charles I. and the death of Charles I. Still this is, after all, a matter of definition. The results which we have reached which are more than matters of definition are that we ought to reject the conceptions of a cause which exerts activity, of a cause which explains its effects, and of a cause which non-reciprocally determines its effect, together with the further result that these rejections do not involve the rejection of the implication of one event (or other substance) by another.

We have then defined causality. The further question arises of the universal validity of causality. The question of whether causation *is* universally valid, or, indeed, valid at all, is beyond the scope of this lecture. All that I shall try to do is to state precisely what its universal validity would mean.

For causality to hold universally it would be necessary that each characteristic of any substance, in each case in which it occurred, should be implied by some other characteristic which had occurred. It would be necessary, then, that the following statement should be true. Let G be any characteristic which occurs, that is to say, which is found in any existing substance. Then, in each case in which G occurs, a characteristic, H<sub>a</sub>, can be found, which occurs in a

relation, *La* to that occurrence of *G*, and which is such that, in each case in which *Ha* occurs, it will stand in the relation *La* to some occurrence of *G*.

Thus *G* might be the death of a human body. The *Ha* that we might find in connexion with a particular case of *G* might be the beheading of a human body. The relation *La* would then be that they were characteristics of the same body, and that the death immediately followed the beheading. And it is the case that whenever the beheading of a human body occurs the death of a human body is found in that relation to it.

I do not say that this is the form which causal laws invariably take. They do take it in some cases, but in others (especially, though not exclusively, in the sciences of inorganic matter) the laws of most importance take a quantitative form. For example, a change in the temperature of water determines a change in the space it occupies, and the amount of the one change is connected with the amount of the other according to some definite formula. But, although such a law as this does not take the form of the proposition given above, yet many propositions of this form must be true, if the law is to be true. If the changes of temperature and sign are connected in this way, then, whenever the change takes place from some particular temperature to another, there must be a change from some particular size to another. And then these two changes will be the *G* and the *Ha*, of which one is always found in a certain relation to the other. Such a law as that which correlates temperature and size will imply many such propositions as these, and cannot be true unless these propositions are true. And thus our statement above will have to be true in any field—whether the universe or a part of the universe—in which causality is universal, even though many of the causal laws are not expressed in this form.

The universality of causality is what is meant when we speak of the Uniformity of Nature, and we may therefore give the name of the Law of the Uniformity of Nature to our proposition which asserts that a causal law can always be found by which any particular occurrence of *G* is determined.

It will be noticed that our statement of the Law of the Uniformity of Nature does not assert reciprocal determination. The *Ha* which can be found for any occurrence of *G* is to be such that every occurrence of *Ha* stands in the relation *La* to an occurrence of *G*, but it has not been said that every occurrence of *G* will have an occurrence of *Ha* stand-

ing in the relation of  $La$  to it. It may well be that different occurrences of  $G$  may be related respectively to occurrences of  $Ha$ ,  $H\beta$ , and  $H\gamma$ , by the relations  $La$ ,  $L\beta$ , and  $L\gamma$ , and therefore, while every occurrence of  $Ha$  stands in a relation  $La$  to a  $G$ , not every  $G$  has an occurrence of  $Ha$  standing in the relation  $La$  to it. Thus, in our previous example, the beheading of a body is always followed by its death, but the death of a body is not always preceded by its beheading. The death may be determined by hanging or poisoning.

Of course, if  $G$  does not reciprocally determine  $Ha$ , it will be necessary, if the law of the uniformity of nature should be true, that  $Ha$ , whenever it occurs should be determined by some other characteristic. Since, for example, the death of a body does not imply the previous beheading of that body, there must, if the law of the uniformity of nature be true, be some other characteristic, the occurrence of which on any occasion implies the beheading of a body. This need not be a characteristic of the body itself. The law may be that whenever a certain characteristic occurs in something in a relation to a body that body will be beheaded.

Why does the law of the uniformity of nature lead to this apparently one-sided result—that for every occurrence of  $G$  we can find an  $Ha$  which determines  $G$ , while there is no guarantee that any  $Ha$  can be found which  $G$  will always determine? The answer is that  $G$  stands in the law for any characteristic which occurs in the universe, whether that characteristic is a description so minute that it applies only to one case in the universe, or is so closely defined and so narrow in its application as “the death of a King of England,” or is as broadly defined and as narrow in its application as “event,” “substance,” “thing”.  $Ha$ ,  $H\beta$ , etc., on the contrary are not *any* characteristics, but only such as fulfil the required conditions with reference to  $G$ . They can therefore be chosen so as to be as closely defined and as narrow in their application as is necessary to ensure that there shall be no occurrence of  $Ha$ , or of  $H\beta$ , which does not determine an occurrence of  $G$ .

The law of the uniformity of nature, then, does not imply the reciprocal determination of characteristics. How must a law be stated which would assert that reciprocal determination?

It is clear, in the first place, that any law which asserted that, whenever there was determination, there was reciprocal determination, would be false. We know that drunkenness determines the drinking of alcohol, and we know that the drinking of alcohol does not determine drunkenness, since

there have been cases in which men have drunk alcohol without getting drunk. Here, then, is at least one case of causal determination which is not reciprocal. Again, if an existent thing is red, that fact determines that the same thing shall be coloured. But the fact that an existent thing is coloured does not determine that it should be red.

If then universal reciprocal determination is taken to mean that every determination of one characteristic by another is reciprocal, it is clear that reciprocal determination does not hold universally. And when it has been said that all causal determination is reciprocal, something else, less far-reaching than this, has, I think, been meant. It has been meant, not that every determination of a characteristic is reciprocal, but that every characteristic has at least one determination which is reciprocal. The determination of death by beheading, it would be admitted, is not reciprocal, but, it would be asserted that all deaths by beheading have some particular characteristic which is found in no other sort of death, and that this particular sort of death and beheading are in reciprocal determination. Again, it would be asserted that there was some characteristic which occurred whenever the characteristic of death occurred, and only then, so that it stands in reciprocal determination with death.

If such reciprocal determination were universal, the law asserting it might be expressed as follows: Let *G* be any characteristic which occurs. Then, in each case in which *G* occurs, a characteristic *H* can be found, which occurs in a relation *L* to that occurrence of *G*, and which is such that in each case in which *H* occurs it will stand in the relation *L* to an occurrence of *G*, and that in each case in which *G* occurs, an occurrence of *H* will stand in the relation *L* to it.

It is impossible to prove empirically that this law does not hold universally. There may be many cases in which we do not see it to hold. There may be many characteristics, even among them for which we can find determinants, for which we cannot find any case of reciprocal determination with another characteristic. Yet for each of them there *may* be a determinant, unknown to us, where the determination is reciprocal. But, on the other hand, it would seem that it must be impossible to prove the law of reciprocal causal determination from the law of the uniformity of nature, even if the latter were itself established. For it is obvious that there is no contradiction in a determination which is not reciprocal, since, as we have seen, many determinations—such as the determination of death by beheading—are not reciprocal.

There is one more question about laws of causation which we may profitably consider. It has sometimes been asserted that complete knowledge of any substance would imply complete knowledge of any other substance, so that, if it were possible for us to know all that was true about any other substance, it would be ideally possible, with a sufficiently powerful intellect, to infer from this all that is true about every other substance in the universe, and the universe itself. This is apparently what Tennyson means when he says that if he could know completely what the flower was that he plucked from the crannied wall, he would know what God and man were. It is often said that this implication of the nature of each substance with that of every other must happen if the law of the uniformity of nature were universally valid, and could not happen unless it were universally valid.

This seems to me to be mistaken. In one sense this implication of the nature of each substance with that of every other is true, and it is true quite independently of the law of the uniformity of nature. In another sense it could be false even if the law of the uniformity of nature—and the law of universal reciprocal determination—were true.

The sense in which it is true, independent of the uniformity of nature, is as follows. Every substance in the universe is related to every other substance in the universe. Complete knowledge of all that was true about any substance A would include knowledge of all its relations to all other substances. This will include complete knowledge of all those other substances. For, if A has the relation L to B, then every fresh fact, C, about B is also a fresh fact about A, since it tells us that A has the relation L to something of which C is true. My relation to Julius Cæsar is not a very close one, but there *is* a relation, and therefore complete knowledge of me will include complete knowledge of Cæsar, since without complete knowledge of Cæsar it will not be known exactly what it is to which I stand in this relation. So a complete description of A—including all facts true of A—would include complete descriptions of all other substances. It would scarcely be correct to say that complete knowledge of B could be *deduced* from complete knowledge of A, but it would be true that, if we had complete knowledge of A we should have complete knowledge of B, and of every other substance.

But this inclusion of knowledge of all other substances in knowledge of A is not what is meant by the theory we are discussing. That theory asserts that from a knowledge of A which does not include knowledge of B, complete knowledge of B might be inferred by any one who had sufficient

knowledge of the laws by which one substance causally determines another, and sufficient power of reasoning to carry out the arguments required. And there seems no reason to suppose that this would necessarily be true, even if universal reciprocal causal determination were true.

That causal determination should be universal means that every occurrence of a characteristic in the universe is implied by the occurrence of some other characteristic in the universe. Now there is nothing in this to prevent it from being the case that there should be two substances, A and B, such that there is no characteristic of B the occurrence of which is implied, directly or indirectly, by the occurrence of any characteristic in A. (It is, of course, as we have just said, impossible that there should be any two substances in the universe which are not related in some way, but it does not follow from this that any two substances must be related by a relation of implication, since there are many other sorts of relation.)

And, even if it should be the case that every substance in the universe were connected with every other substance by relations of implication, the theory we are considering would not be proved. For it might still be the case that, though some characteristics of B were implied by characteristics of A, there were other characteristics of B which were not implied either directly or indirectly, by any characteristic of A. And, in this case, no knowledge of A will enable us to infer all the characteristics of B.

We have thus attempted to decide what should be meant by the word causality, and what would be meant by the universal validity of causal determination. The question whether causal determination is valid is beyond the scope of this lecture. Yet it may be pointed out that, if it is to be shown to be valid, it can only be in one way. To attempt to prove it empirically is hopeless, for all empirical proof must rest on induction, and induction itself rests on the uniformity of nature, so that any such argument would move in a vicious circle. And it is clear that the universal validity of causal determination is not *self-evident a priori*. In the mere assertion that it is not valid, taken by itself, there is nothing self-contradictory nor absurd. Only one alternative remains—that it should be capable of proof by a chain of reasoning resting on premises known *a priori*. It is further to be noticed that it does not follow that causal determination cannot be proved or be valid at all, unless it is proved to be valid universally. It might conceivably be proved to be true with respect to characteristics of certain classes, if it could not be proved about all.

### III.—THE NEW DEVELOPMENTS OF MR. BRADLEY'S PHILOSOPHY.

BY F. C. S. SCHILLER.

Two excellent reasons may be given for this article. The first is the badness of philosophic criticism, which hardly ever troubles to give an intelligible account of the works supposed to be under review. For this again the reasons are in part specific and due to the very general inability of any philosopher to understand any other, in part general and due to the common habit of critics to perform their responsible functions by reading the preface and then proceeding to discourse about familiar doctrines in the author's last book, instead of reviewing the new one. But as prefaces only contain what the author wishes to be believed about his work, and are often written to test or circumvent the critics, they often deceive the latter; also this method of reviewing is evidently apt to bear hardly on any *novelties* the author may have ventured on. It is almost preferable that the critic should practise the egotistic method of discussing the work entirely in relation to his own system. For this may sometimes be enlightening (if there is sufficient affinity between the views implicated, and the critic is not merely a youngster trying to spread himself), and it usually contributes at least to the psychology of criticism, even where it does not produce any adequate likeness to the actual contents of the work so treated.

Now as Mr. Bradley's last book has suffered in both these ways from its reviewers,<sup>1</sup> and there exists a serious danger that some quite important novelties imbedded in his *Essays on Truth and Reality* will be practically overlooked, it seems a public service to call attention to them.

My second reason for this article is that I feel that I owe Mr. Bradley, or at any rate the philosophic public, something like an *amende honorable* for the attitude I have taken up

<sup>1</sup> It is fortunately not necessary to give references or to mention names, as most of the offenders were anonymous, and those who have read both the book and the reviews will easily understand what I mean.

towards Mr. Bradley's philosophy in the past. Not indeed (a) because I repent me of the criticisms passed on some of his doctrines—for most of them still await an answer, as do the criticisms of Mr. Alfred Sidgwick and Captain H. V. Knox, and the pretence that this is so not because they were unanswerable but because they were not worth answering, will deceive no one who is not determined to believe this at all costs. Nor (b) because I failed to acknowledge my debt to Mr. Bradley's writings—for I have always represented my humanism as the logical outcome of the philosophic situation created by his brilliant *reductio ad absurdum* (as it still seems to me) of rationalistic 'idealism'. Nor yet (c) because I have been blind to the pragmatic tendencies of Mr. Bradley's philosophising—for it was just on their account that it seemed to me an appropriate starting-point *en route* to pragmatism.

But what (d) I must joyfully confess is that I did not originally anticipate that Mr. Bradley would himself accompany us on this *route* as far as he has now done. This shows primarily how vastly inferior I am to William James as a practical psychologist. For James was always most reluctant to reply to Mr. Bradley's persistent and copious strictures on himself, not because he thought it difficult to expose the misconceptions in which they abounded, but because he was convinced that it was much better to leave Mr. Bradley to puzzle things out for himself, as he would then in the end convert himself to something remarkably like pragmatism, though very likely he would never forgive those who had forced this development upon him against his will. He was consequently content to predict, *à propos* of the article in *MIND*, No. 72, which forms chapter viii. of the present *Essays*, that some day Mr. Bradley might "take it into his head to revoke" and give away the game of rationalistic philosophy, and to note how very close his views really came to Bergson's (*and his own!*) at the 'watershed,' where they had all originated together in a repudiation of the Hume-Kantian conception of the 'synthesising' function of mind.<sup>1</sup>

At the time indeed it seemed that this prediction had failed. For Mr. Bradley promptly repudiated James's suggestion, and ascribed to Hegel the whole honour of engendering his doctrine.<sup>2</sup> This reply was not quite apposite, because James had alluded to his departure from the *Kantian* tradition, and on closer investigation his disclaimer, despite the vigour of its language, seems far from conclusive.

<sup>1</sup> *Journal of Phil.*, vii., 2, Jan. 20, 1910, pp. 33, 29.

<sup>2</sup> *Ibid.* 7; *Essays*, p. 152.

The point at issue is, of course, very important. It is nothing less than the radical correction of the assumption of Hume and Kant that experience is given as a series of discrete experiences, demanding philosophic '*synthesis*' (either empirically by 'association' or transcendently by *a priori* 'forms'), and not as a continuous flux, upon which our selective attention and interests perform *coupures*, until it is analysed and conveniently transformed into the common-sense world of interacting 'things'. Nowadays this doctrine is chiefly associated with the psychology of James and the metaphysics of Bergson. But it is true, and has not escaped the acuteness of some pragmatists,<sup>1</sup> that this doctrine, though it is not made philosophically prominent, pretty definitely occurs also in Mr. Bradley's *Logic* (1883).<sup>2</sup>

The question is how it got here. Mr. Bradley regrets that he cannot inform us "when it was that the view in question was first advocated in modern philosophy," but feels "perfectly certain" that he himself "derived it from Hegel".<sup>3</sup> But unfortunately he gives neither reasons nor references, and it is on various grounds not impossible that he may be mistaken. The students of Mr. Bradley are familiar with his habit of ascribing vaguely to 'Hegel' many doctrines which affiliate themselves far more obviously to other philosophers, *e.g.* Herbart, and, if they are psychologists, must have noticed how strangely oblivious of the sources of their ideas philosophers can often become. It is difficult to believe, for example, that Aristotle was fully aware of his indebtedness to Plato. Nor, of course, does it follow that because one philosopher (in perfectly good faith) gets a view out of another's stimulation, it is actually contained in that other in a way any one else could have detected. In this case Mr. Bradley's theory has to explain how a view in Hegel which repudiates, not only the Humian psychology but also the Kantian epistemology upon a vital point, came to be overlooked by the whole of the professedly 'orthodox' Anglo-Hegelian School (T. H. Green, the Cairds, etc.).<sup>4</sup> It is not

<sup>1</sup> Cf. D. L. Murray, *Pragmatism*, p. 10 n., though I must confess I myself did not realise the full extent of Mr. Bradley's divergence.

<sup>2</sup> P. 456. Cf. also *MIND*, O.S., No. 47 (1887), p. 363.

<sup>3</sup> *Ess.*, p. 152.

<sup>4</sup> I will first quote from the friendly pen of Prof. J. Watson the general confession that "in so far as such writers as Mr. Green and Mr. Caird are concerned, I think I may venture to say that as they undoubtedly conceive of the problem of philosophy very much as Kant conceived it, and seek to solve it by a method similar, if not identical, with his, whatever applies to Transcendentalism applies in all respects to Critical Idealism as well" (*Kant and His English Critics*, p. 3). For Green, indeed, reality

clear *prima facie* that Mr. Bradley is right against them, though I admit that he is a much greater philosopher. It seems more credible that Mr. Bradley may actually have developed his doctrine out of Aristotle, whose *συγκεχυμένον* is obviously a denial of 'psychological atomism' and certainly a continuum.

In view, however, of the apparent logical connexion of this view with other departures of Mr. Bradley's from 'idealist' orthodoxy, a still more obvious derivation may be suggested. If the psychical datum is conceived as continuous, it follows at once that judgments, 'ideas,' and in general reality and rationality, must be products of *selection*, and that the primary function of intelligence must be to *make* such selections, and that as such a selective agency, a 'soul' cannot be dispensed with. Now it is a curious fact that both these corollaries are (sometimes) found in Mr. Bradley, although intrinsically this whole body of doctrine fits remarkably ill into his metaphysical scheme. He is (a) unwilling to admit the 'uselessness' of the soul, though he does not claim originality for his 'Darwinian' counter-speculations.<sup>1</sup> (b) He emphasises, from first to last, the dependence of intelligence on discrimination,<sup>2</sup> and of judgment and truth on selection,<sup>3</sup> though he hardly attempts to show how this is compatible with his metaphysical dogma that truth must 'somehow' reside in the whole. It is further to be noted that so long ago as 1879 a faithful reader of *MIND* might have found all these

consists essentially of relations and he is for ever seeking for "the principle of union which renders them possible," and so nature "as the source of a connected experience" and our knowledge of it (*Prolegomena*, p. 14). He actually says (p. 13) that "motion has no meaning, except such as is derived from a synthesis of the different positions successively held by one and the same body," which is the exact opposite of Bergson's contention. He protests against those who assume 'facts' without a synthesis of events into objects, "because no such work of *synthesis* is thought to be required of consciousness at all," and insists that "every object we perceive is a congeries of related facts of which the simplest component . . . requires in order to its presentation the action of a principle of consciousness . . . upon successive appearances, such action as may hold the appearances together, without fusion, in an apprehended fact" (pp. 69, 70, italics mine). Cf. finally the following from A. Seth's (Pringle-Pattison) *From Kant to Hegel* (p. 9). "By presenting the categories as the knot which binds man and the world together . . . Idealism becomes independent of the weakness of some of the individual arguments which Kant brings forward against Hume. It becomes unimportant for philosophy to insist on the *a priori* origination of conceptions. The conceptions remain the same, though the whole psychology of associationism be admitted."

<sup>1</sup> *MIND*, N.S., iv., No. 14, p. 176.

<sup>2</sup> *MIND*, O.S., No. 47, p. 377.

<sup>3</sup> *Logic*, p. 459; *Ess.*, pp. 328, 330, 333, 345, etc.

ideas, clearly expressed in their proper logical and biological setting, in the remarkable articles which preluded the appearance of James's *Principles of Psychology*.<sup>1</sup> This may be merely a 'coincidence,' and if so Mr. Bradley will no doubt be delighted to establish this; but it shows that James had better reason to expect a 'revoke' from Mr. Bradley than from the ordinary run of 'idealists' who had never shown any perception either of the difficulties of their own position or of the elegance of the alternative.

It is clear then that there is much in Mr. Bradley to which justice is not usually done, either by his friends or by his opponents. As however I cannot here review the whole of Mr. Bradley's collection of essays in full detail (as it deserves), I shall practically omit (1) the large part of the book which consists of reprinted articles from *MIND*. These I used for years to comment on conscientiously as they came out,<sup>2</sup> and I have little to add, as they have hardly been altered at all. Both sets of articles dealt, more or less directly, with the pragmatic controversy, and Mr. Bradley's share of it is (superficially) distinguished by quite a virulent animus against what he calls pragmatism. But a pragmatist soon discovers both that what is attacked is not any pragmatism any one has ever held, and also that each successive outburst is the precursor of further concessions to the genuine article, so that their cumulative effect is to drive Bradleyism ever closer to pragmatism. Both for this reason then, and for others which will appear, the whole of this material may safely be left to the future historian of philosophy in the twentieth century, who (if he is not a German)<sup>3</sup> will find that it throws much light on the logical transition from absolutism to pragmatism and humanism.

(2) I do not feel it incumbent on me either to expound or to answer Mr. Bradley's criticisms on Mr. Russell's theories. For in part this subject has already been dealt with very fully (quantitatively at least), in part it seems to me that the relations between these views must remain purely 'external' and there is little likelihood that either will ever get near enough to the other to deal it a mortal blow.<sup>4</sup>

<sup>1</sup> Cf. especially "Are we Automata?" in O.S., iv., No. 13, and "The Sentiment of Rationality" in No. 15.

<sup>2</sup> Cf. Nos. 52, 63, 67, 73, 76, 85.

<sup>3</sup> A perusal of Dr. T. B. Muller's *Kennisleer van het anglo-amerikaansch Pragmatisme* leads me to hope that he may be a Dutchman.

<sup>4</sup> I do not reckon as such the objection that the 'coherence' theory of truth contradicts itself by asserting the absolute truth of the partial truth that no partial truths are wholly true, or otherwise, that having presupposed the absolute truth of the evidence on which it accepted its ideal of

(3) Lastly, I do not propose to reply specifically to Mr. Bradley's extensive criticisms on William James. Some of these are new, but most are old, and as the old ones did not seem to James to be worth answering, I should scarcely be acting in the spirit of our departed master if I concerned myself with them minutely. I will merely remark that in general their force seems to be greatly impaired by Mr. Bradley's fondness for mere verbalism (*e.g.* pp. 338-339), by his apparent inability even to conceive empirical verification and what is meant by a thing's 'coming true' (*e.g.*, p. 146), and by the very insufficient provision of exact references and quotations.<sup>1</sup> But it is pretty well recognised that Mr. Bradley's genius does not lie in reproducing the views of others.

### I.

There remain however substantial parts of Mr. Bradley's book which are both constructive and new. They consist of an introduction (pp. 1-18) and particularly of the concluding chapters (pp. 409-473), and what I propose to discuss is

'coherence,' it proceeds to destroy this essential premiss by concluding that no partial truth is absolute. For though this objection itself seems fatal and has never been met, it seems to rest merely on ordinary logic and to be independent of any special philosophy. As a matter of fact it was first urged by Mr. Russell in one form (*Arist. Soc. Proc.*, 1907), and by Capt. Knox in another (*Quarterly Rev.*, No. 419, pp. 390-394), and it now seems open to *any one* to urge it.

<sup>1</sup> Though one gratefully notes that as a rule Mr. Bradley has become kinder to his readers in these matters. But, as might have been expected, their gain is sometimes his loss; as *e.g.* when a specific reference to his *Logic*, pp. 518-519 enables them to judge just how much foundation there is for his claim to have anticipated Mr. Sidgwick's difficulty about the ambiguity of the middle term (p. 368 n.). The reference shows that he had come upon the formal basis of Sidgwick's discovery, but had no conception of its far-reaching logical importance, and regarded it merely as a piece of 'sceptical' ingenuity. For whereas to Sidgwick's mind the liability of the middle to ambiguity shows that there cannot be any 'formally valid' inference, and the conclusion of every argument has always to be verified empirically in fact in every case; to Mr. Bradley's it shows that syllogisms cannot be '*used*,' that unforeseen conditions must '*destroy*' our reasoning, that terms between which the connexion fails for a special purpose cannot be '*really connected*' at all, and that a logical process which is liable to error is '*sure*' to be vitiated. *I.e.* he has not grasped that syllogisms are made to be used, that deductions are intended to predict, and that there is no harm in correcting premisses. Hence the ambiguity for him pre-exists in the eternal being of universals, instead of being produced by the combination of the premisses for a special purpose, and he is still under the spell of the rationalistic delusion that where there is 'risk of error' there can be no genuine truth.

how far they should lead us to modify our estimates of Mr. Bradley's philosophy.

We note to begin with that the subjects discussed are far more interesting than the dreary subtleties to which philosophies usually restrict themselves, and indeed quite sensational. 'God and the Absolute,' 'the Reality and Personality of God,' 'the Fear of Death and the Desire for Immortality' and the possible reality of dream-worlds, strike quite a refreshingly human note at the end of 400 pages of highly technical discussion, which had, apparently, exhausted the patience of all his reviewers. Nor are the results less sensational: for they amount in effect to something very like a series of palinodes and an abandonment of important positions taken up in *Appearance and Reality* and elsewhere.

Not that Mr. Bradley formally withdraws what he said before; in view of the infinite elasticity of his Absolute in accommodating any amount of incongruities in their 'relative truth,' that would be quite unnecessary. He simply *adds* some surprising novelties. If to others these things seem incompatible with the older dicta, that only shows that they still retain an undue respect for the Principle of Contradiction, and a 'one-sided' hankering after consistency. But this principle (though it is good enough to build a metaphysic of Appearance and Reality on) has no terrors for the philosophic adept. He has ceased to listen to "a one-sided cry for clearness and consequence" (p. 124), he is "emancipated once and for all from the narrowness of all one-sided attempts at consistency," and despises "a blind appeal to theoretical consistency, and an uncritical faith in the ultimate Validity of some undiscussed Law of Contradiction" (p. 133)<sup>1</sup>. "To suit his varying purpose," therefore, he is able "from time to time to make statements which, as they are made, contradict one the other" (p. 337). As for metaphysics, he has "seen far too much" of them "to think of staking vital issues on the result of speculative inquiry" (p. 132), and is ever "willing to concede that my metaphysics may be wrong" though "nothing could persuade me that my instinct is not right" (p. 268).

It will probably be admitted that these candid confessions which he had thoughtfully made in the earlier part of his work leave Mr. Bradley a very free hand, and are intellectually disarming. It becomes merely stupid to object to anything he says on the score of inconsistency, and particularly when

<sup>1</sup> Cf. also p. 67 n., pp. 123, 343 n.

he himself objects to others on this score.<sup>1</sup> It is better to observe whither Mr. Bradley's 'instincts' conduct him.

## II.

In chapter xv. he begins by repeating that the Absolute is not God. God has no meaning outside of the religious consciousness, and that essentially is practical. The Absolute cannot be worshipped, because there cannot be a practical relation between it and the finite will: if you try to worship it you forthwith transform it into something which is *less* than the Universe. Hence is inferred a fundamental inconsistency in religion. For God must be perfect—in any but an 'imperfect' religion. A God good but limited, though he could be worshipped and might even evoke a special loyalty, cannot give *assurance* that in the end he may not be beaten, and this entails a loss to the religious (? timid) mind. We get then this dilemma that, if God is perfect, religion must contain inconsistency, while if consistency is sought, God must be limited and this mutilates the substance of religion. But why need we attempt to avoid self-contradiction? Has religion really got to be consistent theoretically? Is ultimate theoretical consistency attainable anywhere? Is it not once for all ridiculous? No truths are more than useful mythology anywhere, and only these inconsistent ideas can serve our various purposes. Religious 'truths' then are no worse than the others, and those of them which best express our highest religious needs, and their satisfaction, must certainly be true. To test them we need merely ask whether they really answer to our need; any other criterion is mistaken and dangerous.

It will readily be perceived that this argument, which has been summarised almost in Mr. Bradley's own words, makes some striking points. (1) It should severely shock the genuine seekers after a rational religion to learn that the quest is doomed to failure, and that religion is essentially a pragmatic business. Unfortunately no religion has yet been convinced either by Mr. Bradley or by any one else of the correctness of this diagnosis, and many of them even persecute the pragmatists they have among them.

(2) It is made quite clear *why* God cannot be identified with the Absolute. The Absolute is not only not worth worshipping, but whoever tries to do so finds that he *ipso facto* limits it, and turns it into something *less* than the Universe. This should cut off one of the chief sources of philosophic hypocrisy.

<sup>1</sup> *E.g.* p. 318.

(3) It manifestly makes extraordinary concessions to the notion of a finite God, who is now acknowledged not only to be thinkable, but adorable and superior, *in theoretic consistency*, to the God of 'perfect' religion. All of these are contentions of a philosophic pluralism for which formerly Mr. Bradley could not express sufficient contempt. True, the finitist theology is still rejected, but with what perfunctory arguments! They reduce themselves to a refusal to alter an arbitrary *definition* of 'religion'. For all that "mutilating the substance of religion" really means is that when you have (rashly) defined religion as the worship of an omnipotent Whole and discovered that this will not do, because the Whole cannot be worshipped, you *must change your definition* into something more in accord with the facts of the situation.

(4) And Mr. Bradley also betrays the shabby and pettily human motives of the refusal to do this. A finite God yields no absolute '*assurance*'; and even a verbal and nugatory assurance *a priori* is better than merely empirical grounds of confidence. The prejudice here revealed is identical with that which prompts the demand of Formal Logic for *formally valid* 'proof,' and its refusal to look at the real reasoning which *runs the risk* of failure. But there seems little reason for dubbing this refusal either 'religious' in the one case or 'logical' in the other. In both cases it resembles rather an instinctive prompting of moral cowardice and intellectual obtuseness. At any rate, when its nature is thus nakedly displayed, we may trust that it will be bravely repudiated by the sturdy old Norse spirit that prefers to run the risk of 'dying with Odin' when *Ragnarök* breaks out, to being ignobly saved by an illusory transmutation into an Absolute that neither knows nor cares.

(5) But the most glaring feature in Mr. Bradley's argument is its aggressive affinity to pragmatism. It even seems at first sight an *ultra-pragmatism*, which exults in those very excesses which the austerer scientists and philosophers have from the first denounced as demoralising and destructive of the most elementary standards of intellectual honesty. It not only seems to make mere emotional satisfactoriness the primary source of religious 'truths,' and makes no mention of any empirical or objective *testing*,<sup>1</sup> but sanctions the completest autonomy of every sort of truth-claim and a complete disregard of the duty of synthesising the various sorts of 'truths'. So long as they do not claim to be absolute, 'truths' have a licence to be as inconsistent as

<sup>1</sup> Though this is not perhaps made quite clear.

they please. Provided, of course, that they can be said to 'work' in any way. For we unmistakably encounter in Mr. Bradley the notorious equating of truth and use, which such desperate attempts have long been made to fasten on to pragmatism. "*Whatever* ideas really are required," he calmly declares, "are true."<sup>1</sup> In short the despotism of the one (unknowable) Absolute Truth rests upon an absolute anarchy among the common herd of its subjects. The reason for this paradox is that nothing is ultimately true but the One and to relative 'truths' everything is permitted.<sup>2</sup>

Could these deliverances be surpassed by any pragmatist? He would certainly be ill-advised to try, and should rather quote *Timeo Danaos*, and scrutinise Mr. Bradley's offers of support. He will then note that their doctrine seems to ignore the scientific source of pragmatism in that unwearying watching of events and critical revision of truth-claims of all sorts, which assure the progress of the sciences, and therefore will *not* abandon the hope of scientifically verifying and synthesising them all. Nor will his failure to attain absolute truth goad him into disregard of intellectual consistency. He will point out to Mr. Bradley that there is no need to despair of the ultimate consistency and complete unification of scientific doctrine because of the survival-value of 'true' beliefs, and that his apparent laxity in allowing all sorts of 'satisfaction' to put in their claims *to be tested*, only recognises the actual facts of human knowing, and redounds to the benefit of the so-called 'theoretic' interest itself, if it aims at an adequate description of the functioning of our intelligence.

Nor will he admit that Mr. Bradley has outbid him in the eyes of the intelligently religious or surpassed him in pragmatism. He will explain rather that Mr. Bradley's present position forms the last halting place but one before true pragmatism is reached, and its exaggerations are reduced to reason. For if we premise that one of the best roads to pragmatism issues from the gradual dissipation of the great illusion about the absoluteness of truth, and that we may begin by discovering that there is an apparently arbitrary (*i.e.* selective), and therefore man-made and 'fictitious,' side to *some* truths, and that this is essential to their function and the very source of their usefulness and value, it is tempting to

<sup>1</sup> P. 433. Similarly, p. 123, "I agree that any idea which *in any way* 'works,' has in some sense truth" (italics mine, in both cases). Miss Stebbing should take note of this (*cf.* *MIND*, No. 83, 84, 86, 88).

<sup>2</sup> It is curious that the doctrine of 'degrees' of truth should no longer be appealed to, to introduce some semblance of order.

proceed to the excessive declaration that *all* 'truths' are 'fictions' and that the way of 'knowledge' always leads away from 'reality'. Now this is the position which has been reached by Prof. Vaihinger,<sup>1</sup> and long before, by Nietzsche.<sup>2</sup> But Mr. Bradley here has *not quite* got to it. He is willing enough to describe all 'relative' truths as useful 'fictions'; but he still thinks that absolute truth *ought* to exist, and so clings to the belief that the Absolute must have it, seeing that no one else can. To the critic this position naturally seems an unreasonable prejudice, but it is Mr. Bradley's *choice*, and cannot be attacked by logic.

What however a critic is entitled to demur to is the tacit assumption, made both by Prof. Vaihinger and (at this point) by Mr. Bradley, that because 'truths' are 'fictions,' no one need trouble about them further. For surely the *values* of such 'fictions' may be discriminated, and are very various. They can therefore be arranged in an order of merit from a purely human point of view. Further, a system of the purposes to which the various truths minister may be gradually built up. And when we watch the persistence and devotion with which the sciences build up their systems, it may suddenly occur to us that after all the impracticable assumption that truth must *not* depart from the given by subjecting it to human manipulations was nothing but an arbitrary prejudice, which led only to an unjust depreciation of the most precious truths as 'fictions'. We can, therefore, uproot this prejudice and abandon this assumption, if we resolve to *cancel* the otiose notion of 'absolute' truth altogether. Our 'relative truths' (*alias* 'fictions') thereupon become truths *optimi juris*, and their failure to be absolute no longer counts against them. In that moment true pragmatism is born, and can proceed to appraise the claims of the conflicting 'truths,' so far as the state of human knowledge permits.

### III.

We return to Mr. Bradley's account of the personality of God. A personal God is not of course ultimate for metaphysics. But he may yet be so for religion (though some religions do without one). The real presence of God's will in ours must not however be denied or impaired by this religious sentiment. For that is more vital still. Hence genuine religion exhibits a 'pantheism' " which

<sup>1</sup> Cf. MIND, No. 81, pp. 100-103.

<sup>2</sup> Cf. Quarterly Review, No. 434, pp. 162-165.

is not less there because it expresses itself by what in fact is an inconsistent polytheism". Religion is once more revealed as consisting of necessary inconsistencies.

This passage accords somewhat better with *Appearance and Reality*, though the postulate of personality is treated with far more respect, and no longer as a mere device of intellectual dishonesty.<sup>1</sup> In the next section, which discusses immortality, the modifications are more marked. The arguments, with the exception of the demand of personal affection, all leave Mr. Bradley "not merely unconvinced but cold," and he doubts whether it is much use arguing about the subject. Nevertheless his intellectual tone has improved—apparently through the influence of Dr. Mc Taggart, like himself, an 'atheistic' absolutist. He concedes that if any one's religion demands a genuine personal existence after death, the belief is "so far right, and under this condition may be called true" (p. 439, 'ultra-pragmatism' again!). He condemns as "one-sided and unsatisfactory" his notorious article in the *Fortnightly Review*,<sup>2</sup> and 'fully recognises' that "in some present attempts to communicate with the dead there is much which deserves sympathy". And he has given practical expression to this change of attitude by joining the Society for Psychical Research some six or seven years ago. Nay, so complete has been his change of mind that he even considers that the official Roman Catholic view that (unauthorised) psychical phenomena are to be ascribed to the Devil deserves serious consideration (p. 440 n.).<sup>3</sup>

#### IV.

Proceeding to pp. 443-447, we get an interesting excursus on the relations of life, metaphysics and common-sense which is marked by great candour and a further advance towards pragmatism. Mr. Bradley points out that the Universe "refuses to divide itself into well-defined objects and clean-cut distinctions". The demand therefore for them by "what counts itself as sound sense and clear thinking must mutilate and distort the living whole". Thus common-sense can never be reconciled to metaphysics, nor can metaphysics cure man's intellectual unrest, though Mr. Bradley holds that

<sup>1</sup> Cf. *App. and Real.*, p. 532.

<sup>2</sup> Dec., 1885.

<sup>3</sup> Like Mr. H. S. Shelton in *Science Progress*, Jan., 1914, p. 410. One wonders after that what Mr. Bradley thinks of a recent case of the ex-communication of a priest for working miracles (not fraudulently but) without his bishop's leave!

for him "it has in principle broken down the unnatural barrier between beauty and truth, between poetry and fact" (p. 444). It is admitted however that this may all rest on personal feeling, and that others may conclude from it to theoretic scepticism. Even this may free us from "the tyranny of intellectual prejudices" and "the superstitious idolatry of abstract consistency. For such a scepticism all our truths, without exception, are mere working ideas," *i.e.* "are there to serve our living interests" (p. 445). For such a view prose and 'fact' may be more fanciful than poetry or art. "Everything in short in life will be tried, and condemned or justified, solely on the ground of our highest human interests" (p. 446). In addition however to such a "mere collection of working ideas" we need "some kind of working creed," in order "to recognise and justify in due proportion all human interests, and at the same time to supply the intellect with that to which it can hold with confidence". It is not in the power of philosophy to supply such a new religion, though a critical philosophy may "in some sense justify and support our faith". Mr. Bradley declines to surmise whether and how "we shall get this new religion," but will not declare it impossible.

It is clear that this argument presents remarkable analogies with the ideas of thinkers like Prof. Bergson (as regards the distortion which comes from conceptualising), Prof. J. A. Stewart (as regards the affinity between metaphysics and poetry), and Mr. A. J. Balfour (as regards the imperative need for a religion). Moreover in his description of the intellectual attitude flowing from 'theoretical scepticism' Mr. Bradley comes nearer to pragmatism than he ever did before, and indeed only just stops short of it. For (a) he gives up the single exception to the pragmatic nature of truths he had insisted on before, *viz.* the alleged Absolute's absolute truth, and allows that *all* our truths may be taken as working ideas. (b) He appears to recognise the need for *testing* truth-claims, and judging them accordingly.

These two advances would together entail complete pragmatism, if (1) we were also allowed to re-name the doctrine and to re-value its products, discarding the term 'scepticism' and the imputation of 'fiction'. This however Mr. Bradley will not let us do. But why should the fortunate fact that ideas 'work' convert them into 'fictions,' and why should our willingness to use them for what they are worth constitute 'scepticism'? Surely real 'theoretical scepticism' does not look beyond the intrinsic quality of the idea it finds intellectually defective and has nothing to do

with their 'working'. Any reference to 'working' must at once import considerations alien to pure contemplation, and transcend pure scepticism, which does not seem to concern itself with the *use* of ideas at all, and least of all with use for the purpose of harmonising or organising human life and action. Indeed it is precisely in its abstraction from the *use* of ideas that the essential error of scepticism appears to consist in pragmatic eyes. A pragmatist would also regard with some suspicion the apparent vagueness and dangerous laxity of Mr. Bradley's idea of 'working'.

(2) Mr. Bradley also does not seem to extricate himself very successfully from the difficulty of *combining* his two views that the Universe is a 'living' whole, and that "life as a whole is liveable, because we select arbitrarily those ideas which seem best to suit the occasion" (p. 443). It seems to follow (a) that conceptual interpretation, because selective, is 'mutilation,' and (b) that nevertheless, unless we select, we cannot *live*. Thus the 'life' of the Universe depends on *forgoing* selection, that of man on *insisting* on it. Life therefore appears to be hopelessly divided against itself, and the 'life' of the Universe consists of a perpetual self-mutilation.<sup>1</sup>

But why not escape from this singularly awkward situation by reconsidering the assumptions which led to it? Why not take the 'life' primarily to be explained as *our own*, and *suspend our postulation of* 'The Universe,' until we have inquired what right we have to make it in the precise form that produces the *impasse*? It may then turn out either that no unity of the Universe need be conceived in such a way as to stultify our whole cognitive procedure, or even that the supposed intellectual necessity of assuming the unity of the Universe was a mistake altogether. After all, once we begin to question the self-evidence and absolute truth of monistic metaphysics, we need not shrink from observing that they never seem concerned to show that there is a practicable *route* from the empirical unity of human experience (such as it is) to the cosmic validity of our notion of 'The Universe'. If

<sup>1</sup> The same difficulty arises for Mr. Bradley in a logical context also. He teaches both that (human) truth must select and abstract and rest on the assumption of the (inevitably risky) irrelevance of much that is 'given,' and that (conceivably absolute) truth has to be all-inclusive and can treat *nothing* as irrelevant (cf. pp. 328-333). But these two positions seem to be clearly incompatible (cf. MIND, No. 82, pp. 162-166), and Mr. Bradley advances no argument for the connecting link between them, that "truth, compelled to select, is therefore forced to remain for ever defective" (p. 330). This is merely to *assume* that the defects of its *origin* for ever preclude it from attaining *validity*.

then this assumption is found to lead to insuperable conflicts with the facts of life, it *may* be preferable to give up the assumption rather than the intellectual functions of philosophy. Thus genuine pragmatism can set a higher value upon 'reason' than *soi-disant* rationalism.

## V.

Chapter xv. concludes with two 'supplementary notes' dictated by 'anxiety to be frank,' about the reality and personality of God and 'our fear of death and desire for immortality'. The former reaffirms that the essence of religion is practical, and speaks of the religious consciousness in terms that might have come straight out of *The Varieties of Religious Experience*. Not even the Jacobin 'polytheism' is missing, when Mr. Bradley does not "deny the possibility or the existence of one or more finite persons, such as to serve as the object of religion, or at least of some religion" (p. 449). In one sense God's personality is even a 'necessary' (=needed) truth, if without it religion remains imperfect, if religion's claim must be perfectly satisfied and it is "the supreme belief on which we have to act". This argument from personal need is sound as an argument (*i.e.* postulate), though it may be false in fact (*i.e.*, empirically unverifiable).

The pragmatic quality of these pronouncements can hardly be disputed, though few pragmatists would affirm so unreservedly the pragmatic value for all men of the extant religions.

The second note may best be described as reading like an answer to such a *questionnaire* as that circulated by the American Branch of the Society for Psychical Research some years ago. As such it is a psychological document of the highest value, and should do something to shake the foolish convention that it is bad form for a philosopher ever to touch on anything intimate and important. I take the liberty of quoting: "to die and go we know not where, to survive as ourselves, and yet to become we know not what—such thoughts must bring disquiet" (p. 459). Yet to infer that this disquiet can be removed by any religion that "will assure us that all evil is really overcome" seems to argue excessive reliance on the ambiguity of 'assure'. *Credat Judaeus*, but hardly a philosopher!

## VI.

But the crowning mercy in the way of novelties, at all events for the purposes of this paper, comes in the last

chapter, on 'My Real World'. It deals with the bearing of dream-experiences on the problem of reality, and closely parallels both the thought and the expression of my own speculations on the same topic. That I should be endorsed in a characteristic line of thought by Mr. Bradley will no doubt excite widespread surprise; but my own surprise was immeasurably greater at finding a favourite doctrine which I had been preaching for a quarter of a century without ever so much as eliciting a word of comment, favourable or otherwise from friend or foe and which I had therefore good reason to regard as universally unpalatable, suddenly supported most effectively in the least probable quarter. In view of this situation it will be well to analyse carefully what Mr. Bradley says and to quote for the parallels.

Mr. Bradley begins by referring to "an old familiar doubt as to dreaming and waking.<sup>1</sup> A man is led at times to ask whether his real life may not be a dream and his dreams reality. . . . Is there not another world within which I might suddenly wake, and from which I should look back upon *this* life as unreal? Such doubts and surmises, far from being irrational, are in my opinion even justified."<sup>2</sup> Our 'real' life, according to Mr. Bradley, is the universe of things which are continuous in space with our bodies and in time with their 'states' and 'actions'. But 'the body' is that of waking life, and that it should have "an exclusive or even a superior reality" is not evident. "For admittedly in dream, in mere imagination, and in states of hypnotism and madness, I find myself with other bodies" (p. 461).

The objection that the waking world is more rational, is answered by a denial, in view "of certain dreams and some hypnotic and other abnormal conditions" that it is always the wider and more comprehensive state. On the contrary the waking mind is bounded and contracted for practical purposes.<sup>3</sup>

<sup>1</sup> It seems first to appear in the *Theætetus*, 158, significantly enough in a Protagorean context; but a mind like Plato's could hardly be expected to discuss seriously so anarchical a thought.

<sup>2</sup> Cf. "While it lasts a dream has all the characteristics of reality. . . . But if the rough touch of death awoke us from the lethargy of life . . . would not our earthly life appear a dream, the hallucination of an evil nightmare?" (*Riddles of the Sphinx*, new ed., p. 280). "How may reality be distinguished from a consistent dream? And seeing that experience presents us with transitions from an apparently real (dream) world into one of superior reality, how can we know that this process may not be repeated, to the destruction of what now seems our real world?" (*Stud. in Humanism*, p. 202).

<sup>3</sup> Cf. "Dreams (while we dream them) have all the marks of an independent reality, are immersed in a space and a time of their own, and

Moreover abnormal or dream states which seem inferior in and by themselves may not be so in relation to a different environment. "What we call our real environment may be indeed the merest fraction of the universe, and such as it is, it might . . . be altered to-morrow" (p. 464). Minds starting from another basis may have worlds "better and more real than mine". If "in hypnotism, madness or dream my world becomes wider and more harmonious than the scheme which is set up from my waking self, then does not what I dream become at once a world better and more real?"<sup>1</sup>

"The thought of other, of even an indefinite number of other, unknown worlds and lives" "as real as my own or more real" seems therefore to be possible. "Into one or more of these orders from time to time I may enter in my dreams." Even now "I may be leading a different life somewhere else." "We may have many lives sundered wholly"; cf. Gautier's *La Morte Amoureuse*, p. 466.<sup>2</sup>

Curiously enough, however, Mr. Bradley does *not* draw from his recognition of these facts the corollary to which they seem directly to conduct, *viz.* that to find any empirical confirmation of the theory of a single Absolute embracing and harmonising the whole Universe, is desperately difficult. It is easy enough of course to postulate an Absolute which accomplishes *ex officio* whatever it is invented for. But how about confirming this postulate by the facts? How *e.g.* is this chaotic assemblage of dream-worlds, infinite in

contain personages just as external to us, and as uncontrollable in their actions as those of waking life" (*Studies*, p. 383). "Nor can I imagine what justified me once in dreaming that I was a beautiful woman well over eight feet high" (*ib.*, p. 477). "Dream-worlds are of inferior value for our purposes, and are therefore judged unreal" (*ib.*, p. 473).

<sup>1</sup> "A world so much better, more beautiful, coherent and rational, and in two words *more real*" (*Humanism*, p. 22). "All our distinctions between the 'real' and 'unreal' are *intrinsic*: it is the dream world's character itself that leads us to condemn it. And if in our dreams we found ourselves transported into worlds more coherent, more intelligible, more beautiful and more delightful than that of daily life, should we not gladly attribute to them a superior reality?" (*Humanism*, p. 367). All the religions "must contend that phenomena which would ordinarily be classified as unreal may, properly, belong to a world of higher reality" (*Studies*, p. 479).

<sup>2</sup> "The coexistence of an indefinite plurality of real worlds, of infinitely various kinds and degrees of completeness, complexity, extent, coherence, pleasantness, rationality, etc., was quite conceivable. Habitually, no doubt, we were confined to *one* of these, but occasionally we were enabled . . . to make fleeting incursions into these other worlds . . . and to return and say (falsely) that it was all a dream" (*Studies*, pp. 481-482, and cf. *Humanism*, p. 366). Instead of Gautier I referred to stories from Dumauiier, Kipling and Bulwer Lytton (*Stud.*, pp. 478, 480).

number and quality, ever to be truly unified? Does not their existence cast a serious doubt on our glib assumption that our multifarious worlds all form parts of the Universe and that this human notion of ours can be successfully applied to a reality that overflows our categories in every direction?

To Mr. Bradley as to me, however, the evidence of dream-worlds seems to "bear specially on the question as to what we call death" (p. 467). For it is only "on the assumption that our real world is the sole reality" that there is "any valid argument at all for senility and death". And even though in principle everything finite is subject to chance and change and dissolution, "it does not follow that finite beings are unable to endure, as themselves, for an indefinite time". "Death may be an overmastering impression, but it is certainly no necessary truth," and may be "a mockery" (pp. 467).<sup>1</sup>

## VII.

It is clear, therefore, that the resemblances here between Mr. Bradley's thought and mine are extremely close. They must however be set down to coincidence; for have we not Mr. Bradley's word for it that he does not read what I write?<sup>2</sup> This however renders the coincidence all the more remarkable, because it shows in what a thoroughly empirical way Mr. Bradley is now willing to handle the facts. He desires his new treatment to be taken as a 'commentary' on the doctrines of *Appearance and Reality*. A 'commentary' of this kind is rather upsetting to its text, especially to those who have not themselves lived through the psychical transition from the one to the other. But it is perhaps as much as any one can fairly be expected to say who is making essential modifications in a position to which he stood committed in print. At any rate it actually involves so complete a transvaluation that it brings us back to our initial question—has Mr. Bradley 'revoked' as James predicted?

This question even now is not an easy one to answer definitely. For Mr. Bradley's moods are somewhat variable,

<sup>1</sup> The bearing of the reality of dream-worlds on the meaning of death is very similarly estimated in *Humanism*, pp. 368-372, and *Riddles*, pp. 378, 382, which also speaks of the 'overwhelming' and 'unanswerable impressiveness of death'.

<sup>2</sup> Cf. *MIND*, No. 66, p. 226.

and will be judged variously according to the reader's bias. Nor can it be predicted whether intellectualistic readers are more likely to be moved to indignation, or to a blind refusal to credit their champion's apostasy. Still if any of them should hold that Mr. Bradley's *had* 'revoked,' or at least had so exposed his hand that the game was up, one could well understand what was meant. He has certainly laid his cards on the table in all sincerity.

Nevertheless, if I had myself to say whether Mr. Bradley had revoked, I should answer 'not quite'. Even in the most advanced position taken up in these *Essays* he is not strictly quite a pragmatist.<sup>1</sup> So long as a thinker continues to cast a slur on our human knowledge as being 'practical makeshift' or 'fiction' and to hanker, however ineffectually, after a generically different sort of truth, he should not strictly be called a pragmatist.

I hasten, however, to add that I have no desire to exaggerate the importance of this difference. The points on which Mr. Bradley can now be quoted as agreeing with pragmatism seem far more numerous and important than the differences for which he still contends. It will be well to enumerate the chief ones.

(1) There is now agreement about the nature of truth, though not quite about its nomenclature. There are not actually in existence any truths which are absolute. Mr. Bradley declares that all truths are 'relative'; we prefer to say that all are 'improvable'. True, the pragmatist gets at his belief in the 'relativity' of truth empirically, by observing the process of truth-claiming and the working of the sciences, whereas Mr. Bradley may still hold (as he originally did) that it is deducible as a necessary consequence from the conception of the Absolute. But this does not alter the result that in point of fact no truths are absolute. Not even the metaphysical doctrine, which affirms that an Absolute may, or must, exist. For as a philosophic doctrine this is a truth-claim like any other, and like any other, afflicted with incompleteness, liable to error, and capable of improvement. Mr. Bradley's own additions and improvements to his doctrine would establish so much at least, even if it were not manifestly a confusion of thought to imagine that a human opinion *about* the Absolute could participate in the absolute truth of the Absolute's own opinion of itself.

<sup>1</sup> This is not to say, of course, that he will not appear such to intellectualists. For these hardly ever have any clear and strict conception of pragmatism, and so have no eye for such fine differences as I should recognise.

(2) It is now agreed that all truths are useful;<sup>1</sup> *i.e.* all are instruments of life.

(3) Likewise that all are selective.<sup>2</sup>

(4) Likewise that all truth is personal. And this not only in the sense that personal feeling may enter into, and taint, even our final 'theoretical' conclusions, and that therefore a plurality of philosophic answers to the same question is theoretically possible,<sup>3</sup> but also in the sense that common truth is not strictly a fact, but a *façon de parler*.<sup>4</sup>

(5) It is now agreed that the whole of man's nature must be taken into account by philosophy and that 'intellectual satisfaction' is *not* the whole of it. The truths of religion and poetry, so far from being inadmissible in a philosophic context, now seem to afford more anchorage to the philosophic soul than merely theoretical consistency.<sup>5</sup> Even where we still read that "the theoretical criterion, for myself, is in theory supreme" (p. 317), it is reduced to a 'special want,' and its 'supremacy' has become a mockery and a tautology. For it exists only 'in theory' and bestows on it no right to the control of life. Practically there is some ground for the apprehension that the disparagement of 'theoretical consistency' may impair, in those who are too readily satisfied with Mr. Bradley's extremer statements, that intelligent control of the instinctive impulses and appetites which is the true biological function of the 'reason'. This function however is equally incompatible with the rationalistic analyses of the 'reason' as 'pure' and independent of vital value and with irrationalistic revolts against the government of the soul which it has taken the struggles of æons to evolve; and it is entirely mistaken to jump from

<sup>1</sup> "I agree that in the end no truth can be wholly idle. A truth that makes no difference to truth is to my mind an impossibility" (p. 122).

<sup>2</sup> "According to this practical creed there is in the end no truth for us save that of working ideas" (p. 132). *Cf.* also p. 445. I do not repeat quotations I have already given above.

<sup>3</sup> *Cf.* p. 329. f.

<sup>4</sup> *Cf.* "For many persons metaphysics would issue . . . in theoretical scepticism . . . and this may be the intelligent outcome of a sincere metaphysical endeavour," p. 445.

<sup>5</sup> "The personal diversity of the individuals is not superfluous but essential" for . . . "it brings with it fresh quality" and "even so far as truth is common to the individuals, it must be taken none the less as modified in each case by its fresh context," p. 121. "Our sense of value, and in the end for every man his own sense of value, is ultimate and final" p. 132. "There is a sense in which we may maintain that every truth, however old, is new at any time when it is affirmed. And, for myself, I agree that in this sense no judgment ever is repeated," p. 334.

<sup>6</sup> *Cf.* the passages quoted above, *sub* iv.

the non-existence of absolute truth to the conclusion that henceforth one truth-claim must be as good as another. To declare that action is the test of thought is not to deny that it is usually better to look before we leap.

(6) Mr. Bradley, however, is no longer disposed to dispute the imperativeness of action. "If I am to live at all I must act" he now declares (p. 465), and he would probably also admit that every thought is an *act*,<sup>1</sup> though not perhaps the corollary that therefore the alternatives to every thought should always be considered.

(7) As regards the 'making of truth' we learn that "the creations of the intellect everywhere are real. The substantiated terms and relations into which analysis breaks up the continuity of the given, are no mere errors or simple instruments" (p. 473). This clearly revokes "there is no tenable point of view from which I can be properly said to make truth" (p. 338).

### VIII.

What then remains to constitute any difference of principle between Mr. Bradley's developed views and pragmatism? Nothing, it would seem, but the Absolute, which remains to the end as the *caput mortuum* of the time when absolute truth and theoretical consistency seemed the *ne plus ultra* of philosophy.

But it is a very much modified Absolute, notable for "its insistence and emphasis on an all-pervasive relativism," and not to be mistaken for "that false absolutism" which asserts the reality of one-sided distinctions (p. 470). This is no longer an Absolute to conjure with. It is no longer a God-engulfing soul-destroying monster that brooks no equal and no other. It has become a 'tender-minded,' 'irenical' creature, like Royce's Absolute (which is of course the prototype of James's), that has accommodation for anybody and anything: in short it has become quite harmless.

But has it thereby as greatly bettered its intellectual, as it has its moral, position? The trouble is that it appears to have become not merely harmless, also quite useless. It is no longer possible to say what its functions are, either (a) theoretically or (b) practically.

(a) It is no longer an imperious necessity of thought, forced upon the mind by a supreme craving for theoretical consistency. It no longer even pretends to satisfy this craving, nor is the craving itself the *ultima ratio* of human in-

<sup>1</sup> Cf. p. 326.

telligence. Intellectually indeed its position is getting very precarious. Even if we do not insist too severely either on the flaw in its pedigree, *viz.* the awkward self-contradiction of trusting a 'relative' truth to reveal an absolute, or on the difficulty it obviously has in escaping from the pragmatist objection that a functionless entity is meaningless and cannot really be accepted, it is avowedly only one out of several intellectual alternatives. Mr. Bradley himself admits that one of these, theoretical scepticism, is quite legitimate and an intelligent interpretation of the situation.<sup>1</sup> A contented acceptance of 'relativity' unaccompanied by theoretical 'despair,' would seem to be another. In short the Absolute seems to be merely a metaphysical overbelief which happens at present to please Mr. Bradley best, for reasons that are probably historical.

(b) The practical functions of the Absolute are equally hard to discover. It seems more otiose even than the Absolute in James's *Pragmatism* that merely issued free passes (that cost it nothing) to cheap trippers bent on a "moral holiday". It explains nothing, not even how it comes to be dissociated into finite centres, and still less why these finite centres should be forever warring with each other.<sup>2</sup> It helps nobody, nobody at least who is not already convinced that it helps. All its positive functions, even that of giving the general assurance that all is well 'somehow,' have now been transferred to 'religion,' and so fall to what must presumably still be called a 'lower' level—though it is the highest there is for man. In short it is intrinsically nugatory and continues to exist simply because it is wanted. To want this sort of Absolute may not do you any good, but it assuredly does no one else any harm.

The epistemological value of the Absolute therefore is no longer negative. It has risen to zero. The Absolute no longer vetoes every intelligible account of human knowledge. Hence the pragmatist strike against the Absolute must be solemnly called off. The Absolute has *abdicated* and resigned all its functions. Its 'tyrannis' no longer drives to revolt all who deem themselves free and responsible agents. And to quarrel with a prodigal father about an issue of this kind seems to be worse than an irreverence, an irrelevance. Rather let us agree that the *Essays in Truth and Reality* are as fine a sepulchral monument as the Absolute deserves, even though it be of necessity a cenotaph.

<sup>1</sup> Cf. p. 445.

<sup>2</sup> Cf. p. 350 n.

#### IV.—LOTZE'S RELATION TO IDEALISM.

BY E. E. THOMAS.

##### SECTION 2.

THE task that lies before us is that of showing how there is contained in Lotze's philosophy two theories of the nature of reality, the one constituting a further development of Idealism, the other being antagonistic to it. Lotze does not hold that they are antagonistic theories; he considers that the pluralism involved in his philosophy leads to a Monism the same in principle as that put forward by Idealism. Now Idealism had contained an explanation of the fact that our various individual experiences possess a certain truth or falsity, which is independent of the nature of the individual as such. The driving back of all principles of unity to a necessary order of logical presuppositions involved in all experiencing whatsoever, makes it possible for us to see how it comes about that all persons have an experience of the same world. If, however, we cut away such logical presuppositions, and make the principles of unity which hold in any individual experience depend upon the concrete nature of that experience, then we start with a pluralism which demands an explanation for the fact that all these individuals, through the medium of their experience, come to the knowledge of a single world which claims to be the same for all. Thus the first problem of Lotze's philosophy is that of explaining how an over-individual reality can manifest itself in a plurality of individual experiences. The first thing Lotze does is to construct a theory as to the nature of the reality which is revealed in experience, and of its over-individual character.

With the Idealists the over-individual character belonging to reality was that of a self-subsistent order existing amongst the contents of experience. With Lotze it is that of self-experiencing being existing as the content of our experience. This latter conception of over-individuality is derived from

the growing emphasis which Idealism itself had laid upon the psychological aspect of experience. Idealism had made it quite clear that knowledge or experience can never go out of itself in order to seek for something to explain that which takes place within itself. Even for the purpose of constructing a theory as to the nature of ultimate reality, knowledge or experience has to fall back and draw upon a reality which exists within itself. At the same time, the very imperfection of knowledge sets before us the ideal of a completeness or perfection to which we must strive to attain. Again, since in experience reality is revealed to us, it is clear that the perfection of reality, which is set before us as an ideal, is no mere limit of experience, but a something which has, or can have, an actual being for self. It would be impossible for us to think that our experience could reveal to us a complete reality, unless that reality were a something finding being or existence independently of the revelations which our individual experiences give us of it. Thus the psychological movement in our experience assures us that there must be a realm of reality which possesses a certain independence of our experience; that which possesses this independence must, in its independence, find actual existence within the content of experience, and such existence can only mean existence for self, or consciousness of its own being, on the part of that which possesses it. Thus the problem with which Lotze has to commence his philosophy is as to how a reality existing in and for itself can find its existence and life in individual experiences.

The solution which Lotze offers, of this problem is, that reality is constituted through and through by individuals standing in various relations to one another. The perceptual relation is one such relation among others. Now this relation is that which gives a thing, in addition to experience of other things, an experience of itself, whereas other relations give it content and character. It is in its experience of itself that a thing attains to being or existence for itself, which is independent of its being experienced by anyone or anything else. Thus the perceptual relation introduces things into each other's experience and makes them live there, while at the same time it gives to each thing an existence independent of the experiences in which it is made to live. But the perceptual relation never gives content or character to that which exists in it; hence the reality which a thing possesses through its experience of itself it not dependent upon the nature or the fact of experience. If reality were thus dependent upon experience, then it would be upon its concrete

nature as constituting individuals, and the perceptual relation would be a relation between souls through the medium of which unity is given to reality. This is the conclusion to which Lotze was being driven. He avoids it, however, by what is, in reality, an arbitrary separation between experience as consciousness and experience as content. Reality is given through the medium of consciousness but is determined in its nature through the medium of content. Content possesses a nature which is independent altogether of the relations in which its elements stand to one another in the actual world of experience; but at the same time this nature has a determining influence upon the relations in which these elements come to stand; hence reality is made to rest in that which is altogether independent of the individual. This side of Lotze's philosophy constitutes his return to Idealism.

Lotze deals in the first place with the nature of this reality, which is revealed to us in experience. While psychological presuppositions of experience tell us of the existence of a reality which is independent of *our* experience, and while logical presuppositions of experience tell us that all reality is given in experience, and is dependent upon the conditions under which alone experience is possible, neither psychological nor logical presuppositions tell us as to the actual, concrete nature of this existence. The Idealists had made the mistake of seeking for the concrete nature of reality in the logical presuppositions involved in the experience of reality. They were wrong, for if the concrete nature of reality followed from its presuppositions, then reality would become empty; concreteness of existence, or the actual *what* of that which *is*, demands existence or being in and for itself, and over such existence presuppositions have no determining power. In order, then, to determine the actual and concrete nature of the reality which is revealed to us in experience, Lotze examines this experience from a point of view which is not logical but real. It is the point of view adopted by the natural sciences in seeking to determine the nature of things, and the laws according to which they behave in relation to one another. In adopting it Lotze seeks to show that what we have to do in order to know reality is not to construct it from abstract principles, or from the unity of such principles with the plurality of sense, but to be able to point to it within our experience, and distinguish it from that which is not real.

Lotze tells us that in our experience, reality is seen to be made up of three sides; we think of things as existing, of

events as taking place, and of truths as being valid. None of these can be reduced to the others, nor can they be cut off from one another. This is easily seen in the case of existence and occurrence, or, as it is sometimes called, of being and becoming; an object exists and yet, in its existence, is the subject of continual change. It is more difficult to see how validity is bound up with the reality of an object; we, as outsiders, make certain judgments about things, and in our judgments is to be found truth or falsity; it is in our judgments, then, that validity rests. Further, the contents of these judgments become formed into a systematic whole, which we call the system of truth, and the validity harboured by this system seems to be independent of the existence of that to which truth refers. If, however, validity is a constitutive moment in the reality of an object, something of the nature of judgment must belong to the object itself. This problem as to how judgment enters into the nature of a thing and becomes a moment constitutive of its reality, is concerned with the relations in which a thing stands to other things, and to ourselves, for it is in these relations that a thing comes to possess validity.

Now it is in the material world that reality first manifests itself to us; indeed, it is often the case that we think of this world as real even if nothing else is real. Lotze, therefore, commences his analysis of the nature which we ascribe to that which we consider as real by an examination of the nature of the material world. In this material world, he tells us, we come into contact with reality through the medium of sensation, a real thing consisting of a group of changing sense qualities. This change takes place in a regular way, or according to law. Now it is this existence of a principle of change amongst a group of sense qualities which gives rise to the conception of a thing as a something having permanence; the thing is now considered as the subject of change, and the sense qualities taking part in the change are considered as the attributes of this subject. Each individual subject has its own individual series of changes, taking place in a form of regularity peculiar to that subject, this form of regularity constituting the law of its being. Lotze says: "Thus it may be stated as a general truth, that our idea of that which makes a Thing what it is consists only in the thought of a certain regularity with which it changes to and fro within a limited circle of states whether spontaneously or under visible external conditions, without passing out of this circle, and without ever having an existence on its own account and apart from any one of the forms

which within this circle it can assume".<sup>1</sup> Thus the constitution of what we call a real thing implies, on the one hand, a changing sense content, and on the other hand, a law which regulates this change. It is this law of change which gives to the thing what we call its reality; or, it is through the law of change that the reality of a thing is given expression to or defined.

The question now arises as to how we are to understand this term 'law' in order that it may be intelligible as a principle of reality. Now the positive sciences seek to bring all reality under the conception of law; in doing this they have a certain aim or purpose, and it is from this aim that the term law takes its meaning. We are told that it is the aim of science to know reality; that is to say, science seeks to bring reality within the grasp of the human intelligence. Now the characteristic of our intelligence is that it seeks to find order in things, and as soon as it has done this it claims to understand that in which the order is seen to exist; laws are the abstract expressions used by the intelligence to hold in its grasp the order which it finds in reality. Law thus combines within itself a subjective and an objective moment; for it contains within itself a moment derived from ourselves, as standing over against the reality which we know, and also a moment derived from reality itself, as being ordered and as calling for interpretation through the medium of law.

Let us deal first with the subjective moment. It must enable us to give expression in our thought to the order which is seen to hold in reality. For this purpose we use what we call a generalisation, which consists of an enunciation of the facts which are to come under the law. In this form "a law is always a universal hypothetical judgment, which states that whenever C is or holds good, E is or holds good, and that whenever C undergoes a definite change into C<sup>1</sup> through a variation of itself C, E also becomes E<sup>1</sup> through a definite variation of itself E which depends on C".<sup>2</sup> Here we have more than mere generalisation, but as generalisation it gives us the form in which law is expressed and also an enunciation of the phenomena which have to be dealt with.

The subjective moment, however, contains more than mere generalisation; it involves an interpretation of the actual order that is seen to exist amongst the phenomena. Now there are many orders in the world. In the material world we have one kind of order, in the world of life another

<sup>1</sup> *Metaphysic*, sec. 26, English translation, edited by Bosanquet.

<sup>2</sup> *Logic*, sec. 265, English translation, edited by Bosanquet.

kind, and in human activity and institutions still another kind. This raises the question as to whether these various kinds of order can be interpreted in one and the same way, or given one and the same form of abstract, intellectual expression. For instance, the order in the material world, as material, demands that mathematical values shall be assigned to its various elements, and that the relations between these elements, whether in the matter of static or temporal relations, shall be expressed as mathematical proportions between the terms which stand in them. But the order in the living world seems to call for something more than a mere mathematical interpretation; it calls for the ideas of development, and of organic unity, and it seems difficult to reduce the content of such ideas to mathematics. In the case of human life the seeming inadequacy of a mathematical interpretation is still more pronounced. We must notice, too, that as we get farther away from a mathematical interpretation of order the more difficult do we find it to give clear generalisations or to formulate laws. Now Lotze maintains that where there is no mathematical interpretation of order there is no law. Speaking of law in the theoretical sphere he says it is a rule "which is such that there is a permanent proportion according to which definite changes in the results correspond to definite changes in the conditions".<sup>1</sup> According to Lotze then, the subjective side of law consists of the formulation of a mathematical proportion as interpreting the order which exists amongst phenomena, of whatever kind these phenomena may be.

We must ask, however, as to the reason for the difficulty we have found in applying law to the higher aspects of life; is it due to an increasing complexity in the material, and thus merely to an increasing degree of difficulty in finding out what mathematical proportions we shall apply to this material; or is it due to this, that the order in the living and human worlds is so different from that found in the material world that it refuses to be expressed as mathematical? Neither of these explanations will account fully for the difficulty with which we are here dealing. The real point of the difficulty lies somewhere else; it lies in the fact that we stand so far above the material world that we can contemplate it and grasp it in our intelligence; whereas, in regard to life, we ourselves are so much part of it, and share in it to such an extent, that we fail to break ourselves loose from it, fail to get outside of it, so that we can contemplate

<sup>1</sup> *Metaphysic*, sec. 32, English translation.

and understand it. Since this is the case, we may say that wherever there is understanding there is order; wherever there is order there is law; and wherever there is law there is mathematical proportion; but that there is something in the world which we cannot reduce to order, and which, therefore, we cannot understand, not from the nature of this something, but from the nature of our relation or attitude to it. This is, indeed, the view which Lotze takes up, for he tells us that there are many people who come to a knowledge of that which is deepest in the world, not through intelligence, but through feeling, not through understanding, but through intuition. Such a knowledge of reality cannot be the systematic knowledge which finds its expression in truth; nor can reality as revealed in such knowledge be a systematic whole rendered such by the presence within it of a clearly defined order. Intuition is the power of the mind to grip, in one moment of apprehension, the wholeness of the reality which is presented to the mind, without laying the elements of this whole side by side in the unity of an order or system. Feeling is the indication of the failure or success of the interaction of the mind with reality; in the case of pleasure the unity of our nature and the unity of the reality, the experience of which gives us pleasure, are in harmony; whereas in the case of pain there is discord between these two. If then, reality, in its deepest being, can be known through feeling and through intuition, this knowledge cannot consist of an interpretation of reality, for such an interpretation places the one who makes it above and outside of the reality interpreted; it must consist of an active participation in the life and movement of reality; the being of the reality experienced enters into, and becomes part of, the life of the experiencing subject, and the life of the experiencing subject enters into the being and life of reality: through the clash and harmony of this interpenetrative life reality moves, and in its movement experiences itself as living, pulsating being. This, then, is what Lotze means when he tells us that what is deepest in the world may be apprehended through feeling and intuition. Reality moves, not from order, but into order; and that which guides it into order, and which is not experienced through intelligence, is that which is deepest in reality, and which may be experienced through feeling and intuition.

We come now to the objective factor in law. We have said that law gives expression to an order as existing in phenomena; that as such it is a product of our thought, and therefore subjective. Now that to which law gives expres-

sion, is that which, according to Lotze, gives reality to phenomena; for whenever a group of facts can be considered, as changing among themselves in such a way that these changes can be formulated as law, then these facts constitute a real thing. What we have now to ask is whether order can perform this function of giving reality to a group of phenomena.

Now the principle of a reality must be a something in the phenomena, holding them together and, since it must regulate change, having a determining influence upon that which it holds together. Order, however, is merely static and therefore cannot perform these functions; it only attests to the fact that they have been performed. Things hold together, not because they are ordered in this or that way but because they possess some deeper affinity to which order gives expression. Change moves through or into order, but order neither brings about nor guides change. Lotze recognises this, and tells us that facts are held together, not by mere order, but by an inner coherence or inner relation as existing within them; he says it is "an inward relation which exists between two facts and constitutes the ground at once of their conjunction and of the manner of this conjunction".<sup>1</sup> It is on this account, he tells us farther on, that a law which gives expression to this coherence claims objective truth. To say, however, that facts belong together, or happen together, because they possess an inner coherence, does not carry us very far; we require to know something of the nature of this coherence. Lotze now tells us that this inward relation between facts consists of a singleness or individuality of activity, as running through, or being undertaken by, the plurality of sense qualities which are seen as cohering together. This singleness of activity he regards as an individual law; by this he seeks to show that activity never does and never can take place unless guided or determined through singleness or unity of principle; that this singleness of principle rests in the single whole formed by the plurality of sense qualities bound together in the constitution of a thing. Thus each individual or particular thing carries within itself, and, as peculiar to itself, the principle through which it acts; this principle is not objectively universal, in the sense of standing in independence of what is or of what takes place, and of constituting a norm in accordance with which what is or what takes must order itself.

<sup>1</sup> *Logic*, sec. 266, English translation.

Lotze, however, maintains that this principle can be expressed as a mathematical order existing among the facts. He thus takes it from the sphere of the merely individual and gives to it an aspect which is general or universal. Since, according to Lotze, all reality involves mathematical proportion, a thing, in harbouring such a proportion as the law of its being, connects itself with what is predicable of all that is real. What we have to determine is how a mathematical proportion can give expression, at one and the same time, to a principle of individuality or uniqueness and to a principle of universality.

Let us take an example of this mathematical determination in individuality. In a piece of marble we have a grouping of the sense qualities, colour, hardness, temperature, shape; these sense qualities are permanent in the sense that marble always has some colour, some temperature, some shape; but they change their specific determinations under changing conditions. At one time the colour is greyer than at another, according to the variations of light which fall upon it; at one time the marble is colder than at another according to the varying temperature of the atmosphere; in one liquid it sinks, in another it floats. Further, these changes take place according to a definite mathematical equation, and this way of changing is so bound up with this particular unity of sense qualities that any alteration in it would destroy the individuality of the object. If what we consider as marble were suddenly to float in water, or to change, in the slightest, its specific gravity, then we should no longer consider it as marble but as something different. This shows us, then, that individuality can and does live through mathematical determination.

But the function of law as mathematical consists in its application to an infinity of cases like the one from which it is drawn. Now in order to give expression to individuality a law must bring out that which makes a thing unique, or which makes it a systematic whole having singleness of meaning; whereas in order to be applicable to an infinity of cases a law must leave out or neglect a great deal of the concrete nature, and, as it would seem, of the individualising content of that to which it applies. The question we have now to ask is how these two functions are combined. We can best answer this question by taking concrete examples. Sodium-oxide combines with water to form caustic soda according to the equation  $\text{Na}_2\text{O} + \text{H}_2\text{O} = 2\text{NaOH}$ . Now what this law does is to draw attention by means of a certain formula to certain substances and to the relation between

them. It is clear that the whole nature of each substance is not expressed in its chemical formula ; the fact that it has this or that colour, that it is of this particular weight, etc., is not represented there. The formula only represents the chemical constitution of that of which it is the formula. Thus although the formula leaves out certain characteristics of the substance, it does so, not in order that it may be general and applicable to an indefinite number of cases, but that it may the better concentrate attention on one aspect of the individuality of the substance. But it may be said that this chemical formula or equation is universal, in that it can be applied to an infinite number of cases. If we look closer, however, we shall find that this is not really the case, but that what we consider infinity of application is no more than the expression of an infinite range of possibilities along a given direction, and that change in this direction takes place in accordance with the individuality of the substances entering into the relation represented in the equation. This infinite range of possibilities consists of differences of spatial magnitude. In the example we have taken the sodium oxide may be of larger or smaller bulk, when the water will be of larger or smaller volume, and the resulting caustic soda will also be greater or smaller in proportion. As an example from another branch of science we will take the law which states that the force which ponderable bodies exert on one another is inversely proportional to the square of their distance. This law draws attention to certain individualising characteristics in substances ; it draws attention to bodies as possessing weight ; further, it draws attention to a certain individuality of relation entered into by these bodies through the medium of these individualising features. This relation is that of the attraction and repulsion which the bodies exert upon one another, and in and through this relation the bodies involved come to form an individual whole, the nature and unity of which is expressed in the above law. The universality or infinity of application of this law is bound up with the infinity of spatiality through which the individual whole may change ; the bodies may be of any size, and at any distance from one another, but these variations all bring with them corresponding variations in the force with which they act upon one another.

Thus a law combines the two moments, the one representing individuality or uniqueness of structure, and the other representing an infinity of possible changes along a spatial direction ; it does this through the fact that spatial

direction exists within individual structure. The mathematical aspect of law is bound up with this spatial aspect of being, and it is through the fact that spatiality enters into the structure of all material existence that laws which can be expressed in mathematical formulæ come to claim universality in the sense of an infinity of application. A law always gives expression to this peculiar union of a spatial, infinity-producing element with the individualising element in a thing's being.

We must, however, be careful to note that Lotze does not give all these arguments to prove that a law is an expression of individuality, which at the same time includes within itself a universalising element. He only shows that both of these elements are contained there.

This explanation of law, of mathematics, and of their relation to reality does away with the distinction between *a priori* and *a posteriori*. Further, laws are no longer mere generalisations; mathematics no longer a mere system of eternal truths. Nor, again, are laws expressive of a form as distinct from a content, both of which belong to the reality to which the laws refer. Law and mathematics are expressive of concrete existence in an individuality which moves through spatiality; this spatiality is characteristic of all that is real and therefore introduces into the individuality of law a moment of universality.

But, while law gives expression to the individuality of the real, it does not tell us in what this individuality consists. We have seen Lotze maintaining that this individuality consists of a singleness of activity as holding together the concrete detail belonging to what we regard as an individual thing. He seeks to elucidate this theory by comparing a real thing to a melody. He does not, however, work out the comparison, but leaves this to the reader. Now there are no two melodies exactly alike; each melody is a unique whole, and its uniqueness is determined by the nature, arrangement, and sequence of its notes, and by the variations in tune, pitch, and rhythm which belong to them. It is this unique and systematic wholeness that constitutes the melody's individuality. We must notice, however, that this individuality is created through the activity of a mind. It is not a something which has come into existence of itself, or which mere notes have produced of themselves. It requires a composer to bring together the various notes and to give them unity, by making them all moments in the working out of a single emotion. Moreover, if the melody is to live again it must be sung or played, and the singer or

the player must give again to the notes the soul which the composer gave to them in the first instance. Thus the individuality of a melody is the creation of a soul or of a life having wealth and richness of emotion; it is a partial expression of the meaning of that life. If then things are to be individual, it would seem that they too must come to individuality through a like creative activity which gives to them a unity of meaning.

We have now to ask, first, where the activity creative of individuality springs from, and secondly, what is the meaning which things, as individuals, possess. In answer to the first question, Lotze tells us that this creative activity centres in the things themselves. He maintains that sense qualities are the constitutive elements in a conscious, creative activity, and that the individual whole which lives in and through such activity is what we understand by a real thing. If, then, a real thing is the creator of its own individuality, and if this individuality is constituted by a unity of idea or meaning running through the plurality of content which finds existence in the being of the thing, it follows that a real thing must possess a soul or mind of its own; for it is only in mind that unity of idea or meaning, and unity of activity can be found. And this is the conclusion at which Lotze arrives. He bases his conclusion upon facts drawn from our own personal experience. We are unity, he tells us, because we are conscious of ourselves as unity, and it is only in our consciousness of ourselves that we find existence at all; we are active, he maintains, only when we can refer to ourselves all the changes which take place in ourselves. The unity and activity which belong to an individual thing are, according to him, essentially the same, and thus require a self-feeling on the part of the thing itself. The next question that has to be answered is as to the meaning of a thing and how it springs from the consciousness belonging to that thing. We know that in creating a melody the composer can trace his emotions, his ideals of life, his purposes, and his aims as formative elements in its constitution. When the melody is sung or played by another, this other experiences something of the same fulness of life as that which inspired the composer. It is this fulness of life which constitutes the meaning of the melody. Mere unity of life, mere consciousness or self-feeling can never be creative of meaning; in order to be creative consciousness must be full, rich, concrete. If the soul of the composer contained no more than mere notes, he could never compose a melody which would contain a meaning. And it must be the same

with things. A principle of unity can act in relation to a plurality of sense content, so as to form this content into a real thing, only if it can limit a thing's being in this direction rather than in that, bring this quality into connexion with that, separate this quality from that, and so on; and it can only perform these functions if it can regard these qualities from a point of view which involves a fulness and concreteness of existence beyond that which is given in the mere qualities themselves. Lotze, however, denies to a thing this fulness and concreteness of life; or at least he denies that we can ever come into touch with such fulness of life as belonging to a thing. He supposes the question to be asked, how a principle of unity can act in relation to the plurality of sense content, so as to form this content into a real thing. To ask such questions, he tells us, is to ask how being is made. We do not create being; we find self-creative individuality in the world as constitutive of the being of its real elements; and all that we can do is to find some form from which we can understand this living, creative, individuality. This form is that of the unity of soul life,—deeper than this we cannot go.

We may sum up Lotze's theory of the reality of things by saying that, according to him, a thing is real in so far as it is a creative individuality centring in an individual mind; the activity of such an individuality manifests itself to us in the form of a law guiding the changes of a plurality of sense qualities; this law being individual in the sense that it gives expression to a unity of idea or meaning as resting in that in which it manifests itself. Thus his theory of reality has gone to show that the real in our experience consists ultimately of minds or souls, each one of which has an existence in and for itself.

And now comes the question as to whether souls are related to one another through an order prior to themselves, or through relationships which centre in themselves; which are not reducible to, nor derivable from, order; and which we may call perceptual relationships. On the latter alternative the individuality or soul life of a thing could be entered into, and partially determined, by ourselves, through the perceptual relation. On the former view a thing would gain its individuality by being connected with a self-subsistent order independent of all that is, or that takes place; and we could not enter this individuality except by connecting ourselves with this order, which could not be considered as constituting concreteness and fulness of soul life. Lotze's philosophy contains both of these views, the

one as being expressly held and worked out by him, the other as the conclusion which he would not accept, of certain premises which he did accept.

The first stage in the working out of these opposite views is that of showing how the empirical relations in which things stand to one another have their basis in something deeper than themselves. So far we have been dealing with objects as single things, disregarding their relations to other things. Lotze now tells us that a thing cannot be regarded as real when standing by itself out of relation to other things. We consider an object real when we can give it a definite place in a complex of things. "For not to be at any place, not to have any position in the complex of other things, not to undergo any operation from anything nor to display itself by the exercise of any activity upon anything: to be thus void of relation is just that in which we should find the nonentity of a thing if it was our purpose to define it."<sup>1</sup> Among such relations, we shall find, Lotze includes the perceptual relation. "*To be, means to stand in relations, and being perceived is itself only one such relation beside other relations.*"<sup>2</sup>

We must notice, however, that it is not altogether possible to reduce the properties of a thing to mere relations in which that thing stands to other things. For instance, we think of a thing as possessing some colour of its own, which serves as a basis for all the modifications which that colour may undergo; and we think the same as regards the other properties of a thing. But, although we consider a thing as having a nature of its own, which serves as a basis for all the modifications which its properties undergo, yet we cannot determine what this nature is; for the full reality of a thing is that in which the thing lives and finds its being, and is determined by the relations in which it stands to other things.

Lotze now distinguishes between those relations which enter into the being of a thing and modify its nature, and those relations in which we mentally place a thing in order that we may the better describe it or know it. As an illustration of the latter we may say that sugar stands in a certain position among the carbon compounds, or that a certain kind of orchid has a certain place in the orchid family, or that man occupies the highest place among the mammals. It is a matter of very great importance whether the systematic unity which we give to classes of this kind is

<sup>1</sup> *Metaphysics*, chap. i., sec. 7, English translation.

*Outlines of Metaphysics*, sec. 10, English translation, by Ladd.

one which exists merely for our knowledge, or one which also exists amongst things and has a determining influence upon the movement of reality. But it is clear that these relations are not those which are meant when we describe relations as entering into and modifying the nature of a thing, and as therefore being necessary to the reality of a thing. If all the other animals in the universe were to be banished from existence, leaving man as the only animal, it would not destroy man's reality or existence; but if a man were taken out of all spatial relations or out of all his social relations then he would cease to be at all.

To turn now to the perceptual relation which, as we have seen, Lotze regards as "one such relation among others," the question arises whether it determines our knowledge but not the reality of a thing. Lotze tacitly holds the view that this relation is not a condition of the reality of that which is perceived, but that it is a condition of the reality of ourselves who perceive. The perceptual relation is thus one-sided in its determining influence; for it does not enter into and determine the nature of that which is perceived, but carries the object perceived into the life of the perceiver, which it thereby enriches and modifies. Since this is the case the world must be split up into two realms, namely, that containing the beings whose reality is determined by the fact that they perceive things external to themselves, and that containing things whose reality exists independently of the fact that they perceive or are perceived. For whatever consciousness of themselves we may give to things as a condition of their reality, we do not consider that this consciousness includes perception on the part of these things of other things which exist outside of them. Thus we come to have a world of subjects on the one side, and a world of objects on the other side; objects having an existence in and for themselves through the fact that they feel their own being; subjects having an existence through the fact that they perceive or know the being of objects, which stand outside of them. This is the view which Lotze holds; he tries to tone down the sharp opposition between these two realms by maintaining that things are minds, but since things are not perceiving minds in the same sense as subjects are, the need is felt of showing how the perceptual relation bridges the gap between them. Lotze, however, does not undertake the solving of this problem; he is content to maintain that the perceptual relation exists, like other relations, between things, and to leave the problems which such a position involves. By thus disregarding the

nature of the perceptual relation, he comes to view the ultimate unity of reality as one which is determined in its nature by the relations in which things, as such, stand to one another. If souls are contained in this unity then they, too, are held together just as things are.

To turn now to the nature of the empirical relations which determine the natures of things and the changes which take place in them, we find Lotze maintaining that these relations exist, not between their terms, but in them, as the states through which they exercise activities in reference to one another. He arrives at this conclusion by trying to answer the question as to how relations determine the changes that take place in things. The first thing he does is to maintain that the changes which enter into a thing's being are brought about by activity on the part of that thing. Now we certainly think of action as being different from mere change. We consider ourselves as active when the changes that take place in our being are brought about by us in order to realise some end which we set before ourselves; we merely change when what takes place in our life is not consciously subordinated to an end or purpose with which we identify ourselves. For instance, we change in that we become old and that our bodies decay; we act when we take exercise to make ourselves strong and healthy. The same is true of a thing. We cannot say that a thing consciously sets before itself an end which it seeks to realise, or that it consciously identifies itself with some ideal or principle, and that when its changes are directed towards the realisation of such an end or ideal it acts. But we do say that a thing acts when its changes proceed from what we recognise as its being, or when the thing manifests its whole nature or some essential aspect of that nature in the changes which take place within it; on the other hand, the thing merely changes when the alterations that take place in it are due to outside circumstances which do not enter into its nature. Lotze recognises this difference. He takes the case of a moist body, A, which, by becoming dry makes a dry body, B, wet; he recognises that a change has taken place in both A and B, and that this change is effected by the moisture; he tells us that this change is not brought about by an active cause existing in A or B, or in both together; that is to say, the change in A and B is not one which we can describe as living in the activity of A or B, or of both A and B together. It is impossible, however, to make this distinction ultimate; for all change must be brought about by activity exercised by a larger whole, of which the objects, which merely change, are

parts. In the case of a moist body making a dry body wet, the heat in the air, the proximity of the two objects, and their relative temperatures, the amount of water vapour in the air, etc., form a single whole whose nature manifests itself in an activity producing change of moisture in these two objects.

The next step taken by Lotze is to show that all action is reciprocal action. When a thing acts, it does so in reference to other things. Lotze argues that it follows from this that all change (and henceforth we will use the term change as meaning active change or change brought about by an active principle existing in that in which the change takes place), consists of reciprocal action between the objects involved in the change. He tells us that if the activity of one thing in relation to another consisted of activity on the one side and passivity on the other, then, since the active element A would find several passive elements C D E standing along with it in the world, it would really have no way of choosing the passive element in reference to which it should act. Before A can act in reference to another object C, this object must already influence it by informing it, as it were, of its existence, and by directing it to itself. It can only do this if it is already active in relation to A. Thus when one thing acts in reference to others, all the things taking part in the change must be active in relation to one another; that is to say, all action must be reciprocal action.

Seeing then that all change consists of reciprocal action, the question arises how relations between things can be that which brings about this reciprocal action. Lotze tells us that a thing can only act from itself; it cannot act from that which is external to itself. Hence if A and B are to act upon one another it would seem that influences must pass between them, enter each other's being and modify it; it is from this modified nature that a thing changes; or, it is the actual modification of its nature which constitutes change on the part of a thing. But influences cannot detach themselves from a thing, float in a formless void, and then attach themselves to another thing. The ordinary meaning attributed to the term 'relation,' according to which it is a something existing between things, may be considered as enabling us to solve the difficulty; for a relation thus constitutes itself a thread or bridge along which influences can pass from one object to another. But the same difficulty arises here again, since the influence must detach itself from the object and attach itself to the 'Between'; and

thus there arises the necessity for another 'Between,' giving rise to an infinite regress. It is clear then, that if a relation exists "between" its terms, it cannot enable us to understand how one thing comes to change in reference to others.

Lotze now goes further and maintains that relations are nothing but their terms in certain states of themselves. He tells us that reciprocal action only takes place between certain things and under certain conditions. For example, A will only enter into reciprocal action with C; it will not do so with D or E. Further, A and C will only interact when they are in certain states of themselves ( $a^1$ ) and ( $c^1$ ). In such states of themselves things take up certain attitudes towards one another; they take note of one another; they become 'susceptible and receptive' towards one another, and it is this which constitutes the actual relations between them. The question now arises as to how things are able to take up these attitudes towards one another. Lotze answers it by maintaining that their natures are adapted to one another. For instance, ( $a^1$ ) and ( $b^1$ ) interact with one another, and to this interaction a consequence ( $f$ ) is attached; ( $a$ ) and ( $b$ ) do not interact and no consequence is attached to them. The interaction and its consequence is based upon a unity of adaptation between the natures of the interacting moments, which may be summed up in the formula  $a^1 + b^1 = f$ . This unity of adaptation constitutes a law possessing universal validity. Such universal validity, however, is different from the universal applicability possessed by individual laws which are principles of reality. The validity possessed by a law which sums up unity of adaptation means that this unity is dependent upon the natures of the things adapted, and not upon their actual existence, nor upon any changes which this existence may undergo. Thus that which lies at the basis of relations is a unity of the natures of these things standing in them. This unity possesses the characteristic of eternity or timelessness in that it 'holds good,' or is 'valid of' that of which it is the unity, and it is therefore called a unity of validity.

What we wish to show now is, that the unity of validity is an order extending over the whole of reality. It is an order in that it is a systematic unity of natures, each of which must, from the nature of the case, remain eternally the same. It extends over the whole of reality in that reciprocal action, which is rendered possible through it, is universal. Lotze tells us that there is a constant inter-

dependence between all that exists, by which the states and changes of one thing are conditioned by the states and changes of all others; a world in which this reciprocal action between all things did not take place would be one about which no scientific conclusion could be established, and in which no event could be anticipated.

We may sum up Lotze position at this point by saying that, for him, the real consists of individuals or minds related to one another through activities dependent upon an order, which is independent of these individuals, as such, and which stands altogether out of the reach of existence and change.

## V.—DISCUSSIONS.

### THE NECESSITY FOR A UNIVERSAL IN REASONING.

'WHETHER it is a personal peculiarity, or whether it is due to the "New Logic" I do not know, but Dr. Mercier seems to have developed an incapacity for understanding argument of any kind whatever.' So says Mr. Shelton in his rejoinder (*MIND*, No. 92). This is a serious charge, and if it is true, I must be in a parlous state, so it behoves me to examine myself strictly to see if I am really open to it. At the very onset I come upon what seems a corroboration of his charge, for I certainly have an incapacity for understanding how an incapacity can be developed. That an incapacity may exist and increase I can understand, but how it can be developed is beyond me. I start, therefore, under the depressing suspicion that the charge may be true; and when I examine Mr. Shelton's arguments I grow more and more uneasy, for at each step it seems to be confirmed.

I suggested that inversion is not a valid inference: against this Mr. Shelton argues that the style and manner of the advertisement of my *New Logic* are quackery. I have tried and tried, but I cannot understand this argument. It seems to me no refutation of my suggestion.

I suggested that Dr. Bosanquet and his critics are playing a game of spoof: Mr. Shelton counters this suggestion with the argument that my profession are spoofing the public and putting public money in their pockets. Again I fail to understand the argument. It seems to me no refutation of my suggestion.

I called the old Logic a game: Mr. Shelton's argument against my assertion is that it is foolish and meaningless. For the life of me I cannot understand that this is an argument at all. It seems to me more like abuse than argument. However, I received it in a humble and contrite spirit, and explained what I mean by a game; and now Mr. Shelton's argument is that my *New Logic* is a game, and still I can't see the force of the argument against my assertion.

Again, I argued that if the syllogism is the only mode of reasoning, it is odd that no one ever uses it; and especially that logicians never use it; and if it is the clearest mode of reasoning and the best, it would be a great advantage to me if Mr. Shelton would put into syllogistic form those arguments of his which I cannot

understand. To this argument of mine Mr. Shelton counter-argues that he has nowhere and at no time put forward views on logic which imply an obligation to express the reasonings of every-day life and of controversy in syllogistic form. Again I cannot understand his reply. It seems to me no reply at all. I should have thought that if every argument can be expressed in a syllogism, Mr. Shelton's arguments can be so expressed; and whatever his views on logic, they certainly include the view that every argument can be expressed in a syllogism. In my ignorance, and from the incapacity that I have developed of understanding any argument whatever, this reply seems to me strikingly similar to the reply I used to give in my earlier years when I was asked something quite beyond my comprehension. The reply I used to give, which I am afraid was not quite ingenuous, was 'I know, but I shan't tell you'.

Then again, Mr. Shelton says that the arguments I used about spooof would prove everything spooof; and again I cannot understand, for I used no argument at all. I merely made an assertion; and now a glimmer of hope shines upon my despondent mind, for I have for some time suspected, and now the suspicion broadens into certainty, that what I call assertion Mr. Shelton calls argument; and when he says that I do not understand his arguments he means that I do not accept his assertions. I am confident that I have now hit upon the true explanation, for I find on looking back that every one of Mr. Shelton's arguments is what I should call an assertion; and I have noticed the same peculiarity in other logicians. The difference between an argument and an assertion is one which they do not appreciate, and to them they are the same thing. All is now explained, and I recover my natural buoyancy of spirits.

I feel now that I have discovered what Mr. Shelton would call the methodology of interpreting his writings. One must scrutinise his terms, and accept them in meanings that are different, and sometimes opposite, to the ordinary meanings, and then everything becomes clear. The crooked is made straight, and the rough places plain. For instance, he says that if I would try to appreciate the gist of his criticism in the *Quarterly Review*, several things would happen. I might obtain some glimmering of the reason why he applies the term quackery to my attempt to confuse the sphere of logic with the sphere of life. I shall begin to realise how the hotch-potch into which I throw the fundamentally different processes of induction and deduction depreciates the value of such ideas as my book does contain.

I have tried to appreciate the gist of his criticisms in the *Quarterly Review*, but his account of my book is such a travesty that I feel sure he has jumbled it up with some of the six or seven other books he was reviewing at the time. Every other book on Logic that I have been able to consult speaks of the transition from de-

duction to induction, or of the inductive syllogism, or reduces inductive reasoning to syllogisms, or in some other way conveys the doctrine that inductive reasoning and deductive reasoning merge and blend into one another. Mr. Shelton himself assures us that all reasoning, and therefore inductive reasoning, can be expressed syllogistically. I am positively the only writer on Logic who draws a hard and fast line between induction and deduction, and insists that they are mutually exclusive. I insist in more than fifty pages, more than one-eighth of the whole book, on the irreconcilable difference between induction and deduction. I begin in the introduction to draw the distinction, I continue to insist upon it throughout the book, and in my final chapter on the faults of the existing Logic, I state as one of the gravest of these faults, the omission of this Logic to show a sufficient distinction between induction and deduction. Not once throughout the book do I use either term except in clear, sharp, unmistakable distinction and contrast to the other; and Mr. Shelton says I throw them into a hotch-potch. It is evident therefore that he is either referring to some other book, or he is using words in a sense exactly the opposite of the sense in which they are commonly used.

I should very much like to obtain a glimmering of the manner in which I attempt to confuse the sphere of logic with the sphere of life. If I wanted to do it I should not know how to begin to confuse two spheres. I may have done it inadvertently, but I can assure Mr. Shelton that I have not attempted to do it. It is about the last thing I should attempt, for I see no use in doing it. So he is quite right in saying that I have not a glimmering of the manner in which I attempt it. But if he means, as perhaps he does, that I have attempted to formulate the logic according to which the reasonings of our daily lives are conducted, I plead guilty at once to the indictment. It seems that Mr. Shelton would have Logic to haunt the interspace 'twixt world and world; he would relegate it to the interstellar spaces and a temperature of absolute zero; he would keep it removed to an immeasurable distance from the lives and affairs of men; and if he means by Logic the old Logic of tradition, I am not prepared to quarrel with him on this point. I should be delighted to see it removed to some region beyond the most distant nebula that the most powerful telescope we possess reveals to our knowledge. It would be quite as useful there as it is on this earth, and its power for evil would be reduced to a minimum. If Mr. Shelton regards my efforts to formulate the logic by which we actually reason in the affairs of life as wicked, or immoral, or stupid, as his reference to my 'attempt to confuse the sphere of logic with the sphere of life' seems to imply, I can only contemplate with astonished amusement his attitude of mind. I don't know whether Mr. Shelton would admit that we common people who are not logi-

cians, and cannot reduce Disamis to Darii, ever reason at all. Perhaps he would not—more likely he does not care whether we do or don't; but I assure him that we do at any rate try to, and that it is of interest to some of us to trace the operations of our minds, and discover how they do their work of reasoning. This is what I have done in my *New Logic*. Mr. Shelton, I am delighted to find, is perfectly willing to admit the existence of other logical forms than the syllogism, but he is not willing, it seems, that I should discover and describe them; or at any rate, he is not willing to admit that I have discovered or described them. Willing to wound, but yet afraid to strike, he does not deny that I have done so, but he will not admit it. He does not deny it, unless we are to take as a denial his assertion that while professing to carry out the explication of what is implied in propositions, I have not really done so. This is not criticism. It is bald assertion, without any attempt at substantiation or proof. But as I have already found, Mr. Shelton probably does not recognise any difference between assertion and proof, and considers that making an assertion is as good as proving it. I have devoted 100 pages of the *New Logic* to the explication of propositions, have described very many methods of explicating them, and have given scores of instances of explication. Mr. Shelton says that for me to call the old Logic a game is foolish and meaningless. I do not care to follow the example of introducing abuse into controversy, or I should call Mr. Shelton's denial that I have done what I have done, silly. However, I prefer to say that it has no relation to fact. It is an assertion so absurdly destitute of grounds that it will discredit Mr. Shelton with any one who has read the book, but for them of course it is not intended. It is intended for those who have not read it. If the multitude of implications that I have explicated from propositions does not include all that could be explicated, Mr. Shelton can no doubt find those I have neglected; and I challenge him to find one. I may say that I have myself since discovered a few that have been omitted, and I shall be interested to see if Mr. Shelton can discover them.

I am amused at his attempts to put the argument *a fortiori* into syllogistic form. He seeks the aid of Mr. Alfred Sidgwick, who primes him with an old device of Jevons', and the three of them contrive to produce a monstrosity which Mr. Shelton admits is not the form that the mind naturally adopts in this kind of reasoning, and he says that the complicated major premiss is not the universal through which we reason. Then what on earth is the use of it? Why take so much trouble to concoct it? What object is served by casting the argument into a stupid, cumbrous, complicated, ridiculous form that is admitted to have nothing to do with the process of thought? Mr. Shelton admits that in this case at any rate, though it is possible to torture the argument into a syllogism, the syllogism is not the true form of the thought. If all reasoning

is through a universal, there must be a universal in this argument. How is it that you cannot find it, Mr. Shelton? Does your failure not raise a doubt in your mind whether there is any universal there at all? If the syllogism is not the true form of the thought, what is the necessity for a universal? And if the syllogism is not the true form of the thought, what is the true form of the thought? You cannot tell me, Mr. Shelton, because you do not know; but I know, and I will tell you. This is one of the many places at which the *New Logic* steps in, and solves *ambulando* problems at which the old Logic stands helplessly nonplussed. Mark now, how plain a tale shall put you down.

If A—is greater than—B  
and B—is greater than—C

Then the second premiss gives us that C is, for the purpose of the argument, implied in B; and by Minor Canon C of the Canons of Explication may be substituted for B in the first premiss, which gives us

A—is greater than—C.

Is this not simple? Is it not even elegant? and does it not correctly describe the actual process of thought employed in reaching the conclusion? At any rate, compare it with the monstrosity of triple authorship formulated by Mr. Shelton, and say which is *primâ facie* more likely to be correct. As soon as the premisses are stated, we see at once that A must be greater than C. But to say that A is greater than C is to substitute C for B in the first premiss. By what right do we make this substitution? The right is given to us by the second premiss, which reveals that C, for the purpose of the argument, is implied in B; the purpose of the argument being, of course, to find the relation between A and C. This is my account of the process of thought. It is thus that I explain the method by which the conclusion is reached. I think it is the correct explanation, but whether correct or no, it is an explanation. The syllogism is not. Mr. Shelton and Mr. Bradley admit that it is not. My Method of Explication does explain what it pretends to explain, and it is a general method which explains many other inferences which are just as inexplicable by the syllogism as the *a fortiori*. It was not made *ad hoc*. It was a general formula into which the *a fortiori* happened to fit.

To convince me of the necessity of a universal in the *a fortiori*, Mr. Shelton says he will state an argument that is *formally* similar to the *a fortiori* but invalid, and invalid for want, I suppose, of a universal. So he states an argument that is not formally similar to the *a fortiori*, and one from which a perfectly valid conclusion can be drawn. The matter is so elementary that I am almost tempted to put on those pedagogic airs with which Mr. Shelton addresses me, as if he were the headmaster and I were the youngest and newest and stupidest sniveller at Rugby or Harrow. The

argument that he says is formally similar to the *a fortiori* is A is next to B, and B is next to C. I cannot see that this bears any resemblance to the *a fortiori*. To get an argument formally similar to the *a fortiori* it would be necessary to fill up the same form with different matter. L is greater than M, and M is greater than N is formally similar to Mr. Shelton's specimen of the *a fortiori*, and is of course itself an argument *a fortiori*; and it is impossible to frame an argument formally similar that is not. The nearest we can get to the *a fortiori* without duplicating it is the argument A is equal to B, and B is equal to C; and this is so far similar that we can get from it a corresponding conclusion—A is equal to C. This also has baffled all the efforts of inquisitorial logicians to torture it into a syllogism, and is explained with the utmost ease and with perfect satisfaction by the Method of Explication.

If A—is equal to—B  
and B—is equal to—C

then the second premiss gives us that C is, for the purpose of the argument, equivalent to B, and it may therefore, by Minor Canon C of the Method of Explication, be substituted for B in the first premiss, which gives us

A—is equal to—C.

'The validity of the form of the *a fortiori* depends entirely on the relation asserted.' I am not sure that I understand what is meant by the validity of the form of an argument. In my view the validity of every deductive argument whatever depends entirely on the application of the proper method of explication, and this does depend entirely on the relation asserted. It is a great step gained to have got a logician to see this in one case. Perhaps in time he will progress so far as to see that it is true in every case; and by that time he will recognise how absurd it is to preach to me the homily contained in his concluding paragraph. "New Logics" are so apt to miss the universals that are implied but not expressed in ordinary reasoning, and to confuse actually valid inferences with formally valid inferences. The *a fortiori*, though valid is not *formally* valid.' Could there be a more utter condemnation of the form which professes to be the form of all reasoning? 'A logic, like that of Dr. Mercier, which attempts to displace the syllogism, is so liable to contain forms of reasoning which are accurate only by accident, that is, the accuracy of which depends on the particulars of the argument rather than on its general form.' Was there ever such an absurdity as to allege that the argument *a fortiori*, the most telling and cogent argument that it is possible to devise, is accurate only by accident? What makes the *a fortiori* the most telling and cogent argument possible is that the implication it contains stares at us more impudently, and forces itself upon our notice more urgently, than does the implication of any other compound proposition.

Mr. Shelton says that from A is next to B and B is next to C it does not follow that A is next to C. Obviously it does not, but why should it? Because, says Mr. Shelton, it is formally similar to the *a fortiori*. It is nothing of the sort. It is no more formally similar to the *a fortiori* than a blackbird is formally similar to a cow because each has a head at one end and a tail at the other. It is the middle part that matters. The one argument is no more similar to the other than proximity is similar to superiority in size, and therefore the method that is applicable to the one is not applicable to the other. But though that method is not applicable, it does not follow that no method is applicable. I think I do Mr. Shelton no injustice if I surmise that he is of opinion that no inference can be drawn from the premisses A is next to B, and B is next to C. It is true that no inference can be obtained by the syllogism; and it is true that no valid inference can be obtained by the method applied to the *a fortiori*; but there is an implication in these premisses which may be employed to obtain a relation between A and C if we apply to them the proper method of explication. For the purpose of the argument we must state the premisses thus:—

If A—is next to B, and B is next to—C

and then, by applying Minor Canon B, we may substitute for this compound ratio the equivalent ratio 'is next but one to,' and thus we get the conclusion

A—is next but one to—C,

giving us the direct relation between A and C which it was the purpose of the argument to find; a perfectly valid conclusion, and one that on occasion may be very useful.

There is no confusion here of actually valid inferences with formally valid inferences. The inference is actually valid, and perfectly valid, but whether or not it is formally valid I neither know nor care. It is valid, not because of its form, but because it conforms to rule. Mr. Shelton calls the *New Logic* a formal logic, and although he is a strenuous defender of formal logic he brings this charge against the *New Logic* as a fault. He is welcome to call it formal if he likes. I don't know what he means by formal, and I doubt if he knows himself. If he means that I cast all arguments into one form, he has not read my book, or he has read it to very little purpose. But whether formal or not, my Logic is regular. It is canonic. It provides a rule for every case; and the validity of every argument depends, not upon its form, but on its conformity with rule. If an argument is invalid, it is because the rule applied is not appropriate to the relation asserted in the premiss. If an argument is valid, it is validated by the application of the appropriate rule. Mr. Shelton will naturally ask how we are to know what rule to apply in any given case, and he will

be horrified to be told that we can only find it by exercising our wits. This is an innovation indeed. The old logic is an apparatus to enable us to reason without thinking—without reasoning, in fact. Its conclusions could be obtained by machinery, and Jevons actually constructed a machine, which he exhibited with applause at the Royal Society, which could obtain every conclusion obtainable by the old Logic, and more besides. Admirable aspiration! Noble achievement! Illuminating commentary upon the old Logic! It is nearly, but not quite, as intellectual as a machine, a thing of cog-wheels and levers!

The accuracy of arguments conducted according to the *New Logic* 'depends' says Mr. Shelton 'on the particulars of the argument rather than on its general form'. I don't know how he reconciles this statement with his accusation that the *New Logic* is formal, but anyhow he brings it forward as a reproach to the *New Logic*. For my part I regard it as a merit. The old Logic has been trying for two thousand years to squash every argument into one single form, and it has failed, and failed ignominiously. What is the use of going on with it? How much longer do logicians want?

'What Dr. Mercier does not appear to realise is that the inference *a fortiori*, simple as it appears, assumes a universal which is not expressed, and which the form in which I have put it expresses inadequately.' It certainly does: for once I can agree with Mr. Shelton; but what Mr. Shelton does not appear to realise is that I deny most positively and strenuously that a universal is necessary to argument. I deny most positively that there is any universal in the *a fortiori* or in any of the great majority of arguments. A universal is in the eyes of logicians as necessary to the complete formulation of an argument as in the eyes of the Greek philosophers was the necessity that all bodies should tend to move downwards; as necessary as in the eyes of the Sacred College was the movement of the earth round the sun; as necessary as in the eyes of biologists was a special act of creation for the formation of every species of plants and animals; as necessary as it used to be for grooms to make a hissing noise when they were grooming their horses; as necessary as it now is to throw some of the spilt salt over the left shoulder in order to avoid disaster; as necessary, in short, as any other irrational superstition. We all know Lord Bowen's description of a metaphysician. He is a man in a pitch-dark room looking for a black cat—which isn't there. There is some excuse for the metaphysician. His room is pitch dark, and he has no reason to believe the cat is not there. But the logician is searching for the universal in a room that is now illuminated with the effulgence of the *New Logic*, and still he maintains that his black cat is there. He has been groping about for it for two thousand years, and he is no nearer finding it than he was at first; but he goes on groping, and is as confident as ever that it is there.

Mr. Shelton and Mr. Sidgwick, with the assistance of Jevons, contrive to produce something that looks a little like a universal if you don't examine it too closely, but they are obliged to confess that it is not the universal they are searching for. What is the inference? What is the plain inescapable inference? That if they were to look a bit longer they would find it? To a logician this may be a valid conclusion, but any other human being on the face of the earth would say, as I say, *de non apparentibus et de non existentibus eadem est ratio*. If you have looked for a very large thing in a very small space for two thousand years and have not found it, you must show some very conclusive reason if you wish others to believe it is there. What is your reason? That every argument *must* contain a universal. But why must it? Suppose I say this belief is only a groundless superstition, is there any reason to suppose it is not? To this question I know of no reply, except that as Aristotle said so, it must be so. Well, that does not convince me. As Mr. Shelton comes the pedagogue over me, I will come Mr. Barlow over him, and acquaint him with the story of The Ancient Physician and the Hole in the Heart, which as he has never heard it, I will now proceed to narrate.

Once upon a time there was a physician named Galen, who spent in physiological speculations such time as he could spare from his usual occupation of spoofing the public and putting public money into his pockets. He knew that the vital spirits are carried to all parts of the body by the arteries, but he could not understand how they passed from the arteries of the lungs to the arteries of the rest of the body. In order to get from the one into the other, they must pass through the septum of the heart, and therefore Galen knew that there must be a hole in the septum of the heart to let them through, and so sure was he that it must be there that he taught that it is there, and every one believed him. For fourteen hundred years Galen was as great an authority on medicine as Aristotle on Logic. For fourteen hundred years anatomists looked for that hole in the heart, and could not find it; but for fourteen hundred years every anatomist taught that there is a hole in the septum of the heart. No anatomist would venture to pit the evidence of his senses against the authority of Galen, for Galen was as great an authority on his subject as Aristotle is upon Logic. At length an anatomist named Vesalius had the temerity to believe his own eyes in spite of the authority of Galen. He declared that there is no hole in the septum of the heart, and he was at once confounded by the clamour of the orthodox logicians—I mean anatomists—and narrowly escaped being burnt alive for his profanity; for Galen was a very great authority, and in the sixteenth century the power of authority was as great in medicine as it is now in Logic. *De te fabula narratur*, Mr. Shelton.

Let me put it in other ways, for it is necessary to spread butter on bacon for logicians. They say there is a universal in every

argument. Very well. Theirs is the assertion, and on them lies the burden of proof. How do they discharge this onus, and prove their assertion? They do not prove it. They cannot prove it. They merely assert and reassert. They do not quite call down fire from heaven to consume the blasphemer who questions their assertion, but they treat him with haughty superiority, as an ignoramus who has trespassed upon sacred ground, and is displaying an antic and contemptible ignorance. According to their own showing, a single negative instance is enough to disprove a universal affirmative, and I bring forward a negative instance in the *a fortiori*. How do they meet this destructive instance? Do they show that it is no instance, for that the *a fortiori* does contain a universal? Not a bit of it. They acknowledge that they cannot find a universal, but they construct a sham universal, which they admit is a sham, and claim that that disposes of my case. And this is Logic!

It is not much use appealing to the reason of logicians, but I hope that some who are not logicians may read this discussion, and I appeal to them. It is asserted that there is only one mode of reasoning, and that this is by bringing a particular case under a general law. There are certain arguments that cannot be explained on this principle, and my contention is that if that is so, then either there must be more than one mode of reasoning, or if there is but one, the method described is not that one. To this it is replied that although these arguments cannot yet be explained on this principle, yet they will be so explained some day, if only we give enough time to the matter. I rejoin that as they have been two thousand years over it, and have not yet succeeded, it is unlikely that they would succeed even if they took several more centuries; and besides this, I bring forward a new principle which does explain to a nicety these arguments which the logical principle does not explain. I am willing to admit that in some cases reasoning does consist in bringing a particular instance under a general law, but I say that this is not the only principle. There are others; and by the application of these others I can and do satisfactorily explain the cases that cannot be explained by the universal. If a corresponding feat had been performed in any other science, the professors of that science would most certainly examine the new process and ascertain whether it did in fact do what it is asserted to do. They would try it, and test it, and probe it, and investigate it, and ascertain whether it is a valid process or not. But logicians will not do this. They will have no dealings with a thing so unholy as a novelty. Aristotle laid down for all time the principles on which reasoning is conducted, and even to test a new principle would be an admission that Aristotle may possibly have erred; which is an admission that no self-respecting logician would dream of making. Besides this, it would be troublesome. It would need an effort. Nay, it would require

the exercise of reasoning, and logicians very naturally and properly distrust their own powers of reasoning; so instead of examining my proposals, they treat them either as the professional logicians do, with dumb obstinacy, or as Mr. Shelton does, with what I may call the haw-haw method. What can an outsider, a mere physician, know about logic? This intruder is to be snubbed and kept in his place. He must be told of philosophical principles of which he has probably never heard, and treated to scornful and supercilious advice; his profession is to be sneered at; and altogether he is to be treated as an intrusive outsider.

Mr. Mayo also adopts the haw-haw method of controversy. He must excuse me if I refuse to take him seriously. He tears a sentence of mine in half, removes it from its context, interpolates words of his own, and having thus altered it, argues from it what I seem to think. He can better infer what I actually do think, if that has any interest for him, from what I actually say, and what I say is that his assertion that I 'misinterpret the significance of the judgment and [to] suppose it to consist of two terms arbitrarily linked together by a copula' is so ludicrously opposed to my whole teaching as not to be worth refutation. The whole of my chapter on the copula is a refutation. I have never said, thought, surmised, or imagined, anything so absurd. I suppose it is the study of the old Logic that teaches its votaries to attribute to their adversaries opinions they do not hold, and ignorance of which they are not guilty, and this confirms me in my desire to see it superseded by the new. Mr. Mayo further accuses me of being so little able to understand the significance and utility of Logic. I think I understand its significance pretty well, but as for its utility, I thought its claim to utility had long been abandoned. As far as I know, no one for the last thirty years has suggested that Logic has any utility. Even its professors no longer make any such claim, and I don't suppose Mr. Mayo's accusation is anything but a bit of haw-haw.

CHAS. A. MERCIER.

## ELEMENTARY LOGIC.

IN his interesting review (MIND, No. 93, p. 98) of my *Elementary Logic*, Captain Knox mentions a point of disagreement between us which I should be glad to clear up if possible. It involves two questions about a certain quality which, as every one agrees, belongs essentially to descriptive names: (1) Shall we call this quality 'vagueness' or 'indeterminateness'?; and (2) Shall we regard it as a defect?

It seems to me that both these questions are merely verbal, at least as between Captain Knox and me; that is to say that they do not point to any difference of opinion between us upon matters of fact. But that need not make them any the less useful questions to raise, since they lead to further explanations of meaning.

As regards (1) I am willing to use either term, or both indifferently. As said at page 197 of the book, they are intended to express merely the fact that, however elaborately any descriptive name may have been already 'defined,' there is always a possibility—of the most practical kind—that further definition of it is required for a given purpose. Descriptive names, as such, fall short of perfect definiteness, though sufficient definiteness (for a purpose) is very often achieved. And it is insufficient definiteness only that we need to guard against.

As regards (2) Captain Knox's objection may perhaps be removed by my free admission that *when* we know that the indeterminateness has not caused ambiguity in a given case, the 'defect' is seen as a virtue *so far as that case is concerned*. Certainly, the more we can dispense with irrelevant details the better, and there would be no sense in complaining of a judgment for "not telling us what we don't want to know". But there is also another point of view to be considered, namely the period before this wisdom about the particular case has reached us. Looking at descriptive names generally, as instruments *capable* of use, we must confess, I think, that the very quality which enables them in fortunate cases to leave out irrelevant details enables them also to leave out relevant ones. That they have this unfortunate liability seems to me a defect, even though it be (as we both think) irremediable. May we not rightly complain of judgment in general that it inevitably runs a risk of not telling us what we do want to know?

Where Captain Knox mistakes my meaning is in his supposition that "the 'defect' in question . . . is the defect of ambiguity"

(p. 102). Its existence—as I conceive it—is prior to the discovery that an actual ambiguity is present (or absent). It is recognisable only while we are considering in a general way the instruments used in reasoning. There ought, I think, to be no real difficulty in agreeing that a defect in actual reasoning is not necessarily the same thing as a defect in the instrument with which all reflective reasoning is performed.

Another possible objection should also be mentioned, in case it has influenced Captain Knox's view. Some people may think it unpractical to complain of things which cannot be mended—since between an 'irremediable' quality and a 'necessary condition' it is hard to find any difference. So it is, I admit. Yet in view of the fact that the necessary conditions of reasoning are such that they open the way to a particular kind of insidious error, it does seem to me practical to dwell on them. If we cannot finally conquer this evil thing, we may at least try to be on guard against its operation.

ALFRED SIDGWICK.

## VI.—CRITICAL NOTICES.

*Scientific Method in Philosophy.* By the Hon. BERTRAND RUSSELL, F.R.S. Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1914. Pp. 30. 1s. 6d. net.

It seems quite probable that Mr. Russell's Spencer Lecture will attain in its series much the same unique position that Huxley's *Ethics and Evolution* holds in that of the Romanes Lectures. Which is to say that once again a selecting committee has chanced to appoint some one who had something to say. Mr. Russell has a number of things to say, and says them very well, with both humour and incisiveness, and with sufficient modifications of his previous doctrines to show that he is a real live philosopher who is in no danger of fossilising just yet.

He begins by deploring the influence on philosophy of ethical and religious motives which import human values into it, and the neglect of the methods which ensure the steady progress of the sciences. As examples of such corruptions he instances the notion of 'the universe' and the antithesis of 'good' and 'evil'. The former he believes to be "a mere relic of pre-Copernican astronomy" which is "an almost undiscussed postulate of most metaphysics". For all that "the apparent oneness of the world" may be "merely the oneness of what is seen by a single spectator or apprehended by a single mind". Quoting and following James, Mr. Russell criticises the Spencerian accounts of the conservation of energy and of evolution as "giving an air of absoluteness and necessity to empirical generalisations," which cannot be erected into universal *a priori* laws, without ruining all philosophic structures based thereon, if there is any failure in their absolute exactness. Evolutionism exemplifies also the second 'hindrance' to scientific philosophising, *viz.* "undue preoccupation with ethical notions," alike in the "older and less radical" form represented by Hegel and Spencer, and in the "more modern and revolutionary" represented by Pragmatism and Bergson. For both believe in 'progress,' on the strength (with the exception of Hegel, to whom "it would be unfair to attribute any scientific motive or foundation") of "a very small selection of facts confined to an infinitesimal fragment of space and time," which is probably not an average sample of the course of events. There follows a delicious protest against "the philosopher's self-complacent assumption" that a development which has resulted in him "is indubitably an advance". Such ethical notions are an-

thropocentric and pre-Copernican attempts "to give legislative force to our own wishes," which impede "that receptivity to facts which is the essence of the scientific attitude towards the world". But ethics is only "the art of recommending to others the sacrifices required for co-operation with oneself," and ethical philosophy always remains more or less subjective. "Even vegetarians do not hesitate to save the life of a man in a fever, although in so doing they destroy the lives of many millions of microbes." It is "thus never impartial and therefore never fully scientific".

Having thus 'extruded' from scientific philosophy 'the universe' and ethical valuations of it, Mr. Russell inquires what specific problems are left for philosophy. Philosophic propositions, he answers, must be (1) applicable to everything that does or may exist, not *collectively* however (for the 'universe' is not the subject of any proposition) but *distributively*. (2) They must be *a priori*, incapable of being proved or disproved by empirical evidence. Philosophy thus becomes indistinguishable from logic which is "an inventory of possibilities, a repertory of abstractly tenable hypotheses". Its method is essentially analytic, not synthetic, and its power is illustrated by the analysis of Kant's problem in the Transcendental Aesthetic into one of logic, one of physics and one of epistemology. It then appears that "our knowledge of physical geometry is synthetic, but is not *a priori*. Our knowledge of pure geometry is hypothetical. . . . Thus with the separation between pure geometry and the geometry of physics, the Kantian problem collapses." It is removed, as an unnecessarily complicated assumption, by Occam's razor and the principle of economy.

The controversy about realism also benefits by analysis, as both sides have been far from clear as to what they were discussing. When it is asked: 'Are our objects of perception *real* and are they *independent* of the percipient?' neither term is defined. Yet both are highly ambiguous, and the questions are indeterminate and unanswerable. Mr. Russell himself is disposed to hold that "objects of perception do *not* persist unchanged at times when they are not perceived, although probably objects more or less resembling them do exist at such times; that objects of perception are part, and the only empirically knowable part,<sup>1</sup> of the actual subject matter of physics, and are themselves properly to be called physical; that purely physical laws exist determining the character and duration of objects of perception without any reference to the fact that they are perceived; and that in the establishment of such laws the propositions of physics do not presuppose any propositions of psychology, or even the existence of mind" (p. 29). Mr. Russell is not sure whether such a view will be recognised as realism, but confident that it avoids the difficulties both of realism and of idealism: he concludes by re-

<sup>1</sup> Italics mine.

commending his method as one which will lead through tentative and partial advances to solid and durable progress, though it will abandon "many of the more ambitious and humanly interesting problems of traditional philosophy".

Apart from its intrinsic interest Mr. Russell's lecture forms a convenient compendium to his present views and a good introduction to his recent Lowell Lectures on the External World. But for those who have been watching the development of his thought it has great interest also as revealing a very marked, and apparently conscious, move in the direction of pragmatism. This development is so important and so little likely to be noted by the numerous philosophers who have not hitherto troubled to understand either Mr. Russell or pragmatism, that it seems incumbent on me to expound it in some detail.

The bond of sympathy between Mr. Russell and pragmatism is of course the respect both have for the method of science and its progressive achievements, in contrast with the sterile quibbling that fills the history of dialectical philosophy. Pragmatism indeed has always conceived itself as the philosophic recognition of the method of real knowing, the scientific method, and regards its own denial of absolute truth as merely the reverse side of the infinite progressiveness of scientific truth. As soon as Mr. Russell, therefore, stimulated apparently by the subtle problems to which the modern theory of relativity gives rise, interested himself in physics and its relation to mathematics, he was bound to discover that absolute truths neither exist nor are needed in the sciences. He now, accordingly, clearly implies, though he does not explicitly state, the pragmatic character of our actual truth. When, *e.g.*, he says (p. 24) that where no empirical means of distinguishing between alternative hypotheses can be found we are entitled to choose the mathematically simplest (= most convenient) assumption, he seems to be not only describing scientific procedure correctly, but to be conceding all that pragmatism asked for.

He and pragmatism are now agreed also that perceiving *must* make a difference to objective perception (*i.e.*, that there is a certain 'making of reality'), that the business of philosophic reflection is *analysis* before *synthesis*, that the terms 'real' and 'independent' are so ambiguous that the controversies about them have long been meaningless, that the Kantian account of Space and Time is a manifest and hideous confusion of perfectly distinct problems,<sup>1</sup> that truth must be attained by the gradual and continuous correction of error (p. 18), that the monistic notion of the 'universe' is assumed quite uncritically, that metaphysical 'systems' are pervaded by ethical assumptions and based on a pitifully slender and utterly partial and subjective selection of facts.

These last two charges seem to me to be quite true, but so un-

<sup>1</sup> As I have long been pointing out. Cf. *Axioms as Postulates*, 40-43.

avoidable that I cannot draw from them Mr. Russell's inferences, but feel bound to point out that he himself has to commit the offences he censures. He too must select, and can only select from the data he experiences, in constructing his hypotheses, and if these are "a selection from the sum total of what exists" (p. 8), *his* beliefs also may be determined by his manner of selecting rather than by the nature of reality. But what is gained by stigmatising this universal and inevitable procedure as a 'subjective falsification' (p. 6)? It seems better to reconcile oneself to the selectiveness of all truth and to make the best of it. Again, is it wise to condemn so unreservedly the intrusion of 'ethical' considerations when you have yourself to practise 'economy,' and to shave the bristling exuberance of 'possible' hypotheses and alleged 'fact' with Occam's Razor? This procedure, doubtless, is scientifically right and proper, but surely the 'principle of economy' is an ethical notion if ever there was one, a typically human way of ascribing legislative force to our convenience. It naturally occurs to us because we have a brief span of life in which to effect our scientific purposes; to a non-human mind that was not pressed for time but disposed of all eternity it would be unmeaning or repugnant. I defy Mr. Russell, therefore, to show any good reason why (on his principles) the objective course of events should proceed in a way that is simple, easy, economical or convenient for us.

Nay I will go further and suggest that the notion he still cherishes that submission to fact is the essence of the scientific temper (p. 15) is itself a leading case of an 'ethical' human ideal, and one that is impossible and self-contradictory to boot. The mere fact that he thinks it *desirable* and desires it gives it the 'subjective' taint he desires to avoid; the mere fact that it must be desired if it is to be attained, renders it impossible and contradictory, because the desire to attain it *ipso facto* humanises it. Nor is its adoption requisite for scientific progress; the scientific inquirer may in point of fact have any sort and amount of human interests, provided that he also has *docility* enough to learn from experience and self-control enough not to let his bias overcome and blind him to such 'facts' as his inquiry brings him to. But docility and self-control differ widely from mere 'receptivity' and 'submission'. Lastly is there not a risk in assuming in advance of experience that the 'facts' revealed in human experience are incommensurable with the ideals rooted in human hearts? Is it not quite as possible *a priori* that our 'science' is as human as our 'ethics' and our 'metaphysics,' and like them strives (with imperfect success, no doubt) to increase human satisfaction? At any rate this possibility should be seriously examined by a philosopher who holds that *philosophy is the science of the possible* (p. 17) and so should not be tied down to a vindication of the actual, but should endeavour also to explore the boundless expanses of the possible.

If Mr. Russell will grant me this, I will confess in return that the evidence on which the belief in progress, and indeed all optimistic interpretations of experience, rest is far more precarious than is at all agreeable to the widespread human desire to blink unpleasant facts. But this is only to say that we need a large measure of faith to live and that all faiths are risky. But so is all life, and it is not clear that by refusing to take this risk we should contrive to live less dangerously. Moreover the belief in progress seems clearly to be one of those beliefs which, as James had the glory of discovering, tend to verify themselves.

On some minor points also I cannot altogether follow Mr. Russell. That philosophic contentions are often such that "they can be neither proved nor disproved by empirical evidence" (p. 17) seems a poor reason for calling them *a priori*, as well as being hard to reconcile with Mr. Russell's empiricism elsewhere, and to be getting perilously near to Ostwald's definition of 'philosophic' problems as pseudo-problems. The fact itself is true enough (if we take 'proof' in the old impossible sense), but its simplest explanation is that such propositions are postulates, and largely methodological. Unfortunately Mr. Russell does not yet appreciate the logical function of postulates.<sup>1</sup>

Again while agreeing that the validity of the notion of universe has been quite unwarrantably assumed, I cannot but think that Mr. Russell's 'absolute pluralism' is a little too bold, and that it would have been sufficient, and safer, to question the monistic assumption without denying it dogmatically. When so questioned, it is apt to disintegrate into a dissolving series of treacherous confusions.

On the question whether Mr. Russell's present metaphysic should still be called 'realism' I cannot speak with much authority; but it seems to me to be a distinct improvement on its predecessors. If the relation between the 'objects of perception' and the unperceived 'real objects' is no longer one of identity but only one of resemblance, it seems to leave room for a moderate humanism, which merely insists that the process of perceiving has to be allowed for and must not be overlooked altogether. Again if the objects of perception are "the only empirically knowable part of the actual subject matter of physics," it becomes pertinent to inquire whether science should not confine itself to this knowable part, and whether the trans-perceptual real objects are really needed. This inquiry might perhaps establish that the supposed need for them was emotional rather than scientific, and rested largely on a misinterpretation of the apparent stability of objects of perception which was capable of a simpler explanation. *E.g.* it might be preferable to construct ideally constant 'things' by a process of selecting the more stable out of a mass of less regularly recurrent experiences.

<sup>1</sup> As appears from his *Knowledge of the External World*, p. 222 f.

I do not, of course, venture to suggest that all these interpretations of the data are likely to commend themselves to Mr. Russell. But his recent writings have made so much common ground between him and pragmatism that there no longer gapes between them one of those insuperable abysses which separate the main types of philosophic thought, and render mutual comprehension and philosophic progress so impossible.

F. C. S. SCHILLER.

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*The Philosophy of Religion.* (International Theological Library.)  
By GEORGE GALLOWAY, D.Phil., D.D. Pp. xii, 602. T. & T. Clark, 1914.

THE publishers of this series of important books had asked the late Prof. Flint to undertake this volume; and if he had been allowed to do so, we should no doubt have had a work of much ability and force. Failing Dr. Flint they were well advised in asking Dr. Galloway to take his place; and he has walked in the footsteps of his teacher and given us a study worthy of a philosopher and at the same time Christian in position and tone, though without discussion of specific Christian doctrine. His former works have shown him to be a frank, competent and thoroughly equipped writer on religion in its comparative and philosophical aspects, in whom reverence and devotion to spiritual interests go hand in hand with a scientific spirit and uncompromising love of truth. The task he has now discharged is a much larger and more exacting one than any he had before undertaken, being no less than to show what religion is in its whole manifestation, how it has arisen out of human nature, and how there is truth in it which is a necessary complement of our knowledge of truth as a whole. To do all this requires a knowledge of many sciences, historical, psychological and metaphysical, of which as he himself confesses no one can be equally master. Religion has to be set forth from the earliest to the maturest form it has assumed, that we may have the great phenomenon fully before us. Psychology must be consulted at every step, to determine as far as possible the roots in human nature from which religion arose, and the relations in which it stands to other activities of the human mind; and when all this is done the central and essential question has to be dealt with, Is religion true? Is the knowledge it claims to bring us really and actually knowledge and not a mere imagination without any solid basis in facts? Does religion as it now is place us in the centre of the universe, and enable us to understand, as it claims to do, the world we live in and our place in it?

It is thus that Dr. Galloway conceives his task, as he states in the very interesting and comprehensive preface with which his

book opens. His philosophical position is that of personal idealism as we know from his former works. It is not obtruded; only at page 421 does he refer to the doctrine of monads which he holds to be the key to our relation to human beings and to God. In his opening account of the history of the Philosophy of Religion we find him putting aside the intellectualism of Hegel, the empiricism of Comte, the pragmatism of James, and every philosophical extreme, always for reasons every one can understand; and throughout the book he exercises a calm and sober common sense. His interest in religion itself is everywhere conspicuous, and no less his conviction that religion is a reasonable thing and that no superstition can belong to the essence of it. It is possible now to say things on this subject which could not be said twenty years ago without disturbing the equanimity of good people, and our author makes full use of his liberty. His book will form a wholesome tonic for religious thought; the critic of existing beliefs will find weapons in it, and the quiet student of religion will be much encouraged. I refer to such statements as that on page 168 that it is an error to regard a dogmatic system as the fixed and authoritative basis of a Church, instead of the historic and growing expression of the Church's spiritual life. *Per contra*, we read on the same page a protest against the tendency to reduce religious doctrines to symbols, because a Church could not hold together in which this view prevailed.

The phenomenological part of the book comes first, explaining from history what it is that is to be examined. Dr. Galloway has read much on the history of religion, and we find here independent discussions of questions belonging to the beginning of religion, Animism, Totemism, Magic, the earliest objects of worship, sacrifice, prayers, etc.; on all which matters he appears to me to be guided to sound conclusions. He rejects Mr. Lang's doctrine of the primitive monotheism of certain Australian and African tribes, and he regards magic as a growth quite apart from religion, neither its parent nor its child. His views on the early stages of the great religions are right and sensible. An admirable feature of this part of the book is the discussion of the psychological side of the beginning of religion, where it is shown simply and vividly how religion sprang of necessity out of man's nature, all his faculties of intellect, feeling and will conspiring in the movement by which he was led to it.

On coming to the end of the jungle of primitive beliefs and practices above which the great religions rear their mighty heads, Dr. Galloway comes to the question of the classification of the religions. He does not classify them at all, either into Nature Religions and Ethical, or as Siebeck into Primitive Religion, Morality Religion and Redemptive Religion. The distinction into religions which have grown and those which have been founded is not here alluded to at all, but is referred to in the brief descrip-

tion of the rôle of the prophet which comes later in the book. Instead of a classification Dr. Galloway proposes an arrangement of the material, according to the great changes which came over the nature of religion in the course of its growth, and caused the religion of the tribe to pass into that of the nation, and national religion into the universal type. Here I can scarcely criticise Dr. Galloway, his arrangement is so closely similar to my own, put forward in my *History of Religion* many years ago. The changes from tribal to national and from this to universal religion, are set forth on a large scale ; but the statement on page 111 that we do not know from direct observation how a number of clans became fused together to form a nation, may be questioned. Mommsen's *History of Rome* gives us a good deal about it, and the histories of Israel. Dr. Galloway counts only three universal religions, Buddhism, Islam and Christianity ; but Judaism should be added to the number. The promise of universalism was not, it is true, outwardly fulfilled ; adaptability was wanting in this case. But all the views and motives which make a religion universal lay near the heart of Judaism ; and the Catholic spirit both of the founder of Christianity and of its foremost missionary were born in it ; not to mention that the foremost missionary hymns of Christianity are found in the Old Testament.

The psychological discussions which accompany the historical part of the book show Dr. Galloway to be fully abreast of the most recent investigations in this field and are of singular interest. The way in which the historical and the psychological elements of the book interact and support each other is one of its chief merits ; there is enough of *History of Religion* to provide examples for the *Psychology* to operate on, and the *Psychology* in its turn is a noble supplement to the *History*, and shows it to have been on the whole a reasonable process. The discussions of characteristic aspects of developed religion which are taken up after the beginnings are disposed of, show the same blending of the historical and the psychological at a more advanced stage of the study. A quotation or two from this chapter (I. iii.) will show the style of treatment better than general description.

"Though appearing within a Christian environment and appealing to Christian ideas, the revival movements which from time to time sweep over a country are attended by phenomena which reveal the working of violent and elemental feelings. And they owe part of their attractiveness to this fact. Subconscious processes prepare the way, and at the psychological moment, and without prevision on their part, men and women are borne away by a flood of emotion. Ordinary religious reserve is broken down, a psychical infection runs through the crowd, and tense feeling finds utterance in songs and confessions, in extravagant joy and fits of weeping. The revival has higher and better features ; but the fact remains that it is commonly linked with phenomena which

belong to a lower stage of religion, and are not without danger to the higher religious life" (pp. 154, 155).

"It is intelligible how a Church, in the war against heresy, is impelled to lay the greatest stress on sound doctrine. But it is impossible to deny that the Christian Church was led to overrate greatly the importance of the doctrinal aspect of religion. Religion eventually became anti-religious in its zeal to extirpate heresy. Creed cannot be made to count for more than character without detriment to the inner life of religion" (p. 160).

"While institutional religion is the stable background, personal religion is the factor which makes for progress. Institutional religion can maintain itself for long through the sheer momentum of its former course; it cannot maintain itself permanently if religion ceases to be vital in individuals. . . . Human culture is a developing whole, and religion as an element in that whole, must develop in order to live" (pp. 177, 179).

The following chapter (iv.) contains a definition of religion and a discussion of its relations with science, morality and art. Dr. Galloway accepts my definition of religion as the worship of higher beings from the sense of need, making certain additions to it; his statement of the relation of religion to other human activities is excellent. His chapter (v.) on the development of religion seems to me less satisfactory: for the reason that it is confined too much to the growth which takes place within a nation and its religion, and takes too little account of the cases where different nations with differing religions come in contact with each other. Religion does not fulfil itself within a single nation; a nation in isolation must degenerate in religion as in other things. The growth of religion at the higher stage consists in movements of syncretism; the name of the God may not alter, but his character expands and new ways are found of serving him. This is recognised by Dr. Galloway; only I think not sufficiently. Judaism and Islam both held out against syncretism, and hence their growth has remained behind the promise of their earlier days.

So far I presume to criticise Dr. Galloway's great and comprehensive book. The second part of it in which the argument is offered that religion, *i.e.* the higher monotheistic religion to which the world's maturer thought has now come, is true and places us on a solid position in this world, I must leave to the judgment of philosophers. Dr. Galloway has not made this part of his task easy for himself. At every advance he summons us to face further problems, and leaves us after each discussion satisfied that it was called for and has received masterly treatment. The result that the testimony of religion about God and the world is true is reached through a discussion of the problem of knowledge, in which the knowledge arrived at in religion is shown to be of a different kind from scientific knowledge, reached by faith and deal-

ing not with outward facts but with values. The chapter on faith is one of the finest in the book, and is the keystone of the building. Dr. Galloway is heartily to be congratulated on the massive and many-sided demonstration he has given of the truth of religion.

ALLAN MENZIES.

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*A History of European Thought in the Nineteenth Century.* By J. T. MERZ. Vol. iv. Edinburgh and London: Blackwood and Sons, 1914. Pp. xii, 825.

It is a real pleasure to be able to congratulate Dr. Merz heartily on the completion of the great work of which the first volume was issued so long ago as 1904. In its vast scope Dr. Merz's book well justifies his adoption of the famous and splendid Platonic identification of the *συναπτικός* with the philosopher which stands as the special motto at the opening of its concluding volume. It would be hard to find anywhere in contemporary literature any book which surpasses the *History of European Thought* in the accuracy and fulness of its "synoptic view" over an enormous field of immense intellectual development. Many a man might have made an honestly earned reputation by doing as much for one of the special departments of thought which the author's programme covers as he has done for many, if not all. Once more, as in dealing with the third volume of this masterly work, the present reviewer has to express his admiration at once for the extraordinary range of the author's knowledge and for the quiet sanity and freedom from intellectual bias with which he surveys the whole century's output in the three great countries of Western and Central Europe. There are few, if any, great works in reading which less correction requires to be made for the "personal equation" of the writer. Of course I do not mean to say that Dr. Merz's work has not its limitations and its marks of personal one-sided sympathies. Absolute freedom from all such defects would be hardly possible except to omniscience. I cannot deny that the exclusion on principle of all consideration of intellectual contributions made to the great body of European thought in the Scandinavian countries, and in Italy is such a limitation. Absolute omniscience dealing with Pessimism as a strain in nineteenth-century thinking would, no doubt, remember Leopardi as well as Schopenhauer. And in dealing with the great body of unsystematised ideas represented by literature in the narrower sense, omniscience, while it would not forget the significance of Goethe and Schiller and Carlyle would, I presume, have to take some account of Shelley and Tolstoy and Ibsen, to mention no other names. In strictness Dr. Merz's great work is rather a history of thought in

Great Britain, France and Germany than in Europe at large. And, to be perfectly candid, I must avow that in Dr. Merz's treatment the last-named country seems to me to get rather more than her due prominence in the story. One cannot complain that the influence of Goethe and Schiller on mankind should be treated of enthusiastically and with a certain amount of unnecessary repetition, and one is glad to see Herder and Schleiermacher come by their rights, but I cannot help thinking that the spiritual influence of Wordsworth or Shelley or Byron or even William Godwin deserves equally adequate consideration. Nor can I quite understand how, in a work which devotes some considerable space to the glorification of Wilhelm Wundt as an original genius, comparatively so little account should be taken of any British thinker since Spencer or any French thinker after Comte, except by the consideration that the marked Teutonisms of the author's literary style prove of themselves that his mind has taken the special impress of a German education. Each of us, to be sure, has his own *idola specus* and I do not mean to suggest that it is any reproach to Dr. Merz that, with all his striving after an impersonal point of view, he has not wholly escaped the common lot of mankind. I would merely hint to his readers that there is some need in studying even his pages to allow for the "personal equation". Thus I am inclined to think that, as far as the "unsystematised thought" embodied in our own literature goes, he decidedly overrates the influence of German writers in general and of Goethe in particular. I should be inclined to say that while our literature has been very deeply impressed by those of France and Italy, the influence of German literature and thought, except upon quite a small minority, has never been very marked. It was virtually non-existent before William Taylor, Carlyle and Coleridge made German poetry and philosophy the fashion, and, from all that I can gather, that particular fashion has long since been out of date except among the specialists of our University Chairs. It is certainly the fact, whatever may be the reason of it, that even knowledge of the German language is much less common among "educated" young men in this country than was the case as recently as twenty or twenty-five years ago. I should suppose that the change may be largely due to growing dissatisfaction with the methods and results of the "classical" German philosophy. When T. H. Green and his pupils were preaching the study of Kant and Hegel to "Englishmen of under five-and-twenty" as the one appointed way of salvation from a hopeless Agnosticism, it was natural that acquisition of the German language should come to be looked on as the "key" to higher spiritual knowledge; to-day the younger generation is at least sceptical about the Gospel of Absolute Idealism, and not disposed to think the privilege of reading Treitschke and Bernhardt worth the expenditure of energy in the acquisition of a difficult language. My allusion to Green

leads me to mention another point in which Dr. Merz, as it seems to me, rather exaggerates the dependence of English on German thought. Green is often spoken of as an "Hegelian," though the truth is that it is Kant rather than Hegel whose influence is prominent in his writings, and it is noteworthy that he seems to have been wholly indifferent to the dialectical method which the more genuine disciples of Hegel have always insisted on as the special feature of their master's philosophy. But a more potent, and perhaps a more beneficial, influence on Green's positive doctrine is that of Aristotle. All that is best in his Ethics might be said to be little more than Aristotelian doctrine expounded and developed by an old-fashioned Radical of the school of Bright and Cobden with special reference to the social problems of nineteenth-century England. On the strictly ethical side I doubt if Green's views would have been materially different supposing him to have known nothing of Kant and Hegel beyond their names. And when one turns to the least satisfactory part of his doctrine, the metaphysical, though one sees that as a matter of fact his theories about the "timeless self" have been formed under the influence of the Kantian conception of *Bewusstsein überhaupt*, they are really much more akin to the cryptic Aristotelian utterances about the "separable intellect," and might, in fact, have been reached, as very similar views were actually reached by some of the less orthodox of the schoolmen, directly by an attempt to interpret the *de Anima*. One might perhaps even venture the suggestion that as a metaphysician Green is neither a Kantian nor a Hegelian but just an Aristotelian of the "Alexandrian" type. At the same time, I admit that it was probably the reawakening of interest in Greek philosophy for which we have so largely to thank Hegel and some of his followers that led Green to concentrate his attention on Aristotle. It is significant that, as one would expect from the relative backwardness of Platonic studies in the Germany of Green's age, he seems to have taken little interest in Plato and wholly misunderstood him.

But I am wandering a little too far from my appointed task. To return to Dr. Merz. In a sense, this concluding volume may be said to be the product of an even vaster labour than those which have gone before it. For it deals with topics which have been prominent in the serious literature of three nations during a whole century, but have not, to the same extent as those treated of in volume iii., been made the subject of precise and exhaustive consideration in the philosophical schools. This is true even of the subjects dealt with in the first three chapters, "Beauty," "the Good," "the Spirit". Æsthetic, Ethics, Philosophy of Religion have, of course, all been made the subjects of set "courses" of lectures by famous philosophers, but even in Germany a great deal of the most important work on them has been done by men standing altogether outside the philosophic tradition and unencumbered

by the need of fitting their views into any metaphysical framework. I would call attention specially to the balanced and luminous account given in these chapters of the work of more than one eminent man who has received less than his due in those current histories of thought which confine themselves to the discussions of the academic system-makers. Thus the full treatment of Schleiermacher's ethical and religious theories, which is fully justified by their historical importance, is one excellent feature of the book; another is the study of the æsthetics and ethics of J. M. Guyau, an author whose real originality has hardly yet won due recognition in this country. And Dr. Merz deserves the highest praise for the skill with which he has succeeded in exhibiting the real significance of Nietzsche without straying either into hyperbolic laudation or unintelligent depreciation. To write of Nietzsche with perfect sanity is, in my opinion, no easy task and Dr. Merz has achieved it to perfection. Yet, and this is another illustration of what I mean by Dr. Merz's failure to maintain a perfect sense of proportion in his estimate of the achievements of the three nations, Ruskin's widespread influence hardly receives due recognition by the devotion of a page or two, largely made up of quotations from Dr. Bosanquet, to *Modern Painters*, and a few scattered references in other places. His social theories, for the sake of the historical part they have played in moulding British ideas for the last forty years, surely deserved as careful and methodical examination as that which Dr. Merz has given to more than one German not exactly of the first order of genius. Similarly I am inclined to think that Newman is not altogether so insignificant a figure in the history of religious thought by comparison with Ritschl as Dr. Merz's treatment of the two men might suggest. (Kierkegaard and Tolstoy are both, of course, excluded by the plan of the work; yet a really comprehensive study of religious thought in the nineteenth century would surely have to take very serious account of both men.)

The social and economic thought of the century forms the subject of the next chapter, and the book closes with two more which discuss respectively the "Unity of Thought" and the "Rationale of Philosophical Thought". In the two first of those chapters the outstanding feature is naturally the elaborate and highly sympathetic study of Comte which is, to my own mind, one of the very best pieces of work in Dr. Merz's whole four volumes. If I might single out a special point as particularly admirable it would be the comparison of Comte's philosophical ideal with those of Hegel on the one side and Herbert Spencer on the other. In his general attitude to the problems of philosophy and the possibility of their systematic solution Dr. Merz remains in all essentials faithful to his description of himself in the third volume as in the main following in the footsteps of Lotze, though it rather surprises me, as I have already hinted, to find him elevating Wundt to a level

of almost equal importance. I can only suppose that he has succeeded in finding in Wundt's voluminous writings a revelation which has been denied to me, to whom this author has always seemed a rather dull eclectic. I wonder at any rate how far Wundt would accept Dr. Merz's last work on the whole philosophic problem as one to be solved, if at all, by the interpretation of the world in the light of the idea of personality, or the Theism which inspires his final sentence. "Not only in the far away summation of things but in human life as it is—

Love alone leads us  
Upward and on."

However that may be, I should like to end this notice with a simple record of my deep feeling that the *History of European Thought in the Nineteenth Century*, if it does not wholly fulfil, as work of mortal man hardly could do, the whole promise of its title, is the noble achievement of a noble task and will remain a κτῆμα ἐς αἰὲν for all students of the development of thought through one of its most important eras.

A. E. TAYLOR.

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*Is Conscience an Emotion?* Three Lectures on Recent Ethical Theories. By HASTINGS RASHDALL, D.Litt., D.C.L., LL.D., Fellow of the British Academy. Houghton Mifflin Co. Boston and New York, 1914. Pp. xi, 200.

THIS little volume contains the "Raymond F. West Memorial Lectures on Immortality, Human Conduct, and Human Destiny," delivered at the Leland Stanford Junior University in October, 1913.

A short course such as this is attended by certain peculiar advantages. It challenges the lecturer to make clear to himself the main issues of his question, and his main ways of meeting them; to disentangle from the mass of questions which interest him, and which call for attention, those which must be faced as important. But in philosophy especially it has great disadvantages; for you have not only to see clearly yourself, but to help your audience to see. And this involves a great amount of preparatory work, for which there is not time.

This admirable volume testifies to Dr. Rashdall's great success in his task. The problem he chose for discussion concerns the character of moral judgments; whether they belong primarily to Reason, or to Emotion. The first lecture states the problem and the main consequences of answering in this or that way; in the second lecture the views of Westermarck and McDougall, and in the third those of James, are discussed. Perhaps the most interesting point is Dr. Rashdall's reply to Dr. McDougall.

The question stated at the outset is, "What is the real character and meaning of the mental act which takes place when we call this act right, that one wrong?" (2-3). The answer to this question turns on the characteristics of the moral judgment itself. The fundamental thing about the moral judgment is its objectivity, which is shown in our demand that it should be impartial, and consistent with all other moral judgments. This objectivity is seen in the very form judgments take. The savage does not merely say, "This is prescribed by the clan," nor does the developed man say merely, "I approve of this"; the judgment takes the form, "This is right" (74-76). Thus, according to Dr. Rashdall, we have here just the same difference between subjectivity and objectivity as we have in the difference between "I agree with this" and "This is true"; and precisely the same intellectual processes are involved in passing from the one to the other.

From these characteristics it is inferred that a moral judgment can never spring from a mere emotion, which is purely subjective, and can never give rise to anything objective. The mere fact that I have a particular emotion in connexion with a certain act does not make any difference to the kind of emotion you ought to have; nor indeed does it constitute any claim on me to have the same emotion on another occasion, or to have similar emotions in relation to actions of a similar nature. Again, no mere emotion can be regarded as higher or lower than another; and thus, if we are to remain within the emotions, we can never speak of higher pleasures, or of a higher or lower self.

It follows then that the mere emotions are incapable of giving rise to the peculiar characteristics of the moral judgment, which therefore must rest on something else. This must necessarily be that faculty which does give rise to judgments of objectivity, impartiality and consistency, *viz.*, the intellectual or rational part of our nature, "the faculty of apprehending *a priori* or immediately those axiomatic truths upon which in the last resort all knowledge depends . . . a distinguishable activity of the same rational self or mind or soul . . . to which is due our judgment that two and two make four, and that two straight lines cannot enclose a space" (134-135).

This theory has been the subject of attack by Dr. McDougall, in his *Social Psychology*, and Dr. Rashdall's endeavour has been to show that he does not occupy the positions which Dr. McDougall claims to have rendered untenable. Dr. Rashdall is classed with those who "place moral conduct in a separate category, apart from all other forms of behaviour, and attribute it to some special faculty peculiar to human beings . . . which seems to be conceived as having been implanted in the human mind by a special act of the Creator, rather than as being the product of the slow processes of evolution" (McD., 378). It must be admitted, I think, that this does not represent Dr. Rashdall's position. Reason for him is not

a special faculty out of all relation to emotion and desire. Nor is it independent of evolution. But however closely connected with evolution our reason may be, it exists in the developed consciousness in an entirely different form from the form in which it existed in the rudimentary stage. And the validity of its utterances is intrinsic to its developed form. It is true that the ethical judgment is in most cases, though not always, accompanied by a certain amount of emotion. In some cases, indeed, the judgment on a particular action is determined by the emotions excited by the act. But in these cases, Dr. Rashdall insists, the judgment does not rest on the mere emotion, but on the judgment, "That the emotion has value"—something entirely different (146 ff). "... it is a *thought* satisfactoriness rather than a felt satisfactoriness, even when what is pronounced satisfactory is most clearly and obviously some feeling or emotion" (173).

But while Dr. McDougall appears to regard Dr. Rashdall as having a more extreme position than he really holds, Dr. Rashdall appears to do the same as regards Dr. McDougall's position. Dr. McDougall is represented as answering in the affirmative the question as to whether moral approbation can be analysed into emotions (R. 61), with the implication that he would answer "No" to the question, "Is there anything in the idea of right and wrong which is not mere emotion?" (R. 67). I do not think that this does justice to Dr. McDougall's position. An emotional disposition is only one aspect of Dr. McDougall's fundamental element, the instinct. It is true that in Dr. McDougall's treatment of human action he lays great emphasis on "emotion". A "sentiment" is defined as "an organised system of emotional dispositions centred about the idea of some object" (McD., 160); and the growth of morality is attributed fundamentally to the sentiments; but it would be wrong to ignore the part played by intellectual processes throughout this development. Dr. McDougall speaks of our judgments of value and merit as being "rooted in our sentiments" (160), our judgments of moral value depending on our abstract sentiments. Abstract sentiments (162) are thus the basis of moral principles. "It is through the development of such abstract sentiments that the individual's moral development and the refinement of his moral judgment . . . is effected, and that his moral principles are formed" (219). It is clear that this cannot be adequately described as meaning that our moral judgments are reduced to "mere emotion". For the development of the abstract sentiments involves "the intellectual process of discriminating and naming the abstract qualities of character and conduct." (219)—which on examination, I think, will be found to involve all that Dr. Rashdall contends for, though it is possible that Dr. McDougall might not admit it all—influenced by our development as members of society: whereby our approval, on the lower plane, is dependent on what is demanded by our fellows, but on the higher plane, is con-

ditioned by what we demand of ourselves in virtue of the ideal of character that we have formed.

It is clear that there is room on Dr. McDougall's principles for any amount of scope as to the way in which our intellectual processes shall react on our emotions and sentiments. It is no part of his object to discuss in detail the precise intellectual principles on which men do proceed in elaborating such abstract concepts as justice, virtue, etc. It is sufficient for him as psychologist to chronicle the fact that we do come to have such concepts, and to have sentiments relating to them.

It is true that Dr. McDougall speaks of "the consequences of action upon human welfare" as the only true and ultimate criterion of moral judgments (382); but it is clear that "welfare" is not to be measured by any standard which does not involve the satisfaction of man's whole nature. Nor need the phrase "human welfare" necessarily involve the subjectivity of moral judgments; for it is certainly possible that man's intellectual processes should result in genuine knowledge of reality, and also that the abstract sentiments should be determined largely by these processes.

To do justice to all the facts, it seems only necessary on the one hand to supplement Dr. McDougall's account by emphasising the part played by intellectual processes in our abstract sentiments and in our accepting something as our duty rather than as merely enjoined by some external authority; and on the other hand to apply to Dr. Rashdall's account of moral axioms a criticism similar to that directed on the axioms of Mathematics, in such a way as to bring out the part played by the fundamental emotions and the development of society. The former is the real point of Dr. Rashdall's criticism of Dr. McDougall, the latter that of Dr. McDougall's criticism of Dr. Rashdall; which would in each case have been more effective had it not been associated with any misunderstanding of the position criticised. Indeed, however Dr. Rashdall and Dr. McDougall may differ, their essential views do not seem to me to be in any way fundamentally opposed. It is not a fair account of either to say that for Dr. McDougall reason pronounces certain things to be good or valuable because our emotional nature approves, whereas for Dr. Rashdall our emotional nature approves because reason has pronounced them good, however suggestive this statement might be in indicating their differences of attitude. For it is not possible for Dr. Rashdall to exclude all reference to the emotions in his account of what reason pronounces to be good; nor would Dr. McDougall desire to exclude all reference to reason in his account of the emotions. And it seems possible to combine what each is chiefly contending for, without any difficulty; though it is probable that neither would agree with the result. The result would be somewhat as follows.

Before any proposition can be accepted by us as true it must appear self-evident. But this self-evidence is, in every case, the

result of an examination, by intellectual processes, of an extended field of material, and depends on the characteristics of this material. In the same way, the acceptance of an action as one which ought to be done, if it is to be fully justified, involves at once an acceptance of the act as a duty, and the perception of it as following on a self-evident judgment as to what is a duty. The material which gives rise to self-evident judgments about duties is (*a*) feelings of approval and disapproval in regard to certain actions, (*b*) the characteristics of these actions. This material must be sifted by an intellectual process until we discover (i.) the type of person whose feeling is to be accepted as right, (ii.) the character of those actions which make such a person feel as he does. This sifting will issue in a system of consistent judgments regarding duties, expressing the characteristics of actions which every one would be compelled to approve, so far as he was influenced entirely by relevant considerations. And it seems possible to prove that such a system would be in harmony with our deepest thoughts about the Universe; inasmuch as a precisely analogous account would be given of the way in which both intellectual and æsthetic judgments arise. If it is possible to make objective judgments regarding the Comic, these would be arrived at in the same way. Whether the Good, the Beautiful, and the True are ultimate, or the only ultimate categories, would depend partly on the specific nature of the feelings aroused, and partly on the characteristics of the material arousing these feelings; and the only method of deciding the claims of any other aspirants to the title of ultimate categories would be that of endeavouring to build up a system of consistent judgments on the material provided.

L. J. RUSSELL.

## VII.—NEW BOOKS.

*A Psychological Study of Religion: Its Origin, Function, and Future.*

By JAMES H. LEUBA. New York: The Macmillan Co., 1912. Pp. xiv, 371.

PROF. LEUBA ranks with James and Starbuck as one of the most eminent of American psychologists who for the past twenty years have given themselves to ardent and fruitful study of the religious mind. He and Starbuck have led what is called the Stanley Hall group, and their work has greatly stimulated men like Vorbrodt in Germany and Flournoy in France. One merit of the volume named above is that it gathers up the main results of Prof. Leuba's earlier publications and carries on the process of interpreting their final import. I regret the lateness of this review, and am in part responsible for it.

Prof. Leuba's definition of religion is unpromising. He thinks of it as a distinctively biological phenomenon, as contributing to breed the best kind of human life measured by a social standard. "Religion," he writes, "should be looked upon as a functional part of life, as that mode of behaviour in the struggle for life in which use is made of powers characterised here as psychic, superhuman, and usually personal." As he puts it in a later passage, "the reason for the existence of religion is not the objective truth of its conceptions, but its biological value". Clearly his notion of what religion essentially is will be drawn from its low and least developed forms. In a fresh and striking treatment of magic and religion he describes their proper difference as consisting in this, that magic aims at coercing gods to do what is wanted, whereas religion is anthropopathic, that is, it operates by way of appeal to the god's intelligence or heart. Primitive peoples, it is held, nearly always have in their minds not so much the idea of a personal divinity, as of power or force, which means that magic here predominates over religion. There is not one source of the ideas of gods: gods arose out of several different notions of supernatural beings, independent in origin, and characterised by attributes which vary according to their sources. These varied ideas of deity interacted on each other, one gaining ascendancy here, another there. Of these ideas, moreover, "the one arising from curiosity about the making of things is necessarily a relatively lofty conception," and Prof. Leuba agrees with the majority of recent anthropologists in holding that "there exists among the most primitive people now living the notion of a Great God high above all others, to whom is usually assigned the function of a creator". But he rejects the inference of Andrew Lang, that these tribes have deteriorated from what was the earliest state of mankind. To become a god, an invisible being must possess genuine importance for the struggle of life; and it is interesting to find the following laid down as a prerequisite of godhead—"benevolence toward men must enter into his composition". Attention should be called to a good chapter on "The Emotions in Religious Life". Robertson Smith is held to have been

nearly right in holding that not fear of unknown powers but loving reverence for known gods is the beginning of religion, Leuba only adding that Smith is describing positive religion as distinguished from *negative*, which covers man's attitude to essentially bad spirits.

We are now arrived at the close of Part II., and from this point onward the value of the argument much declines. There is an excellent chapter, indeed, on quite modern forms of piety, such as Mind-Cure, Christian Science, New Thought. And the book closes with a sifted list of notable definitions of religion from the three points of view of intellectualism, affectivism and voluntarism, with brief comments mostly by way of explanation. This is most useful. But in the main Parts III. and IV. go to prove that real eminence in psychology need not imply special gifts for philosophy or theology. In a long chapter headed "Theology and Psychology" the writer argues that psychology by itself covers the whole field of the religious interest and will answer all the questions we need to raise. To do him justice, he makes the same assumption as to morality. "I shall venture the statement," he says, "that the objective character and the obligatoriness of moral obligation is a problem that falls within the fields of social and individual psychology." Surely it is obvious that psychology has no bearing on the truth of the ideas it reports. A convenient fiction is as real a datum for it as a valid judgment. In fact, the writer who starts with Prof. Leuba's assumptions cannot hope to understand the importance of the question of *truth* for the normal religious man, who puts aside the notion that beliefs can be treated as mere biological values as little better than a bad joke. Once persuade the believer that his belief is false, or that its validity does not matter, and it ceases to be useful to him—though doubtless it might still be so to the bystander or the magistrate. The curious thing is that to Prof. Leuba it seems self-evident that theology, to be serious, must consent to be a branch of psychology. But wherever genuine religion has mastered men, it is because they have felt themselves under the constraint of some *trans-subjective* Power, that laid unconditional obligations on their life and claimed the first place in thought and will. Let us place next to one another these two statements, the first by Prof. Leuba, the second by the Psalmist as rendered by Martin Luther: "God is not known, He is not understood; He is used," and "Wenn ich nur Dich habe, so frage ich nichts nach Himmel und Erde". The mere juxtaposition shows there are more things in any higher religion, be it Judaism or Christianity, than are dreamt of in biological psychology. Religion is what it is because it declines to be taken as means to an end. Every religious man is quite sure of this, and to try to convince him that what he estimates as an end in itself is only a complex of utilities is the equivalent of asking him to give up religion altogether. There can be no impartial study of religion any more than there can be a purely disinterested study of morality. We can only know what religion is by reflecting on the shape it takes in ourselves. We really stand outside the religious experience so long as we fail to see that it is determined and even constituted by the thought of revelation. Revelation is something we do not make; it is a datum for the soul, it claims us, it bows us down before itself in faith and reverence. The logical structure of religious consciousness is unintelligible till this element of its thought is recognised; and failure to do so is in some degree responsible for Prof. Leuba's inability to give a convincing explanation even of the difference of magic and religion. He understands this as a difference of behaviour; but that is to fix attention rather on their forms of expression than on the real nature of their meaning.

One has the impression, while perusing works of the anthropological

school, that their discussions of the origin of religion, if not indeed altogether wide of the mark, are at all events oblivious of the problems that really count. What we chiefly want to know is why religion is born in A, B, and C, our contemporaries and friends, not simply why it came into existence long ago. Certain writers, ignoring this, fasten the religious consciousness to experiences distinctive of the earliest periods of human culture—dreams, visions, the sight of sleep or death. It is assumed that once religion began, it could not help persisting for a while, till the initial animistic impulse had spent itself. Manifestly this gives us little or no help in discovering why men are religious now.

H. R. MACKINTOSH.

*Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society.* 1913-14. Pp. 438.

This number of the Aristotelian Society's *Proceedings* is considerably larger than usual owing to the presence of a 'discussion' between Drs. Schiller and Wolf on the "Value of Logic," and a 'symposium' in which Dr. Moore and Prof. Stout took part on the "Status of Sense-Data". (What by the by is the distinction between a discussion and a symposium in this connexion? Is it that in the former the participants are rude to each other and that in the latter they are polite to each other? There is some evidence for this view in the volume before us.)

The symposium, Prof. Dawes Hicks' paper on "Appearance and Real Existence," and the translation of Lossky's article on "Intuitionism" have a pretty close connexion in their subject matter. Prof. Hicks begins with an historical discussion as to the meanings which appearance has had in important philosophical systems. He is concerned to show for his own part that appearances are 'not objects but ways in which objects are presented'. He says that we are immediately aware not of sense-data but of things, and the grounds that he offers are (a) that we need attention and abstraction to know that we are aware of sense-data and (b) that our immediate objects are complexes and not separate sense-data. The latter argument seems to me quite irrelevant; the former rests on the view that if we are immediately aware of anything we must also be immediately aware that we are aware of it. And this seems very doubtful. Either our attention creates the sense-data of which Prof. Hicks admits that we find ourselves to be aware or not. If not the sense-data are objects all along whether we know it or not. In such examples as the stick in water I fail to see how we are helped by the explanation: The stick has a bent appearance = the bent appearance is a way in which a straight stick surrounded by water is presented to us. For I do not see that this is (a) incompatible with the bent appearance being an object to us, nor (b) what precisely is meant by 'way' here. If 'way' = 'means' then the only means by which the appearance presents the stick is by being an object and being believed to be connected in some definite way with the stick. And if 'way' = a particular kind of mental act whose object is the straight stick or some part or quality of it what precisely is bent? Surely not a mental act.

Lossky's article is very similar to the one which he contributed to the volume on Logic in the *Encyclopedia of the Philosophical Sciences*. It begins by a sound and sensible recognition of all the distinctions by confusing which most idealisms render themselves plausible. But it seems to me to fail to recognise the many difficulties which confront naïve realism even after these confusions are removed. One remarkable statement is that very likely secondary qualities are qualities of parts of our nervous systems. I find it difficult to believe that when I see a green patch of colour some part of my nervous system must be green, and

obviously the whole suggestion needs a great deal more elaboration before it begins to be plausible. According to Lossky all propositions are in themselves necessary, and the relation between subject and predicate is that of ground and consequent. What we call a necessary proposition is one in which the predicate is seen to follow necessarily from some quality already recognised to be present in the subject; in what we call contingent propositions the predicate is equally necessitated by *something* in the subject, but that something has not been explicitly recognised by us. It is obvious that such a view can only be maintained if we take causal laws to be laws of necessary connexion, hold that all qualities are connected by such laws with each other, and are further prepared to admit that what we take as one subject may have to be supplemented by something which we took to be other subjects. For Lossky all genuine judgments must be true; error arises through the subjective play of fancy adding to what is before the mind. But this subjective play will not lead to error unless we erroneously suppose it to be absent or that a part of the object really supplied by us is independent of us; and this seems to involve genuine false judgements.

The symposium is a very valuable piece of work. Dr. Moore elaborates with his usual clearness the relations which he believes sense-data to have to the mind, and states the difficulties in supposing that they either are physical objects or parts of them, and of validly inferring the existence and qualities of physical objects from them. Prof. Stout scouts the suggestion that our sense-data could exist when we are unaware of them, but holds that they are never given without a reference to a physical source in general. The progress of knowledge of the physical world consists in tying down this reference more and more, and seeing to what part of the total physical world (*e.g.* physical source, medium, or our own nervous system) a particular sense-datum is to be referred. I still find an epistemological difficulty in his position. Sense-data and their mutual relations are *given* in complexes related by these relations, and the relations and *both* the terms are present as particulars to the mind and can be analysed out of the complexes. But on his view of reference we are given a particular sense-datum and a relation with one end in it and the other in the universal 'some physical object or other'. Such a complex seems hardly capable of being given as a whole, and, if it be, it is difficult to see how we are to have any logical guarantee of our further determination of the universal 'some physical object,' in view of the fact that we never directly experience any particular physical object whatever. One minor point that remains is that it is difficult to see how Prof. Stout can be so sure at the same time of the two propositions (*a*) the sense-data of which I am aware never exist when I am unaware of them and (*b*) physical objects (of which I am never directly aware) are composed of more of the same kind as my sense-data.

There is an interesting article by Prof. Alexander on "Freedom". This he defines as enjoyed determination. *E.g.* we say that we are free when we feel a state of mind as determining another or as determining a contemplated physical event, such as a bodily change. And we say that we are unfree when a contemplated physical event is seen to determine a state of mind (and also apparently when a state of mind, however actually determined, is not felt as determined by some enjoyed state). Freedom increases as the determinant is more nearly identical with the whole felt self; but such determination is not of the essence of freedom. There are some very excellent remarks on the relation of causation to prediction; they seem to me to come to the true and important statement that although we may be able to predict what will be the parts and their relation in a certain complex it does not follow that we shall be able

to predict all or indeed its most interesting qualities. Prof. Alexander aptly quotes Dr. Moore's principle of organic unities in Ethics here. There are also some very difficult dicta about the memory of a past state of mind. Even with the help of a supplementary note I cannot profess to be clear enough as to Prof. Alexander's meaning either to summarise or to criticise them.<sup>1</sup>

Mr. C. Delisle Burns contributes a very valuable paper on Ockham's Theory of Universals and argues that Ockham's controversy with the Scotists shows that we can dispense neither with universals nor with particulars.

I have no space left to do more than mention the remaining articles. These are "On Feeling" by Prof. Smith; on "Philosophy as the Co-ordination of Science" by Mr. H. S. Shelton; on the "New Encyclopædia of the Philosophical Sciences" by Prof. Brough; on the "Psychology of Dissociated Personality" by Dr. W. L. McKenzie; on the "Notion of a Common Good" by Miss Shields; on "The Treatment of History by Philosophers" by Mr. Morrison; and on the "Principle of Relativity" by Dr. Wilson Carr, who holds that it all brings grist to Bergson's mill.

C. D. BROAD.

*Introduction to the Science of Ethics.* By THEODORE DE LAGUNA. New York: The Macmillan Co., 1914. Pp. xi, 414.

Prof. De Laguna has followed a method of his own in arranging the contents of his text-book. In Part I. he discusses briefly the character, methods and range of a science of Ethics and (more fully) the problem of moral freedom as necessarily introductory to further detailed study of Ethical problems. The remainder of the First Part is then devoted to an account of the standards by which conduct has actually been judged by civilised and uncivilised men, and the whole of Part II. to an historical account of the Ethical doctrines of the chief classical and modern thinkers. His own views are then expounded systematically in the third and last Part.

The author's style is fresh and agreeable; he illustrates his positions happily from cases known to have arisen in actual fact, and there is much to be said for his method of treating debated issues in dialectical fashion. This return to something like the dialogue as against the sophistical epideixis, in which the weak points of one side are almost certain to be concealed, seems to me likely to be of real value to the student. I should call the first two parts of the book on the whole both useful and entertaining and I believe they might be prescribed with advantage to a class of students first entering on the study of Ethics. But I should not like to go bail for all Mr. De Laguna's assertions about fact. It is a hazardous thing to talk of "*Socrates* and Francis Bacon" as typical empiricists, or to credit Plato with a "boundless contempt for the mass of mankind,"—a judgment probably inspired by popular misconceptions about the politics of Plato's family. And it is more than hazardous, it is appallingly false to say that Plato tells the philosopher to put himself "in a sphere where courage, temperance, and even justice have no place". One wonders if Mr. De Laguna looked up the description of the philosophic character in *Republic* II., before writing this amazing sentence. It is significant that in the whole account of

<sup>1</sup> Since writing this I have had some conversation with Prof. Alexander on this subject. I think that I now understand his view better; but I am not certain, for the better I seem to understand it the less plausible it seems to become. But I cannot do justice to him here.

Platonic Ethics no use seems to have been made of the *Philebus* or *Laws* or even of any part of the *Republic* except the fourth book, and that the actual texts employed, chiefly passages from the *Phaedo*, have been curiously misunderstood. The account of modern theories seems to me on a higher level and often quite excellent, though I think it unfortunate that Butler, whose importance the author clearly recognises, should have been left out, apparently from a difficulty in fitting him into a ready-made classificatory scheme. I would particularly commend as useful in giving a young student some idea of what considerations are and what are not relevant to an ethical issue the concluding chapter on the "hedonistic controversy," though I could not myself subscribe to all its conclusions. My objection to Hedonism is not Dr. Laguna's, that the theory is unproved and unprovable, but that it seems to me so patently false. For example, I am sure that I judge certain experiences of aesthetic contemplation to be among the best of my own experiences, and that I should regard such experiences as cheaply purchased by a great deal of painful or tedious existence. Yet I am equally certain that these experiences are not distinguished from others by any particular intensity of pleasurable-ness. In fact I think they are sometimes accompanied by a sense of strain which is the reverse of pleasant. Hence it cannot be because they are so very pleasant that I think them so good. And I am equally sure that I should think it a bad thing to gratify a mob by condemning an innocent man even if I knew that the act would add enormously to the amount of pleasure in existence. If my judgment in *any* such case is a right one, this single fact disproves Hedonism. On the other side, I wish the writers of our text-books would make it clearer that what is morally objectionable in practice is not the mere *seeking* of pleasant experiences solely on the ground that they are pleasant,—this is often innocent and sometimes a duty—but *living* for pleasure.

The third part of the book, in which the author is developing his own views, seems to me more concerned with secondary than with fundamental questions. He has much to say which will be profitable to a young learner about the "usefulness" of "morality" to society and to the individual, but he never fairly tells us exactly what this "morality" of which we hear so much is, or what is the fundamental principle exhibited in it. Indeed he often seems to mean by "morality" no more than what happens to be the current practice of a given community at a given time. Whether there is any standard by which we can judge whether this current practice itself needs to be improved and in what respects we are never clearly told. We are told indeed that the verdict of time will show, but this is surely a very shallow answer if left to stand alone. Mr. De Laguna himself gives as a sample of the problems which only time can decide the question whether the German Emperor is a great (I suppose he means morally great) man. Surely it is manifest that there might be a divergence of opinion to the end of time between the Germans and their present enemies on the point. You can only justify the appeal to a supposedly unanimous verdict of future ages if you make the double postulate that the judgment of the future will be a unanimous one and that it will be a true one, and I cannot see that the author has given any reason for holding either opinion. If Mr. De Laguna were less hesitating in his recognition of the objectivity of moral obligations, he would, I think, hardly be forced to so lame a conclusion.

A. E. T.

*The Philosophy of William James.* By HOWARD V. KNOX. London: Constable & Co., 1914. 1s.

In this little book Captain Knox, an enthusiastic disciple of William James, presents the main outlines of his master's teaching. He has "aimed largely at effective selection . . . with a minimum of explanatory comment". The selection of extracts and the stringing of them together have been carried out with great skill and judgment, the minimum of comment being extremely pungent, pithy and well-directed. In this way the author has produced a guide-book to the field of James's thought which will be useful to all who desire to delve in that fruitful field or to appreciate in some degree the achievement of this great man.

But the book is more than a skilfully compiled guide-book for the general reader. It claims the attention of serious students of philosophy; for it demonstrates—and indeed this demonstration was the main purpose of its author—the fact that the important and profound philosophical doctrines, set forth with so much brilliancy and persuasiveness in the writings of James's later years, are in the main elaborations and developments of views implied, and, in large part, actually stated in his first and largest and greatest book, *The Principles of Psychology*. This demonstration was needed; for it is too much the fashion among our philosophers to proclaim a cheerful and unabashed ignorance of psychology, while they make use of sweeping and dogmatic psychological assertions. In accordance with this tendency some of James's critics seem to have neglected the *Principles* as a work produced when its author was still 'a mere psychologist'; regarding James as a writer, who, after practising for some years the shady profession of the psychologist, turned over a new leaf and in his later years aspired to become a philosopher. Indeed James himself lent some colour to the view that the two periods of his activity were discontinuous; for sometimes in his playful way he spoke of the time when he had been a psychologist; and he never revised his *Principles*. If he could have lived to revise the *Principles* a quarter of a century after its first appearance, the issue would have been of extraordinary interest and value. Captain Knox's little book is a partial substitute for such a revised edition; for he clearly shows, not only that James's philosophical views grew out of suggestions embodied in the *Principles*, but also that his philosophy consisted in the application of his psychology in the fields of logic and epistemology; that in fact his life work was essentially the reformation of psychology and its restoration thereby to its proper position among the philosophical disciplines, a position which it had lost through its own errors, especially through its short-sighted capitulation to the mechanistic claims and tendencies of nineteenth century science. As the author of this book so clearly shows, James's reform of psychology consisted in breaking away from the narrow tradition, which confined it to the description of subjective states or sensations or feelings, and in bringing it back to the study of mental processes regarded as functions of organisms by means of which they strive for life and a better life in an environment which, with more or less success, they shape to their ends; in short, in making of it the positive science of the behaviour of organisms, rather than a science of subjective states. Now, as soon as psychology adopts this view of its functions, it can no longer remain indifferent to questions of truth and error; but, becoming vitally interested in them, strives towards such a reform of logic and of the theory of knowledge as Pragmatism claims to have effected.

Captain Knox has fully proved his main thesis, the continuity of the development of James's philosophy out of his psychology; but his

book accents, perhaps unduly, the consistency of James's later with his earlier views. No mention is made of the several important points in which James's later views were incompatible with those expressed in his *Principles*; of which the most striking, perhaps, is the implied recession from the theory of the material conditions of memory—too dogmatically presented in the earlier work. But in this the author is justified, no doubt, by the narrowness of the space prescribed for the treatment of so great a topic as the thought of William James.

W. McD.

*Interpretations and Forecasts: A Study of Survivals and Tendencies in Contemporary Society.* By VICTOR BRANFORD, M.A. London: Duckworth & Co., 1914.

Under this somewhat formidable title, Mr. Branford has collected a number of addresses originally delivered to Women's Clubs, University Classes, Working Men's Societies, Home Reading Unions and divers other like and unlike associations. Naturally the papers are very different in value, though their author's position as a disciple of the Geddes-Le Play school of Sociology gives them some approach to unity of matter and treatment.

Mr. Branford has a pleasant style, admirably adapted to addresses of this kind, but occasionally marred by such 'modernisms' as (the use, for example,) of 'urge' as a noun substantive. But the titles of the addresses are apt to be somewhat misleading. "The Citizen as Psychologist," for instance, turns out to be a glorification of the mission of Woman,—doubtless sound in the main, but rather inclined to fanciful idealisations and generalisations,—and of the City's possibilities and actualities as a focus of social life.

The most striking characteristic of the whole work is, indeed, a very uncontrolled symbolic interpretation of all kinds of facts, tendencies, movements, modern and mediæval. The most interesting part of the book, to my mind, is a study of the possibilities of occupational education, in a chapter entitled "The Present as a Transition": while the chapter on "The Mediæval Citizen," and a few pages on the mediæval University are instructive as showing in a highly idealised picture, the destiny of city development in the minds of members of Mr. Branford's school. That the possibilities of civic life in future social organisation cannot easily be overrated, I agree: but I am inclined to think that Mr. Branford surmounts the difficulty.

J. W. W.

*Ontology, or The Theory of Being, An Introduction to General Metaphysics.* By P. COFFEY, Ph.D. London: Longmans, Green & Co., 1914. Pp. xii, 439.

Dr. Coffey's volume, which is intended to be a sequel to his work on Logic and to be further completed by a third treatise on the Theory of Knowledge, certainly, as he says in his Preface, fills a gap in English philosophical literature. It is not altogether to our credit that hitherto there has not been a single modern work in our language on Metaphysics as understood by the great schoolmen, with the natural consequence that English writers who have not been brought up to the Scholastic tradition have usually exhibited a ludicrous want of knowledge when they have felt themselves called upon to make pronouncements about the philosophical thought of the great mediæval doctors. Dr. Coffey's treatise should prove valuable to many readers outside the circle of students

in Roman Catholic institutions for whose use it is primarily destined. Without being too much taken up with matters of secondary importance, it is full enough to meet all the purposes for which a work on Scholastic Metaphysics is likely to be in demand by any but a very few specialists. Dr. Coffey brings to the exposition of his subject a lucid and forcible style, and is frequently happy in throwing Scholastic doctrine into clearer relief by apposite criticism of the rival theories of more recent times. I am however a little surprised that he should have fallen into the mistake of classing Nietzsche with Schopenhauer as a typical Pessimist.

A. E. T.

*Essays on the Life and Work of Newton.* By AUGUSTUS DE MORGAN. Edited with Notes and Appendices by P. E. Jourdain. Chicago and London: The Open Court Publishing Company, 1914. Pp. xiii, 198.

A welcome reprint of the more important of de Morgan's writings on Newton. To praise these essays either for the vigour and scholarship of their style or the noble spirit of impartiality which they display (a virtue all the more admirable since they appeared at a time when British mathematicians and men of science still appear to have thought it a positive duty of patriotism to admit no shadow of a fault or defect in Newton and no merit at all in any of the contemporaries with whom he had differences), is, of course, superfluous. The essays selected are the biography supplied by de Morgan to the "Cabinet Portrait Gallery of British Worthies," the "Short Account of Some Recent Discoveries Relative to the Controversy on the Invention of Fluxion," published in 1852 in the *Companion to the British Almanac of Useful Knowledge* for that year, and the article on Sir David Brewster's *Memoirs of Newton* contributed by de Morgan to the *North British Review* for August, 1855. Mr. Jourdain's name is a more than sufficient guarantee for the industry and accuracy of the editorial notes. His editorial appendix to the second essay which forms an elaborate bibliography of the papers written by both Newton and Leibniz while they were developing their respective calculuses is likely to be found of particular usefulness. The publishers deserve credit for the excellent portrait of Newton which forms the frontispiece.

A. E. T.

*A History of Japanese Mathematics.* By SMITH and MIKAMI. Open Court Publishing Company. Pp. v, 288.

The authors of this book give an account of Japanese mathematics from the earliest period till it merges into international mathematics through the opening up of Japan to Western science. The work is admirably illustrated, and we are given examples to enable us to understand the use of the *sangji* or computing rods, and the *soroban*, a kind of abacus. The use of algebra seems to have been introduced into Japan from China, the unknown quantity being called the 'celestial element'. But algebra received a fairly high development in Japan after it had once been introduced. The greatest of Japanese mathematicians seems to have been Seki Kôwa, who certainly discovered determinants and perhaps the calculus. The independence of the latter discovery is doubtful; it is uncertain whether the 'Circle Principle' is due to Seki or to Takebe, and it is moreover doubtful whether the first notion of the method may not be due to the Jesuit Jartoux, who corresponded with Leibniz. In any case the

Circle Principle was never completely generalised into a definite calculus, and therefore we can hardly allow to the Japanese the same credit as to Newton and Leibnitz.

C. D. B.

*Naturalism and Agnosticism.* The Gifford Lectures delivered before the University of Aberdeen in the years 1896-1898. By JAMES WARD. Fourth Edition. London: A. & C. Black, 1915. Pp. xvi, 623.

Prof. Ward takes advantage of this fourth edition of *Naturalism and Agnosticism* to make numerous small emendations and to add a number of explanatory notes. In order to get the whole more easily into one volume, the detailed table of contents has been omitted. In his preface Prof. Ward points out, that, as he has now, in *The Realm of Ends*, tried to meet the wish that he would discuss the relation of God as the Supreme Mind to finite minds, a better title for the present course would perhaps have been *The Realm of Nature or Naturalism and Spiritualism*.

*Les Philosophes Belges. Tome IX. Le Traité Eruditio Regum et Principum de Guibert de Tournai (étude et texte inédit).* By A. DE POORTER. Louvain: Institut Supérieur de Philosophie de l'Université, 1914. Pp. xv, 91.

*Les Philosophes Belges. Tome III. Les Quodlibet Cinq, Six et Sept de Godefroid de Fontaines (Texte inédit).* By M. DE WULF et J. HOFFMANS. Louvain: Institut Supérieur de Philosophie de l'Université, 1914. Pp. iv, 416.

*Quomodo sedet sola civitas.* The sight of these two handsome volumes, the most recent addition to the series of texts of mediæval Belgian thinkers issued by the University of Louvain, must intensify the horror and disgust felt by all lovers of the things of the mind at the infamous outrage recently perpetrated by the hordes of a modern Attila on a seat of learning and science not more venerable by its ancient traditions than honoured by the contributions it has made in our own time to the intellectual life of Europe. The writer of this notice begs, in the name of all subscribers and contributors to MIND, to express to the members of the great Belgian University the profoundest sympathy with them in the monstrous wrongs inflicted with equal perfidy and cruelty upon their illustrious native land and their honoured society, and the most earnest hopes that when, before long, the murderers and brigands whose work these horrors are, have reaped as they have sown, the University of Louvain may resume its activity and add fresh distinctions to the many it already enjoys.

Guibert of Tournai's letters to St. Louis on the duties of kings cannot, perhaps, be said to contribute much to political theory. The writer is more concerned to call attention to special abuses and to make practical suggestions for their immediate mitigation than to speculate on the nature and functions of government. It is historically interesting, however, to find that he raises and deals with the problem of the "two swords" in a way which altogether avoids any reference to the Empire and the Emperor. Writing in 1259 he addresses the French King in a way which assumes that monarch to be, in his own realm, the supreme wielder of the civil "sword". In effect, though he never has occasion to be explicit on the point, he tacitly takes it for granted that, according to a famous later formula *rex in regno suo est Imperator regni sui*, and makes no reference to the common mediæval theory of the necessity of a world-emperor. The implied doctrine that the King of France is wholly

independent of the Empire was, as we all know, hotly contended for by French publicists from the beginning of the fourteenth century; its tacit adoption by Guibert seems interesting as an indication that it was already held at the Court of St. Louis in the middle of the thirteenth.

MM. de Wulf and Hoffmans give us the second of these volumes which were planned to contain the *Quodlibeta* of Godefroid of Fontaines. Space and the character of MIND naturally prevent elaborate examination of such a collection of what we should now call "mixed essays" on questions alike of metaphysics, theology, psychology, ethics and casuistry. As an illustration of the singular "modernity" of many of the problems which vexed the mediæval schools it is interesting to find an elaborate discussion of the question whether a term can be its own *relatum*.

A. E. T.

*Geist und Freiheit, Allgemeine Kritik des Gesetzesbegriffes in Natur- und Geisteswissenschaft.* Von WALTHER KÖHLER, Doktor der Philosophie zu Berlin. Tübingen: Verlag von J. C. B. Mohr, 1914. Pp. viii, 174. Price, M. 4.80.

This work represents generally the author's solution of the question of natural law and freedom, and its general procedure is that of Kant and his more idealistic successors. Its special interest lies in the changed scientific situation. While Kant found his basic contrast between the sure and steady progress of natural science and the confusion of metaphysics, Dr. Köhler's conclusions emerge from a comparison of the cross-purposes and inconclusiveness characterising for him the hypotheses and investigations of the most recent science with the constancy of the conditions in thought of scientific results. He finds that the more narrowly we scrutinise the modern sciences the more clearly does it come out that they are entirely the free product of thought. (1) "Nature" is a thought-construction, whose main principle is the law of contradiction. As it has no material unity whatever, we should not look for unity of aim or result among the sciences. (2) Scientific laws turn out now to be no more than definitions, *e.g.*, the principle of the conservation of energy merely defines energy, and so with the law of attraction, etc. (3) In the mathematical *expression*, which is the sole condition of their exactitude, these laws are necessarily symbolical; mere description is impossible. This again points to the free play of mind. (4) The notion of Law itself disappears, within the scientific procedure itself, in the system of Theory.

From this position the transition to freedom is generally Hegelian in method—it is by way of History. The author denies the possibility of historical "laws," and consequently the existence of a science of sociology; our social knowledge being a "moment" in historical. In World-History we transcend the antithesis of thought and its subject-matter which is essential to natural science and its *Gesetze*. In History the understanding is also intuitive; the true historian would have to be himself a historical Person. Structural Totality is now the leading idea, from which we derive necessity, but further that of freedom. In this latter argument the author preserves the notion of causation, of which he takes an evolutionary and historical view. Causation is teleological and creative, but then there is no causation except within a spiritual totality, and the idea of it arises there when we attend to the distinction of universal and particular.

Though the scientific references are quite adequate and to the point, the argument as a whole is very abstract, and this tells at least on the

historical part. There is no discussion of alternative theories of History, beyond the mere suggestion that there might be historical laws if historical knowledge dealt not with the essence of historical events, but with an external construction of the type employed in natural science. Still it is usual to allow the idea of a pre-historic, and were the author to take account of this he might have to reverse his remarkable view of the priority of historical to sociological conceptions. Perhaps this is avoided by making the question that of *World-history*, but, if so, the insistence on the absence of knowledge of the scientific type would not seem to retain much meaning or importance. One feels that the whole argument gets much of its plausibility from a confusion, in the scientific discussion, of absolute phenomenalism of a Kantian type with the relative phenomenalism assigned to science by such a position as that of Hegel. This would seem to underlie the view of the absolute disappearance of Law in the scientific sense at the stage of "spirit". But no one can expect to be allowed the advantages of both positions at once.

W. ANDERSON.

*Spinozas Stellung zur Religion (Studien zur Geschichte des neueren Protestantismus. Heft 9).* By Dr. GEORG BOHRMANN. Giessen: Tölpelmann, 1914. Pp. 84.

A careful and detailed study of the problems suggested by Spinoza's apparent recognition, especially in the *Tractatus Theologico-Politicus* of two distinct types of religion, "revealed" and "philosophical". In the main Dr. Bohrmann's conclusions do not seem to me to differ in any important respect from those more briefly expressed in Sir Frederick Pollock's discussion in *Spinoza, His Life and Philosophy*. This is to say that I think him in the main right in holding that Spinoza's language about "revealed religion" is not intended to be a full expression of his own personal views and that there is a good deal of "accommodation" to the prejudice of the "multitude" in his apparent readiness to recognise the reality of the "inspiration" of prophets and the supernatural character of the "signs" requisite to establish a man's claim to the prophetic office. At the same time, I cannot help feeling that there is always just the possibility that we may go a little too far in insisting on forcing an absolutely coherent and systematic theory about these matters on Spinoza. To be consistent, no doubt, he ought to have meant a great deal of what he says to be taken with a degree of mental reservation which would hardly be honest in our own tolerant times and, to speak plainly, was not quite heroic even in the Netherlands of the seventeenth century. There are statements in the *Tractatus Theologico-Politicus* about which I have always felt that if they are merely "accommodations" they are not quite worthy of their author, and even on Dr. Bohrmann's attractive hypothesis that the work was meant as an official exposition of the views of the de Wits, I do not find this feeling entirely removed. May it not be that Spinoza, like many another, was not absolutely consistent with himself about these matters. After all, we can hardly doubt that he was proud of his race, their language and their sacred literature, and it would not surprise me if this laudable pride led him at moments when he felt warmly, to use language about prophets and prophecy which we can see to be unjustifiable on his metaphysical principles without being himself aware of his inconsistency. There is a valuable appendix to Dr. Bohrmann's essay in which he gives a fuller list of early British notices of Spinoza than any I have seen elsewhere.

A. E. T.

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- Alessandro Bonucci, *Il Fine dello Stato*, Roma, Athenaeum, 1915, pp. 456.

## VIII.—PHILOSOPHICAL PERIODICALS.

**PHILOSOPHICAL REVIEW.** Vol. xxiv., No. 2. **J. H. Tufts.** 'Ethics of States.' [The intrinsic character of the state and the nature of its organisation serve to maintain and reinforce the historical precedence of self-preservation and honour over justice, not to say benevolence; yet national appeals for moral approval mark a new stage in the development of a world-conscience.] **F. Znaniecki.** 'The Principle of Relativity and and Philosophical Absolutism.' [An absolute system based on relativity must (1) study the relations by which values are connected in systems (extension of logic) and (2) unify the totality of value-systems in a new and universal system (creative metaphysics).] **W. K. Wright.** 'The Evolution of Values from Instincts.' [Argues, following McDougall and Shand, that valuation rises by co-ordination of the ideas concerned with the conflicting instinctive impulses.] **E. G. Spaulding.** 'Proceedings of the Fourteenth Annual Meeting of the American Philosophical Association.' Reviews of Books. Notices of New Books. Summaries of Articles. Notes.—Vol. xxiv., No. 3. **A. Lalande.** 'Philosophy in France, 1913-1914.' [Reviews the work of Couturat; then takes up in order books on general philosophy (Fouillée, Weber, Maury), aesthetics (Kostyleff, Dauzat, Souriau, Paulhan, Lalo) and 'objective' psychology.] **L. E. Akeley.** 'Bergson and Science.' [The history of science is that of the growth of human power over the forces of nature, not the discovery of truth hidden in nature and waiting to be found; and science in the making comes from the realms of intuition. Hence scientific men may learn from an intuitional philosophy.] **N. K. Smith.** 'Kant's relation to Hume and to Leibnitz.' [Kant's rationalistic problem was to reconcile Leibnitz's view of the legislative function of pure reason with Hume's proof of the synthetic character of the causal principle. Kant knew the *Treatise* through Beattie.] **H. W. Wright.** 'Principles of Voluntarism.' [To solve the problem of knowledge we must transcend rationalism and empiricism, and treat thought as an expression of will. Will, the power in man which strives to initiate such sequences of movement as satisfy the greatest variety of interests, itself implies the dualism of movement and choice, necessity and freedom; this can therefore be removed only by activity of will. The task is moral or practical.] Reviews of Books. Notices of New Books. Summaries of Articles. Notes.

**PSYCHOLOGICAL REVIEW.** Vol. xxii., No. 1. **R. S. Woodworth.** 'A Revision of Imageless Thought.' [Reviews and meets criticisms; then proceeds, by way of a survey of work on memory, to formulate a theory of perceptual reaction. "Its basic idea is that a percept is an inner reaction to sensation," which adds new content of a non-sensory kind; every such reaction is specific, and contributes specific content. "In recall, it is these perceptual reactions that are revived, and not sensation."] **K. Dunlap.** 'A New Measure of Visual Discrimination.' [Test

of acuity by the double images of a bright rectangle.] **J. W. Todd.** 'An Electro-mechanical Chronoscope.' [From the Psychological Laboratory of the University of California.] **W. Brown.** 'xviii. Practice in Associating Colour-names with Colours.' [The relative slowness of colour-naming as compared with word-naming is due neither to practice nor to overlapping of the two functions.] **B. von der Nienburg.** 'xix. The Apparent Rate of Light Succession as Compared with Sound Succession.' [Light succession is not always apparently quicker than sound succession; the light series seems the more rapid if rate is high, if series are long, and if light precedes sound.] **A. H. Chamberlain.** 'xx. A Memory-test with School Children.' [Objects shown in groups of three are better recalled than single objects; the total average of recall for all grades and for all methods of presentation shows that girls are not superior to boys.] **W. Brown.** 'xxi. Practice in Associating Number-names with Number-symbols.' [Words are named more quickly than objects, somewhat less quickly than arabic numbers; the speed of word-naming depends neither on practice nor on suggestion from the letters.] **W. Brown.** 'xxii. Incidental Memory in a Group of Persons.' [Recall of advertisements; items which appeal to the largest number make the strongest appeal to most of that number; items which appeal to a few only, appeal weakly to them.] Vol. xxii., No. 2. **G. A. Coe.** 'A Proposed Classification of Mental Functions.' [Distinguishes biological and preferential functions; the former are increase in range (space, time, magnitude, quality) of objects responded to, and of co-ordinations to which co-ordinated response is made; the latter are consciousness, multiplication, control and unification of objects, communication, contemplation.] **K. Dunlap.** 'Colour Theory and Realism.' [Assume yellow, peacock, mauve, and neutral as fundamental; the theory will square with sensational realism.] **T. H. Haines.** 'Point Scale Ratings of Delinquent Boys and Girls.' [The Yerkes-Bridges scale agrees on the whole with the Binet-Simon; the cases of disparity are significant.] **C. E. Ferree and G. Rand.** 'A Preliminary Study of the Deficiencies of the Method of Flicker for the Photometry of Lights of Different Colour.' [Attacks the flicker-method on the ground of sureness of principle. The eye is very much under-exposed to its stimulus. That this fact is not negligible is shown by a characteristic underestimation of the luminosities of red and yellow, and overestimation of those of blue and green; by variation of these deviations with variation of the ratio of time of exposure to the coloured and colourless light; and by the divergence of flicker-results from those of the method of brightness-equality.] Discussion. **S. B. Russell.** 'The Functions of Incipient Motor Processes.' [Argues against Washburn that a motor discharge which is too faint to cause contraction may yet excite in the muscle sensory terminals which communicate with cortical centres, and may thus furnish 'strain-signals'.]

BRITISH JOURNAL OF PSYCHOLOGY. Vol. vi., Pt. 2. **C. S. Myers, G. Dawes Hicks, Henry J. Watt and William Brown** contribute a symposium on 'Are the Intensity Differences of Sensation Quantitative?' [Myers applies to the question the "all or none" principle of spinal reflexes. He concludes that the ultimate difference between the quality and the intensity of sensation depends on the nature of the underlying reaction. "Broadly speaking when the reaction changes its fundamental type it alters in quality and the sensation also changes in quality. So long as the reaction preserves its fundamental type, it can be said to vary only in quantity, and the sensation changes also in intensity." But intensities "are not quantitative in the sense that there is a moreness or lessness of excitation within the same anatomical area";

for we have "reason to believe that any given neural tissue, central or peripheral, follows the 'all or none' principle". Dawes Hicks gives criticisms of various psychological assumptions of Myers, of Bergson's explanation of the reason why we regard sense contents as quantitative, and of Meinong's interpretation of Weber's law. He maintains that differences of intensity may be regarded as magnitudes but not quantities. Watt claims that intensity cannot be treated as a "Multitude"; nor can an object "at one and the same time be directly immeasurable and indirectly measurable". Myers's contention that "the psychological correlate of intensity differences is a sub-group of extensive changes" may be true but does not help to elucidate the real nature of intensity. Brown agrees with Myers, and seeks to justify the actual methods of measurement of intensities adopted by such experimentalists as Ebbinghaus and Titchener.] **C. W. Valentine.** 'The Aesthetic appreciation of Musical Intervals among School Children and Adults.' [Order of pleasantness of intervals found to be very different from order of degree of consonance. Minor third and minor sixth less frequently described as sad than are the major third and major sixth. Elementary school children show no appreciable preference for consonants before discords before the age of nine: but girls in preparatory schools, trained in music, reach by eight or nine years of age a stage of development only reached by the elementary school children at twelve. Correlation appears between general intelligence and musical capacity as determined by several kinds of tests.] **Godfrey H. Thomson.** 'Note on the Probable Error of Urban's Formula for the Method of Just Perceptible Differences.' [Indicates the error in Urban's application of Bernoulli's theorem for calculation of probable error in the method named.] **W. Brown.** 'The Effects of Observational Errors and Other Factors upon Correlation Coefficients in Psychology.' [Gives a means of testing empirically the validity of Spearman's correction formula, and shows inapplicability of formula in certain cases given examples. Author concludes that "for the accurate determination of a correlation coefficient a large number of measurements should be made at fixed intervals throughout an extended period of observation, and then the later measurements showing a sufficient degree of constancy of mean and  $\sigma$  should be averaged and the coefficient calculated from them alone".] **H. J. Watt.** 'The Main Principles of Sensory Integration.' [Gives an explanation of this author's use of the terms "mode" and "integration," and an exposition of three principles of integration, viz.: "1. The mode which results from the integration of an attribute must bear an immediate introspective resemblance to it. 2. The results of the integration of the same generic attribute in the different senses must be introspectively and functionally similar. 3. Every typical mode of experience must to some extent at least arise spontaneously and automatically and independently of such processes as will, attention, inference, proof."

JOURNAL OF PHILOSOPHY, PSYCHOLOGY AND SCIENTIFIC METHODS. xii., 1. **W. H. Sheldon.** 'The Vice of Modern Philosophy.' [It contents itself with principles which cannot possibly be turned to practical account, or account for the specific character of any fact, and are therefore practically and intellectually barren. So philosophy has become "a narrow and unfruitful eccentricity".] **A. C. Armstrong.** 'The Principle of International Ethics.' [Discusses whether the morality of nations can be identified with that of individuals.] xii., 2. **G. A. Tawney.** 'What is Behaviour?' [It is not enough to describe it in terms of accommodation and habit; selection and valuation also must be treated as fundamental.] **E. L. Thorndike.** 'Ideo-Motor Action.'

[A reply to W. P. Montague; cf. xi., 23.] **W. S. Hunter.** 'A Reply to some Criticisms of the Delayed Reaction.' [About the behaviour of some raccoons observed by Hunter and commented on by J. B. Watson.] **A. T. Poffenberger.** 'Report on the Meeting of the New York Branch of the American Psychological Association.' xii., 3. **G. P. Adams.** 'The Mind's Knowledge of Reality.' [Thinks that the 'dilemma of knowledge' is solved if "we can now say both that knowledge of reality is immediate and unacquired, that the mind and real do confront each other, but the knowledge of what it means to be real is not derived from experience".] **G. Santayana.** 'Some Meanings of the Word *Is*.' [Distinguishes (1) *identity*, as in 'xi. is 11,' (2) *attribute* as in 'wine is red,' (3) *existence*, (4) *identity with a supposed 'substance' or 'cause'*. But a thing is never 'nothing but' these.] **J. E. Russell.** 'Professor Hocking's Argument from Experience' [of nature to the existence of God. Hocking having argued that the unsatisfactoriness of nature makes certain a divine mind to cure it, it is objected this confuses the fact of experience with an interpretation of it. And as other interpretations of the fact are possible the argument fails.] **H. L. Hollingworth.** 'Report on the Twenty-third Annual Meeting of the American Psychological Association.' xii., 4. **G. C. Myers.** 'Affective Factors in Recall.' [Experiments with school children to decide whether there is preferential memory for the agreeable and inhibition of the disagreeable. This probably holds for 80 per cent. of the subjects, with the reservations (1) that "we forget not so much the disagreeable ideas as useless ideas," and (2) that for social reasons we are more prone to *express* the agreeable.] **W. T. Bush.** 'Report on the Joint Meeting of the American and Western Philosophical Associations at Chicago in December, 1914.' xii., 5. **G. Santayana.** 'Philosophic Sanction of Ambition.' [Contributes to the philosophising about the war the paradoxical idea that the Nietzschean Will to Power has been all along lurking in the classical German rationalism.] **W. B. Pillsbury.** 'The Mental Antecedents of Speech.' [Considers (1) 'how thought gets translated into words as one prepares to speak,' and (2) how this bears on actual vocal expression, and concludes that "the unit is a preliminary idea that develops in the sentence" and this "idea or intention is itself determined by wider antecedent intentions and in its turn determines the later and subordinate meanings or intentions". Thus "the end of the sentence may control the beginning as well as the beginning the end" and "no part can be isolated".] **G. F. Williamson.** 'Individual Differences in Belief, Measured and Expressed by Degrees of Confidence.' [A questionnaire research which investigated (1) "What is the correlation between an individual's degrees of confidence and the differences discriminated by him?" (actually *her*), (2) Has it social significance? (3) "Can subjective confidence be defined and quantitatively measured in terms of objective differences discriminated?"] xii., 6. **G. H. Mead.** 'Natural Rights and the Theory of Political Institutions.' [A historical survey leading to the conclusion that their "ultimate guarantee must be found in the reaction of men and women to a human situation so fully presented that their whole natures respond".] **G. A. Coe.** 'On Having Friends; a Study of Social Values.' [Concludes that (1) "the experience of having a friend involves valuing an object as experiencing. (2) Such valuing includes, and is the source of, our certainty of other minds. (3) When psychology seems to translate our naïve social consciousness into experience without experiencers it at most substitutes for one set of experiencers another . . . namely psychologists, actual and ideal. (4) Functional psychology errs when it treats consciousness as merely an instrument of adjustment: we adjust ourselves *to* it, not merely *through* it." xii., 7. **G. H. Sabine.** 'The Social Origin of

Absolute Idealism.' [The reaction against *laissez faire* individualism used absolute idealism in the interests of liberalism; but F. H. Bradley showed that its tendency was really reactionary. Absolutism however in admonishing the individual to fulfil the duties of his station neglects "the evident fact that the individual in many cases must make rather than find his station". For "social evolution is an epigenesis".] **J. F. Dashiell.** 'Humanism and Science.' [Criticises two articles published in the *Philosophical Review* by Prof. Warner Fite, who had first attacked pragmatists for taking a 'mechanical' view of nature and then taken up the extreme humanist attitude that science should construe nature as personal. Dashiell points out that Fite's criticism is not substantiated and unfounded, and that the responsiveness of nature to human endeavours to know it hardly justifies us in construing it in terms of a "hylozoistic demonology".]

ARCHIVES DE PSYCHOLOGIE. Tome xiv., No. 4. **A. Descœudres.** 'Couleur, forme ou nombre? Recherches expérimentales sur le choix suivant l'âge, le sexe, et l'intelligence.' [Tests of the choice of colours, forms, and numbers. The gross results are: normal children of three to six, and abnormal of seven to sixteen, choose in the order familiar form, colour, geometrical form, number; normal children of seven to thirteen,—form, colour, number; adolescents and adults, —form, number, colour.] **V. Cornetz.** 'Fournis dans l'obscurité.' [Ants (*Tapinoma*) find their way home in pitch darkness, without olfactory or tactual cues. The author suggests some kind of internal orientation, possessed in full development only by certain individuals, and perhaps akin to the 'sense of direction' sometimes shown by man when external cues are lacking or confused.] **P. Bovet et S. Chryssochoos.** 'L'appréciation "objective" de la valeur par les échelles de Thorndike.' [Proposes, for psycho-educational purposes, to replace Thorndike's scales by others, whose zero is the performance to which no other is ranked inferior by the unanimous verdict of a large number of judges, and whose unit is the least difference of merit between two performances unanimously recognised by these judges.] **C. Huguenin.** 'Reviviscence paradoxale.' [Confirmation of Ballard's 'reminiscence'. Differences of attention, or of interruption by associated processes, may account for the phenomenon.] Bibliographie.

ARCHIV F. D. GESAMTE PSYCHOLOGIE. Bd. xxxiii., Heft 3 u. 4. **A. Kirschmann.** 'Zeit und Bewegung.' [Movement is psychologically prior to time. If spatial continuity is assured, we perceive direction of movement long before we are able to apprehend duration.] **J. Krug.** 'Neueres zu den Raumtheorien Kants und Stumpfs.' [Defends Stumpf's theory of 'partial contents' against Schmied-Kowarzik (*Archiv*, xviii.). The perceived continuity of space can be accounted for in terms of 'form of combination'.] **P. Linke.** 'Das paradoxe Bewegungsphänomen und die "neue" Wahrnehmungslehre.' [Claims priority over Wertheimer and others. Describes an illusion of movement produced by the succession of black and white rectangles.] **V. Benussi.** 'Monokularlokalisationsdifferenz und haploskopisch erweckte Scheinbewegungen.' [Witasek's difference of monocular localisation does not appear if eye-movement is ruled out.] **S. Witasek.** 'Bemerkung zu vorstehender Abhandlung von V. Benussi.' [Plea for suspense of judgment and further work.] **F. M. Urban.** 'Über Grössenschätzungen in objektiven Massen.' [Discussion of the problem of estimation; suggestion of experiments; formal rules for the mathematical treatment of material such as that collected by Bauch on the estimation of tenths of millimeters.] **A.**

**MacDonald.** 'Die geistige Betätigung der Völker und antisoziale Erscheinungen.' [Illiteracy is correlated with murder, stillbirths, infant mortality; negatively with suicide and divorce. Literacy is correlated with suicide.] **H. Schmidkunz.** 'Psychologisches und Pädagogisches zur Werttheorie.' [The five kinds of value, ethical, logical, æsthetic, hedonic, technical, are represented in psychological types, normal, excessive, defective, indifferent; so that there are twenty 'pure' types, aside from mixture; these are characterised in the paper. Pedagogy, within its technical limits, has to do with all five values; for its own purposes, truly, but yet without violence to the values themselves.] **Boden.** 'Über eine experimentelle Methode der Gesetzgebung.' [The 'social consciousness' of justice could be ascertained if a large number of persons were given, not ready-made concepts under which cases were to be subsumed, and not the complex cases of the law-courts, but simplifications of actual cases; with the question whether the deed were punishable or not, and, if punishable, by what penalty. Legislation might thus be experimentally based upon an inductive-deductive method.] Literaturbericht. **F. Ackenheil.** 'Entgegnung.' [Reply to Bloch.] Bd. xxxiv., Heft 1. **G. Anschuetz.** 'Theodor Lipps.' [Appreciation and selected bibliography.] **H. Lehmann.** 'Sinnliche und übersinnliche Welt: Wundt und Kant.' [Kant's critique of knowledge aims to determine the form by which a given material is to be shaped; Wundt's, to analyse historically the process of knowledge, the shaping of a vast material. Wundt's book affords, among other things, an epistemological basis for the psychology of religion.] **F. Boden.** 'Ethische Studien.' [Ethics must broaden into the science of human conduct at large, with the threefold problem of education, sanction, creation. The bridge between individual and social ethics must be built by way of the psychology of impulse.] **A. Huther.** 'Der Begriff des Ästhetischen psychologisch begründet.' [The work of art appeals so strongly to the feelings because we live over again in ourselves the artist's creation (empathy), and because we recognise the work of human will and intelligence, and the human significance of the result.] **R. Mueller-Freienfels.** 'Studien zur Lehre vom Gedächtnis.' [The author, as against the associationists (1) distinguishes three modes of memory: orientating (a matter of feeling and attitude), reproductive, proving, in the memory-constellation, in increased excitability of contents, and in their disposition for determinate ends.] **T. Kehr.** 'Allgemeines zur Theorie der Perzeption der Bewegung.' [In cases of the movement of an object in space, our objective experience is simply that of a spatial waxing or waning; and our apprehension of this is made possible by the extensity of perception on the subjective side.] **F. M. Urban.** 'Die empirische Darstellung der psychometrischen Funktionen.' [Discusses the problem of simple expressions which shall exhibit the course of the psychometric functions with the highest attainable accuracy.]

ZEITSCHRIFT F. PSYCHOLOGIE. Bd. lxx., Heft 5 und 6. **S. Baley.** 'Versuche über den dichotischen Zusammenklang wenig verschiedener Töne.' [Stumpf's dichotic limen may be determined; at about 500 vs. it amounts to some 9 to 15 vs. The paper contains observations on localisation, clang-tint, etc.] **S. Baley.** 'Versuche über die Lokalisation beim dichotischen Hören.' **C. Stumpf.** 'Anhang: Bemerkungen und Selbstbeobachtungen.' [It is possible to localise correctly, without movement of the head, a fairly large number of simultaneous tones sounded to right and left in dichotic hearing. The paper contains many observations of detail.] **H. Henning.** 'Das Panumsche Phänomen.' [Critique of Jaensch and new experiments. All of Jaensch's objections

to Hering are invalid; and his theory is inadequate. His work with least separations confirms Hering; and Hering's empirical factor may be identified as the fusion of the single line with both of the paired lines. Jaensch has failed to distinguish between 'insistence' (which is irrelevant to the phenomenon) and stereoscopic effect.] **E. von Aster.** 'Theodor Lipps.' [Appreciation.] *Literaturbericht.*

**RIVISTA DI FILOSOFIA.** Anno vi., 1914. Fasc. iii. May-June. **B. Varisco.** 'L'imità dello spirito, e la morale.' [Men are distinguished from children by the more perfect unity of their self-consciousness. But this unification is not merely individual; it necessarily embraces the relations of human beings with one another. There are purely individual experiences, but there is the recognition of a common element without which there could be no reason and also no morality. Is there also a fundamental unity between man and the universe? According to Prof. Varisco there is such a unity, making reason and also morality possible. But here he seems to assume as axiomatic what most stands in need of proof.] **Achille Marucci.** 'Di alcune moderne teorie del Concetto.' [Criticises various modern theories of the concept from Romanes to Benedetto Croce. The writer prefers the experiential and evolutionary to the *a priori* and transcendental interpretation, Croce being handled with particular severity.] **A. Aliotta.** 'Dalla teoria dei modelli al panlogismo.' [Prof. Aliotta begins by observing that philosophy at the close of the nineteenth century was distinguished by a revival of irrationalism under all its manifestations—an orgy of fideism, pragmatism, and intuitionism. But we are now returning to the reign of reason, and in that allegiance he is happy to find himself associated with Annibale Pastore. The two, however, are separated by some important differences, here discussed at length. Both agree in accepting the rationality of nature; and both uphold Hegel. But surely the definition of nature's reasonableness, accepted by both Italians, which consists in the principle that when certain material conditions are repeated they are followed by identical results (p. 313) is not Hegel's logic—nor anything like it. More might be said for the vaguer principle, here reproduced, that nature remains ever consistent with herself; only it would be a very poor description of Hegel's theory that the universe is constituted by the evolution of opposites from one another and their reconciliation in a higher unity.] *Recensioni, etc.* Fasc. iv., 1914. July-August. **R. Ardigo.** 'La meteora mentale.' [Discussing the celebrated statue of Condillac with its sum of sensations ingenuously offered as constituting by their simple enumeration a sufficient account of mind and its nature, the venerable Italian Positivist condemns this view as a mere survival of the old metaphysical psychology with its spiritual faculties strung together on an abstract ego, substituting for it, as would seem, the mechanism of a cerebral organism.] **R. Ardigo.** 'Filosofia e positivismo.' [Knowledge is related to its object as a photograph to the things it represents; the two are analogous but not identical.] **B. Varisco.** 'L'arte nell'educazione del sentimento nazionale.' [True culture to be complete, demands the development not merely of intellectual acquisitions but also of sensuous impressions. The necessary combination is furnished by art. And the art studied should be national. In this respect Italy has been looking too much to foreign influences, but for some time things have been improving. Yet more ought to be done by the Government; and if it cannot increase the existing amount of beauty at least it might not make things worse by destroying beautiful objects; and educational buildings in particular might well be made more ornamental.] **G. Maggiore.** 'Intorno all'Etica bruniana.' [Giordano Bruno properly conceived morality as a

realisation of the ideal, representing justice as the mainspring of human progress; like Socrates setting the seal of heroic martyrdom on his teaching.] **A. Mieli.** 'Per una classificazione delle arti.' [The arts admit of a twofold division as they fall in space or in time. Under space come architecture, sculpture, and painting; under time music, drama, and literature. But there is another tripartite division; architecture and music being classed together as constructive, sculpture and drama as reproductive, painting and literature as imaginative arts.] **G. Rizzo.** 'Il problema fondamentale della filosofia moderna e la originalità di Rosmini.' [Truth is neither exclusively objective nor exclusively subjective, but involves an active relation—a great discovery reserved for Rosmini.] **Julia Dicksteinowne.** 'Un filosofo polacco.' [Gives a brief but touching account of Adam Mahrburg, the Polish positivist who in the face of unemployment, persecution and lastly disease, constructed a philosophy based on Auguste Comte's but in some ways departing from it.] **A. Gnesotto.** 'Ancora del giudizio particolare.' Recensioni, etc. Fasc. v., 1914. September-December. [A good deal of this number is devoted to commemorating the centenary of J. G. Fichte's death which occurred in January, 1814, after the victorious passage of the Rhine by the German army. If character counted for marks in modern philosophy no name would stand higher than that of Fichte. But his intellectual position is also most eminent. Indeed it is the pivot on which all German speculation turns. Kant had a more enduring influence; but Fichte is the intermediary connecting Kant on the one hand with Schelling, Hegel, and Schopenhauer on the other. Moreover he created the method of Thesis, Antithesis and Synthesis now associated exclusively with Hegel's name. Of more doubtful validity but good as an evidence of power is Fichte's claim, generally accepted in his own country, of Germany's leadership in universal thought. His demand for absolute freedom of religious opinion, denied even to Kant, although at first unsuccessful at Jena has ended by scoring a victory all over Western Europe. Finally, for writing-power he has been pronounced by no less a critic than J. S. Mill to be the most eloquent of the transcendentalists. The Christmas Number of the Italian Review opens with a glowing tribute to the memory of this great man, referring to the high panegyrics pronounced on him by Windelband and Eucken. It is followed by bibliographical notices of Fichte's writings and correspondence by **A. Rava**; on his work as an educationalist by **E. Moreselli**; and on his first dialectic method by **M. Losacco**.] Of more modern interest are: **A. Gemelli.** 'L'intuizione ed il concetto nella Neo-scolastica italiana.' [The Italian Neo-Scholastics are agreed in holding (against W. James and Bergson) that philosophy is essentially a conceptual elaboration; but they are not agreed as to what concepts are admissible in modern philosophy, nor as to what is really valid in the objections of modern intuitionism.] **G. Mazzalorso.** 'Variazioni su vecchi motive.' [Discusses in a rather sceptical spirit and with copious references to other writers—among whom Italians hold a prominent place—whether an objective truth and right can be known by man.] Bibliografia, recensioni, etc.

'SCIENTIA' (RIVISTA DI SCIENZA). Vol. xv. No. 4. July, 1914. **B. Russell.** 'The Relation of Sense-data to Physics.' [Physics exhibits sense-data as functions of physical objects, but verification is only possible if physical objects can be exhibited as functions of sense-data. Further, in so far as physics leads to expectations, this *must* be possible, since we can only expect what can be experienced. We have therefore to solve the equations giving sense-data in terms of physical objects, so as to make them instead give physical objects in terms of sense-data. This problem leads to much interesting logico-mathematical work. In

this paper a rough preliminary sketch is given. The tendency seems to be characterised by such a remark as: 'Since the "thing" cannot, without indefensible partiality, be identified with any single one of its appearances, it came to be thought of as something distinct from all of them and underlying them. But by the principle of Occam's razor, if the class of appearances will fulfil the purposes for the sake of which the thing was invented by the prehistoric metaphysicians to whom common sense is due, economy demands that we should identify the thing with the class of its appearances. It is not necessary to *deny* a substance or substratum underlying these appearances; it is merely expedient to abstain from asserting this unnecessary entity. Our procedure here is precisely analogous to that which has swept away from the philosophy of mathematics the useless menagerie of metaphysical monsters with which it used to be infested.' Again: 'The supreme maxim in scientific philosophising is this: *Wherever possible, logical constructions are to be substituted for inferred entities*.']

**H. A. Lorentz.** 'La gravitation.' [Examination of theories of gravitation whose aim, as distinguished from mechanical theories of gravitation, is to bring gravitation into connexion with other phenomena and to imagine the nature of the bonds which unite it to these phenomena. Three such theories are here spoken of: (1) Lorentz's own (1900) 'electromagnetic theory of gravitation'; (2) The relativist theory of Poincaré and Minkowski (1906 and 1908); (3) The theory of Einstein (1907, 1911, 1914).]

**L. Cuénot.** 'Théorie de la préadaptation.' [Considering the insufficiency of the classical explanations of adaptation by selection, it is natural to think of adaptation before entry into the environment; and the notion of preadaptation falls into line with that of mutations and with the Mendelian theory.]

**A. Adler.** 'Die Individualpsychologie, ihre Voraussetzungen und Ergebnisse.'

**R. Pettazoni.** 'Storia del cristianesimo e storia delle religioni.' [From its beginnings to its full development, the history of Christianity is closely connected with the universal religious history of humanity.]

Critical Note: **M. Abraham.** 'Sur la problème de la relativité.' [On Einstein's article in the May number of *Scientia*.]

General Reviews. **F. Savorgnan.** 'Les antagonismes sociaux.' Review of Reviews. Chronicle. French translations of the German, English, and Italian articles. A very interesting number. Vol. xv., No. 5. September, 1914.

**T. C. Chamberlin.** 'The Planetesimal Hypothesis.' [Presents evidence "that the planets sprang from the sun, not at his birth, but later in the course of his history. The satellites might easily seem to be the offspring of the planets, and this was the common view in the last century, but there are signs that planets and satellites had a common birth and that the satellites escaped being little planets only because their birth-places fell within the spheres of control of their larger sisters to whom they were forced to dance attendance as a first duty, and respond to the common call of the sun incidentally."]

**D. Einhorn.** 'Archigonie und Deszendenztheorie.'

**C. Golgi.** 'La moderna evoluzione delle dottrine e delle conoscenze sulla vita. Parte I<sup>a</sup>: I problemi fondamentali bio-fisiologici.'

**O. Jespersen.** 'Energetik der Sprache.' [The text of this is Humboldt's remark that language is not an *Ergon*, a completed work, but an *Energie*.]

**Ch. Guignebert.** 'Le dogme de la Trinité. III<sup>ème</sup> Partie: La crise arienne, S. Augustin et le symbole d'Athanase. IV<sup>ème</sup> Partie: Immobilité, décadence et ruine.' Critical note.

**R. Maunier.** 'Les lois de l'évolution de l'art.' [On a recent book by W. Deonna.]

Book Reviews. General Reviews. **S. Magrini.** 'Électrons et magnétons.'

**W. Oualid.** 'Revue annuelle d'économie. I. Questions générales. II. La valeur et les prix. III. La répartition. Review of Reviews. Chronicle. Supplement containing French translations of the English, German and French articles.

## IX.—NOTES.

### MIND AND ITS OBJECTS.

IN MIND No. 93 Mr. J. E. Turner makes some comments on my paper on the Basis of Realism to which I will reply briefly, thanking him for them. My reply will be brief for the alleged inconsistencies appear to me to rest on verbal misunderstandings; and otherwise Mr. Turner raises questions which could only be answered now at great length and fall outside the limits of my paper. I refer to the comments by their numbers.

(1) and (2). In speaking of the compresence of mind and its object I add the caution that compresence does not imply simultaneity but only belonging to one world. As I was speaking of mind, I said "one experienced world". Mr. Turner supposes that the point lies in the word "experienced". It might have been omitted, perhaps with advantage, but he himself sees that any two compresent things experience one another in my view, in a wide sense of experience. Thus his difficulty that compresence has not the same sense as between mind and its objects and as between two physical objects disappears. I suppose from (2) that he finds it impossible to speak of the compresence of mind with a past object (as *e.g.* when I see the sun eight minutes late). That comes from denying the reality of time, so that the past as past ceases to be real. (See also on (4) below.) But for me time is real, quite extraordinarily real; and the past as past is just as real as the present, only it is not present.

(3) Mr. Turner thinks that I commit the confusion of denying consciousness to be a relation and at the same time holding knowing to be a relation. He is mistaken. Consciousness (including knowing) is an act and stands in relation with its object. I call the relation the cognitive relation, which corresponds to the word "of" in the phrase "consciousness of the object" (p. 14). On page 24, which he quotes imperfectly, I say "object and subject enter into a relation, that of being known on one hand and that of knowing on the other". The relation of knowing is the cognitive relation; knowing itself is an act. Only we do not say knowing *of*, though we do say knowledge *of*.

On the basis of this misconception that knowing and with it perceiving, conceiving, etc., are relations while consciousness itself is not, I am supposed (6) to hold that consciousness is different from them. Of course these are all specific conscious acts, which, equally of course, are in relation with their objects.

(4) The proposition that "the mind knows things" is declared inconsistent with the proposition that "the mind is the whole tissue of mental processes, considered as a whole". Apparently "knows" (underlined) is taken with some different interpretation from mine, but if so I am not chargeable with inconsistency. But I think Mr. Turner means that a tissue of processes in time cannot have the identity necessary for knowledge, because a temporal series is transient. In fact time is taken to be unreal. I quite admit the problem involved. But Mr. Turner forgets that I spoke of mind as a tissue of *processes*. That was enough for

my purpose. But I did not analyse process or a tissue of them. Such an analysis would I believe remove the difficulty. But it would mean an investigation of motion. Meantime I plead that the work can only be done empirically. We must not start with preconceptions about time. It may turn out that though the empirical facts may be hard to understand, it is the preconceptions that may be wrong. Nobody doubts that Caesar really *was* assassinated.

(5) Consciousness was said by me to be a new quality which emerges in nervous process when it is of a certain grade. The act of consciousness is the process as having this quality. I referred and can only again refer to the later chapters of Mr. Lloyd Morgan's *Instinct and Experience*. Mr. Turner thinks my whole doctrine of the spatiality of mind commits us to materialism. But though mind should be expressible without residue in terms of motion, it is not therefore mere motion. On the contrary there is a higher quality than mere motion, namely mind. Here too there is a far deeper problem. Can there be anything which does not contain something corresponding to mind? As to materialism, if it were materialism what is there so dreadful in that? I think myself it is as far as possible removed from materialism as that word is understood. But if it is materialism, then you would have to count Spinoza amongst others a materialist. And for my part if I am sent to a part of the Inferno where I shall be in sight of Spinoza I shall think I am being let off very easily.

S. ALEXANDER.

#### MIND ASSOCIATION.

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Prof. R. D. Ranade, Fergusson College, Poona, India, have joined the Association.

Robert Gibson, M.A., Fellow and Tutor of Balliol College, Oxford, and Captain in the 2nd Battalion of the King's Own Scottish Borderers, is the first member of the Association to lose his life in the present war.